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ABSTRACT
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
May 27, 1984
Jesse L. Yoder, B.A., University of Maryland
M.A.
,
University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews
The principal critical objective of this dissertation is to
examine three contemporary theories about the mind-body problem:
dualism, anomalous monism, and functionalism. The dualism examined
is closely linked to Cartesian dualism, while functionalism is a
form of materialism. Anomalous monism is a kind of dual aspect
view. All these theories have a long tradition with different
formulations and exponents. I examine three contemporary exponents
of these views: Saul Kripke, a dualist, Donald Davidson, an
anomalous monist, and Daniel Dennett, a functionalist.
I argue that each of these theories is incorrect or has serious
difficulties. The chief difficulty for dualism is in giving an
account of mind-body interaction. The chief difficulty for
anomalous monism is that internal tensions within the theory
relating to Davidson's conception of physical events and scientific
laws have the consequence that anomalous monism applies to the
viii
entities of physics and chemistry but not to events in the brain.
The most serious difficulty for functionalism is in accounting for
the qualities of subjective experience.
I then discuss two criteria for identifying mental phenomena:
incorrigibility and intentionality . I consider the problem of
mind-body interaction as a problem for dualism. I argue that the
mind-body problem is misconceived in that it is supposed that a
univocal definition of 'physical' can be given. I state three
different definitions of this term: one containing a scientific
conception, one an objective conception, and one a personal
conception.
In my final chapter, I formulate a plural aspect view that
accounts for mind-body interaction. On this view, mind is an aspect
of body and body is an aspect of mind. This plural aspect view can
be derived from a more general theory I call Viewpoint Pluralism.
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INTRODUCT ION
What is the relation between mind and body? This is one
formulation of a problem which has perplexed both philosophers and
non-philosophers for many centuries. This problem has come to be
known as the mind-body problem", and is not lacking in attempted
solutions. Fortunately, each solution is not completely unique;
solutions fall into categories and types so that a survey
of the main solutions is not an impossible task. While such a
survey could not hope to examine every variation on a type of
solution, many comments on a theory which offers a type of solution
also apply to other theories offering a solution of the same or
similar type.
The principal objective of this dissertation is to critically
examine three contemporary theories about the mind-body problem:
dualism, anomalous monism, and functionalism. The dualism examined
is closely linked to Cartesian dualism, while functionalism is a
form of materialism. Anomalous monism, on the other hand, is a kind
of dual aspect view. All these theories have a long tradition with
different formulations and exponents. I have chosen contemporary
exponents of these views to focus on since my purpose is primarily
critical and not primarily historical. However, in this first
chapter I give a historical overview of the mind-body problem. I
will now outline the chapters in the order in which they occur.
1
2The critical examination of three contemporary theories about
the mind-body problem takes place in Chapters II, III, and IV. In
Chapter II, I consider dualism as represented in the writings of
Saul Kripke. In Chapter III, I discuss the anomalous monism of
Donald Davidson. In Chapter IV, I consider the functionalism of
Daniel Dennett. These three theories are contemporary formulations
of three traditional solutions to the mind-body problem: dualism,
dual aspect views, and materialism. I argue that each of these
three theories is incorrect or has serious difficulties. In Chapter
V, I discuss two criteria for identifying mental phenomena:
incorrigibility and intentionality . In Chapter VI, I present the
problem of mind-body interaction as a problem for dualism. I also
distinguish three conceptions of what is physical. In Chapter VII,
I present an account of mind-body interaction, utilizing the
distinctions developed in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER I
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the mind-body
problem as a philosophical problem and then to provide a historical
overview of the problem. I introduce the mind-body problem as a
philosophical problem in the next section. The historical overview
follows, and is divided into five main sections: Dualism,
Materialism, Plural Attribute Monism, Idealism, and Pluralism. The
purpose of placing the "Dualism" section first is to allow me to
begin with a consideration of early Greek conceptions of mind and
body, which are dualistic, and also to allow me to discuss Plato
before Aristotle. I begin the "Dualism" section with a
consideration of early Greek conceptions of soul, mind, and body,
particularly as they occur in the works of Homer. I then consider
the views of Plato and Descartes. In the "Materialism" section I
mainly discuss materialism as represented by Aristotle and Hobbes.
In the "Plural Aspect Monism" section I discuss Spinoza's dual
aspect view as an ancestor to anomalous monism. Because I do not
consider idealism in later chapters, it receives only brief
attention here. In the "Pluralism" section I describe the views of
3
4Leibniz, mainly in relation to his notion of a point of view. I
conclude with a brief summary of the chapter.
1.2 The Mind-Body Problem as a Philosophical Problem
Sometimes when I tell my non-philosophical friends that I am
writing about the mind-body problem, they say "Oh, I didn't know
there was a problem!". What, then, is the problem about the
relation between mind and body? The fact that many people who have
not reflected on this issue think it odd that someone should think
there is a problem about the mind-body problem reflects how
unproblematical this relation is in daily life. We have no problem
in acting on our decisions, in intentionally raising our arms, in
feeling pain due to bodily injury, and in seeing an oncoming
automobile. These examples of mind-body interaction are so natural
that it seems pointless from a practical viewpoint to raise a
problem about them. These actions would be problematical only to
someone with paralysis or a mental disorder. If there is a
mind-body problem, then, it is a theoretical or philosophical one,
not a practical one.
The philosophical problem here is not the practical question
"How can I raise my arm?" but the philosophical question "What
coherent account or explanation can be given of mind, of body, and
of their relation?" Some solutions to this problem have held that
mind and body are of the same type. These solutions are monistic.
5^nd both inatsirialisiti and idaalisni ars fonns of monism; th© view that
there is only one type of entity or phenomenon in the universe.
Other solutions are dualistic; there are two types of entity or
phenomenon in the universe and these two types are mind and body or
mental and physical phenomena. There are also pluralistic
solutions; minds and bodies are two of a wide variety of types of
entities and phenomena in the universe.
It should be apparent that the problem is already becoming more
complex than it appeared at first. To answer the philosophical
question "What coherent account or explanation can be given of mind,
of body, and of their relation?", at least the following questions
need to be answered;
1. What is mind?
2. What is body?
3. What is the relation between mind and body?
Even questions 1 and 2 can be interpreted conceptually or
ontologically
,
as can question 3;
1(c)
.
What does the term 'mind' mean, from a conceptual
viewpoint?
l(o) What type of entity is mind, from an ontological
viewpoint?
2(c). What does the term 'body' mean or refer to, from a
conceptual viewpoint?
2(o)
.
What type of entity is body, from an ontological
viewpoint?
3(c) .
6
What conceptual relations obtain between mind and
body?
3(o). What ontological relations obtain between mind and
body?
Question 3 could also be taken to mean either of these two questions:
3(a). Are mind and body related by identity or
distinctness?
3(b)
.
Are mind and body related by interaction, and if
so how?
This list of questions shows that the mind-body problem is not
just one problem but rather a set of related problems. Probably the
way the mind-body problem is most commonly formulated as a
philosophical problem is;
I. What is the relation between mind and body?
Answers to this question do implicitly or explicitly contain a
theory about mind and body. For example, materialism asserts that
mind is identical to, can be reduced to, or is a function of body,
while dualism asserts that they are of different (usually
dichotomous) types and they are distinct. In this and later
chapters I shall take question I as being the formulation of the
mind—body problem with which I shall be concerned; if there are
other ways of formulating this problem, then what I say may or may
not apply to these other formulations, depending on what they are.
The only ways to show that the mind-body problem is a
philosophical problem other than what I have just said is to argue
that it is traditionally discussed by philosophers in philosophical
contexts^ or to appeal to a general conception of what a
7philosophical problem" is. The rest of this chapter shows that
this problem is traditionally discussed by philosophers. I have
already done the second implicitly by saying that the mind-body
problem should be interpreted as a question about what coherent
account or explanation can be given of mind and body. Rather than
defend the conception of "philosophical problem" which is implicit
in these remarks, I will simply say that it is a traditional
conception of a "philosophical problem" that it involves giving a
coherent account or explanation of some type of entity or
phenomenon, or a coherent account or explanation of the terms
referring to some type of entity or phenomenon. One of the
challenges in solving the mind-body problem is to construct a single
coherent account or explanation that will account for both minds and
bodies, or both mental and physical phenomena, as well as for their
relations. Thus, materialism is not usually faulted for its account
of body (although I do so in later chapters) but for its account of
mind. Another way of putting this is to say that a solution will
involve constructing a single coherent viewpoint in terms of which
mind, body, and their relations can be accounted for.
I now begin the historical survey of views on the mind-body
problem. This survey is divided into five sections; Dualism,
Materialism, Plural Aspect Monism, Idealism, and Pluralism. While
such a survey cannot be exhaustive, its main point is to show that
there is a link between those contemporary theories discussed in
later chapters and traditional mind-body theories. This link is
8that those contemporary theories discussed in later chapters are
contemporary formulations of traditional dualism, materialism, dual
aspect views, or pluralism. Hence, many criticisms of and arguments
for these contemporary formulations also apply to traditional
formulations of these theories. Therefore the critical discussion
of contemporary theories in Chapters II, III, and IV should be
conceived as a critical discussion of the traditional theories which
these contemporary theories formulate and not merely as a discussion
of single isolated theories.
1.3 Dualism
Dualism is the view that there are two irreducibly distinct
types of entities or phenomena in the universe. Dualism can be
formulated as an ontological claim or as a conceptual claim.
Ontologically
,
dualism is a claim which can apply at least to
entities or substances, properties, events, states, conditions,
objects, and subjects; and this list is not complete. Sometimes a
distinction is made between substantial dualism, or dualism of
substance, and dualism of properties. On the former view, there are
2
two irreducibly distinct kinds or types of substance in the world
or universe: minds and bodies. On the latter view, there are two
irreducibly distinct kinds of properties in the the world or
universe: mental properties and physical properties.
91.3.1 Types of Dualism
Mind-body discussion also often involves discussion of what
types of events or states there are: mental and/or physical. An
event or state is not a property, but neither events nor states seem
to fit the criteria for being a substance either. Substances such
as chairs and persons have continuity over time while most events
occur at a particular time and then cease to exist. Even the term
'entity', which might seem applicable to almost any thing, does not
seem clearly applicable to an event such as the blinking of an eye
or to a state such as the state of confusion in which someone might
find the kitchen after a Chinese meal has been cooked. Besides
dualism of substance and dualism of properties, then, there is also
dualism of events and dualism of states. Similar reasoning could
also show the existence of dualism of conditions, dualism of
objects, and dualism of subjects.
What distinctions are significant here? Certainly one of the
most important distinctions is between the term 'mind' used as a
noun and the term 'mental' used as an adjective. Used as a noun,
'mind' contrasts with 'body' and refers to a type of substance or
entity. Used as an adjective, 'mental' can refer to a type of
property, event, state, condition, subject, or object, to name some
but not all of the types of phenomena which can be either mental or
physical. I might say "My mind is playing tricks on me" or "A
feeling is a mental event". Rather than trying to specify all the
10
types of phenomena which can be either mental or physical
each time this issue arises, I use the term 'phenomena' as a general
term to cover at least properties, events, states, conditions,
abilities, capacities, and phenomena other than entities that can be
either mental or physical. This is not because I think there is no
important difference between, for example, dualism of properties and
dualism of events. Furthermore, there are times such as in the
discussion of Davidson in Chapter III when the discussion will
center on one particular type of phenomenon; in Davidson's case it
centers on events. Only when the differences in types of phenomena
are unimportant in a particular context or I wish to make a general
statement do I use the term 'phenomenon'
.
One distinction I maintain throughout future discussion is the
distinction between questions about the relation between mind and
body and questions about the relation between mental phenomena and
physical phenomena. Much contemporary discussion of the mind-body
problem centers on the relation between mental and physical events
or states rather than the relation between mind and body. The
implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption of those conducting
this discussion seems to be that if one could state the relation
between mental and physical events, states, or other phenomena, then
it would be a simple matter to state the mind-body distinction. A
person's mind could be defined as a collection of mental events or
states, or some other such definition could be given. While this
may be true, it is not obviously true, and it is a mistake to make
11
such an assumption without examining its merits. Furthermore, the
notion of a person is central to the mind-body problem and it is
more important to say what a person's body and mind are and what
their relation is to the person than to say what the relation is
between a person and his brain states and mental states. And even
if it is not more important, the issues are distinct and should be
distinguished. Hence I maintain the distinction between mind-body
questions as opposed to mental-physical phenomena questions
throughout future discussion.
In general, I use the term 'entity' rather than the terns
'subject', 'object', or 'substance' to denote an individual thing.
A subject is an individual thing which is the subject of perception
or of properties, while an object is an individual thing that exists
independent of the mind or that is the object of perception.
Something can be both a subject and an object: a subject of
perception can also be an object of perception, while a physical
object can also be described as a subject of properties. The term
'substance' has philosophical difficulties of its own. The term
'entity'
,
on the other hand, simply refers to an individual thing
and does not refer to a particular type of individual thing. In
general, then, I use the term 'entity' to refer to persons, h\iman
beings, animals, minds, bodies, physical objects such as rocks and
tables, and also mental objects such as beliefs and feelings. The
mind-body issue, then, is one of the relation between minds and
bodies, and of the relation between mental and physical phenomena.
12
Let us return to the distinction between ontological and
conceptual dualism. Ontologically
,
dualism can be stated as follows:
D(o). There are two irreducibly distinct types of
entities in the universe: minds and bodies.
D(o)'. There are two irreducibly distinct types of
phenomena in the universe: mental and physical
phenomena
.
Conceptually, dualism can be stated as follows:
D(c). The terms 'mind' and 'body'- represent irreducibly
distinct categories.
D(c)'. The terms 'mental' and 'physical' as applied to
phenomena represent irreducibly distinct
categories.
These distinctions become especially important later when I discuss
philosophers such as Spinoza who combine conceptual dualism with
ontological monism.
1.3.2 Early Greek Conceptions
The history of the concepts of mind, body, and soul which we
have today goes back to the earliest recorded part of Western
civilization. Homeric man had a very different view of himself and
3
his neighbor than we do today. According to Bruno Snell, "the
early Greeks did not, either in their language or in the visual
arts, grasp the body as a unit". The Homeric man knew the human
body not as a unity but as a sum total of the limbs. Likewise,
there are at least three words that characterize the mind or soul.
For Homer psyche is the force which keeps the human being alive.
Thymos is the generator of motion or agitation in Homer, while noos
13
cause of ideas and images, Thymos, noos, and psyche are
conceived as separate organs, each with its own individual
function. Just as the limhs of the body are not conceived as part
of a whole called "body", so thymos
,
noos, and psyche are not
conceived as elements of a whole called "soul" or "mind".
Among the three terms ' thymos '
,
' noos '
,
and ' psyche '
,
'thymos'
and ' noos ' are most closely associated with our concept of "mind",
while ' psyche ' is most closely associated with our concept of
"soul". Snell describes the thymos as the organ of (e)motion and
4
noos as the organ of perception. We also might describe this as
the distinction between feeling and thought, certainly a fundamental
distinction today within the mind. The word 'psyche' is akin to the
Greek word meaning "to breathe" and denotes the breath of life which
departs through the mouth. Homer says that the psyche leaves man at
the moment of death and goes down to Hades; hence, this is one of
the original sources for the conception of the soul as an immaterial
entity that survives death.
Snell's account of how the terms 'soma' (body) and 'psyche'
(soul) evolved from these very limited applications to terms more
closely resembling our terms 'body' and 'soul' is very
5interesting:
That Homer's conception of thymos , noos and psyche still
depended to a large extent on an analogy with the physical
organs becomes a matter of absolute certainty if we turn
to that era of transition when his conception began to be
abandoned. To be sure, the evidence for the use of the
words soma and psyche during the period extending from
Homer to the fifth century is not full enough to allow us
to trace the origin of the new terms 'body' and 'soul' in
14
every detail. Apparently they were evolved as
complementary terms, and more likely than not it was
psyche which first started on its own course, perhaps
under the influence of notions concerning the immortality
of the soul. The word denoting the eschatological soul
was put to a new use, to designate the soul as a whole,
and the word for corpse came to be employed for the living
body; the reason for this must be that the element which
provided man during his living days with emotions,
P®^^®ptions and thoughts was believed to survive in the
psycl;^. Presumably people felt that animate man had
''^ithin him a spiritual or intellectual portion, though
they were unable to define this element by one term
sufficiently accurate and inclusive. As a matter of fact,
this is the state of affairs which we shall meet among the
early writers of lyric poetry
. And it may be inferred
that, because the eschatological psyche had been
correlated with the soma of the dead, the new psyche, the
'soul', demanding a body to suit it, caused the term soma
to be extended so that it was ultimately used also of the
living body. But whatever the details of this evolution,
the distinction between body and soul represents a
'discovery' which so impressed people's minds that it was
thereafter accepted as self-evident, in spite of the fact
that the relation between body and soul, and the nature of
the soul itself, continued to be the topic of lively
speculation.
Snell credits Heraclitus with being the first writer to
introduce this new concept of the soul:
The first writer to feature the new concept of the soul is
Heraclitus. He calls the soul of living man psyche; in
his view man consists of body and soul, and the soul is
endowed with qualities which differ radically from those
of the body and the physical organs. We can safely say
that these new qualities are irreconcilable with the
categories of Homer's thought; he does not even dispose of
the linguistic prerequisites to describe what Heraclitus
predicates of the soul. The new expressions were
fashioned in the period which separates Heraclitus from
Homer, that is to say the era of the lyric. Heraclitus
says; 'You could not find the ends of the soul though you
travelled every way, so deep is its logos ' . This notion
of the depth or profundity of the soul is not unfamiliar
to us; but it involves a dimension which is foreign to a
physical organ or its function. . . . Homeric speech does not
yet know this aspect of the word 'deep'.
15
Snell goes on to recount several other important ways in which the
psyc^ of Heraclitus is different from the Homeric psyche
. It has a
logos which is a "common" thing, so that two beings can be of the
same spirit or mind, and the psyche of Heraclitus also has a logos
capable of extending and adding to itself of its own accord. For
Homer, any augmentation in mental powers is effected from without,
not from within. We see, then, that the development of the concepts
of soul and body was like an organic process which took many
centuries and did not occur by sudden stipulation.
In the course of his discussion of 'psyche', 'thymes' and
'noos', Snell offers some interesting insight into the origin of 'to
know' ;
^
Never does Homer, in his descriptions of ideas or
emotions, go beyond a purely spatial or quantitative
definition; never does he attempt to sound their special,
non-physical nature. As far as he is concerned, ideas are
conveyed through the noos
,
a mental organ which in turn is
analogous to the eye; consequently 'to know' is <6 (^6
which is related to see', and in fact
originally means 'to have seen'. The eye, it appears,
serves as Homer's model for the absorption of
experiences. From this point of view the intensive
coincides with the extensive; he who has seen much
sufficiently often possesses intensive knowledge.
We often speak of "intellectual perception" and of seeing that
something is true. Also the term 'view' as it occurs in "visual or
intellectual point of view" is related to this analogy. If Snell is
right, the idea of intellectual perception or having an intellectual
view originated in a conception that there is a mental organ like
the eye which is responsible for understanding and perceiving in a
way similar to the way the eye is responsible for vision.
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Furthermore, this "mental organ" was conceived as being quite
any conception we might have today of such an
"organ", since it was not conceived as being an element of a greater
whole known as "mind". This conception of a "mental organ" or
something like it is in the Aristotelean doctrine of mental
faculties and in the "faculty psychology" of today. It also
survives today in terms such as 'faculty', 'view', and in phrases
such as "I can see what you mean".
We can see from the preceding discussion that it was not
possible to even formulate dualism as a philosophical doctrine until
the elements of psyche
,
thymos
,
and noos could be seen as elements
of a greater whole. However, it is important to notice that even as
early as Homer's time people found it useful and important to
distinguish between their body and other aspects which today we call
emotion, perception, and life, spirit, or soul. Materialists who
wish to deny the validity of these distinctions would do well to try
to explain why peoples in the earliest part of Western civilization
found it useful and important to develop a language which recognizes
a distinction between the body and non-physical elements.
1.3.3 Plato
Two main elements of Plato's thought are of interest in
relation to Plato's views on the mind-body problem: his doctrine
that the soul exists before the birth of the person and also
17
survives death and his doctrine that the soul consists of three
elements. I now discuss both of these doctrines, beginning with the
former.
G. M. A. Grube cites a source for Plato's conception of the
soul which is different from the Homeric source we have just
discussed;
^
The conception of the soul as the highest part of man
seems to have been imported into Greece by those mystical
teachers and prophets who are usually somewhat summarily
lumped together as the Orphics. Their doctrines came from
the East; they seem to have taught an immortality that was
no longer a pale reflection of earthly life, but a release
from the body and a deliverance. The body to them was the
prison or tomb of the soul
— as they pithily
expressed it. Man then aims at the purification of this
soul, and after many incarnations rises to perfection and
is absorbed, or reabsorbed, into the divine. It was
probably under Orphic influence that the Pythagoreans
developed their way of life as a gradual process of
purification. But to them this immortal psyche was the
intellectual power of man and purification lay to a large
extent through a strictly scientific, which to them meant
a mathematical, training; though some of them seem to have
laid a great deal of emphasis on number-magic and on
ritual. From them must have come the conception of the
intellect as the noblest and immortal part of man, of
salvation through knowledge, a conception so magnificently
expressed in the Phaedo
,
and it remained with Plato to the
end.
This account and the view that Plato's conception also originated in
Homeric concepts are not inconsistent: the Homeric conception of
psyche was that its survival in Hades was a pale reflection of human
life. This original weak conception of psyche had by Plato's time
become strengthened through the work of philosophers such as
Heraclitus and Pythagoras into a conception of a single entity which
survives through time and which unites different mental elements
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into one. If Grube is right, this conception became identified in
Plato with the rational and intellectual part of man through the
influence of the Orphics. What was the soul now acquired mental
properties, but still survived death.
This account should shed some light on a fundamental ambiguity
in dualism which survives even today: the ambiguity between "soul"
and "mind". Philosophers today prefer to discuss "the mind-body
problem" and take dualism to assert the distinctness of mind and
body. Talk of the soul is left to theologians and ministers, and to
those who speak metaphorically. Phrases such as "a spirited
display", "my spirit was set free", or "a feeling in my soul" are
dismissed as metaphorical and/or anachronistic. The preceding
account shows, however, that the original conception of psyche or
soul was developed long before Christianity and as developed as a
way of conceptualizing life itself, not in connection with a
religious theory
. In Plato, this conception of psyche became
identified with the intellectual part of man; this intellectual part
or element then was conceived as having immortality but lost some of
its association with life. Today, philosophers generally focus on
the intellectual mind which they presume not to be immortal and
9discuss life or the soul seldom or not at all.
One principal source for Plato's views and arguments for the
preexistence and postexistence of the soul is the Phaedo . The
purpose of this dialogue is to show that virtue has its own reward,
that the man who lives a virtuous life is rewarded after he dies.
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In order to demonstrate this, Plato must show that the soul survives
death. Plato has Socrates argue for the existence of the soul after
death by arguing that it follows from the existence of the soul
before birth
the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life
and being born can be born only from death and dying, must
she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be
born again?
Socrates offers several distinct arguments for the claim that the
soul exists before birth. One is based on the idea that things
having opposites are generated out of their opposites (the opposites
here are life and death)
. Another argument is based on the famous
Platonic doctrine that learning is recollection of knowledge gained
prior to our birth as human beings.
My purpose here is not to critically evaluate Plato's argument
but rather to describe the type of dualism he advocated. However,
there are two comments worth making in relation to his arguments.
One is that it is important to distinguish questions about (mere)
survival of death from questions about the immortality of the soul.
If I am to live forever, I must at least survive my own death. But
I might survive my own death yet not live forever. Perhaps, as
Cebes proposes, the soul enters into one body after another, but
eventually perishes at the end of one of these lives.
Secondly, if Plato wishes to prove that a virtuous man is
rewarded in the after-life, it is crucial that a person be
identified with his soul. If my soul survives death, but I am not
identified with my soul, then it is difficult to see why this is of
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more interest than the claim that my liver will survive my death.
This same point applies to preexistence. Suppose, as Plato says,
learning is recollection of something known in an earlier life. If
some person ^ can be truly said to be remembering that so-and-so,
then it must be the case that at some earlier time _A has at least
believed (and perhaps known) that so-and-so is the case. This also
applies to experiences and events. If I am to be truly said to
remember an experience or event, then it must be an experience ^ had
or an event ^ witnessed. Hence if Plato's theory that learning is
recollection of knowledge gained before birth is to succeed, he must
claim that the person existed before his birth in order to acguire
this knowledge. Thus Plato's arguments for preexistence and
postexistence both require that a person be identified with his soul.
The second main element of Plato's thought I will discuss is
his tripartite division of the soul. The main sources of this
12doctrine are The Republic and the Phaedrus
. In the Phaedo
,
Plato considers the soul as a simple unity, identifying it with the
intellect. The tripartite division of the soul retains the idea
that the soul is a unity, but adds the idea that it is complex, not
simple. Plato's argument that there are three elements of the soul
is based in part on an analogy with his division of the state into
three classes and also on the fact that we experience internal
13
conflicts
:
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Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though
thirsty refuse to drink?" "We are indeed", he said, "many
and often." "what then," said I, "should one affirm about
them. Is It not that there is a something in the soul thatbids them drink and something that forbids, a different
something that masters that which bids?" "i think so."
And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such
actions arises when it arises from the calculations of
reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through
affections and diseases?" "Apparently." "Not
unreasonably," said I, "shall we claim that they are two
and different from one another, naming that in the soul
whereby it reckons and reasons the rational and that with
which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter
and titillation of other desires the irrational and
appetitive—companion of various reflections and
pleasures." "It would not be unreasonable but quite
natural," he said, "for us to think this." "These two
forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as
actually existing in he soul. But now the Thumos or
principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger,
is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one
of these?
Plato has Socrates, who is speaking here with Glaucon, conclude that
the third element, the "spiritual" element, is a distinct element
from the rational or appetitive elements. These divisions resemble
the Homeric mental organs of perception, emotion, and life except
that the "spirited" element has lost much of its connection to the
"breath of life" and is a more purely psychological concept. Also,
the Homeric divisions were not elements of a whole; they existed
independently, while in Plato the three elements are elements of a
unity known as the soul.
In conclusion, Plato did not seem overly concerned to prove the
distinctness of soul from body; perhaps he thought this did not
require proof. Instead, he was concerned to demonstrate much bolder
claims: that the soul exists before birth and also after death. He
22
also provided a tripartite analysis of the soul which preserved the
idea that the soul is a unity and yet accounts for some of the
complexity of our mental and emotional experience. Although the
idea that the soul exists before birth is not much discussed or
widely held in Western cultures, yet the idea that the soul survives
death is standard Christian doctrine. Philosophers today, however,
tend to read "soul" as "mind" and concentrate on Plato's
identification of the soul with the intellect or reason at the
expense of those aspects of the soul connected with life or
af ter-1 if e.
Plato also made another important contribution to dualism; it
is in Plato that the soul appears as an independent substance which
can exist apart from the body. It is this conception that was later
taken over by Descartes who referred to this substance sometimes as
"mind" and sometimes as "soul". At the same time, Plato made
dualism possible rather than triadism or some other form of
pluralism by identifying the soul with intellect or reason and by
treating the soul as a unity. It is not an oversimplification to
say that in Plato the concepts of "soul" and "mind" merged; a merger
made possible by incorporating a psychological interpretation of
"spirit" into the soul-mind. In this way the concept of "spirit" or
"life" was legislated out of the mind-body problem and out of
dualism. Hence Plato should be considered the architect of dualism.
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1.3.4 Descartes
Descartes did more than defend a robust form of dualism: he
also laid down the ground rules for discussion of the mind-body
problem in modern philosophy. Descartes divided the universe into
mental and physical entities and phenomena. He treated the terms
'soul' and 'mind' as being interchangeable and identified himself
with his soul-mind in parenthetical remarks. Descartes'
determination to bring the study of animals and the human body under
the control of natural law together with his mental—physical
dichotomy resulted in his claim that animals do not have souls or
mind; that they have no feelings. Even today Descartes'
mental/physical dichotomy is written into the formulation of "the
mind-body problem".
Descartes, unlike Plato, is concerned to prove the distinctness
of mind and body; he is less concerned to prove the survival of
death by the soul, although he believed in this. Descartes gives
his proof of distinctness of mind and body in the following famous
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passage:
And first of all, because I know that all things which I
apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as
I apprehend them, it suffices that I am able to apprehend
one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in
order to be certain that the one is distinct from the
other, since they may be made to exist in separation at
least by the omnipotence of God; and it does not signify
by what power this separation is made in order to compel
me to judge them to be different: and, therefore, just
because I know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile
I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains
to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking
thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely
in the fact that I am a thinking thing (or a substance
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whose whose essence or nature is to think). And although
possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment)
I possess a body with which I am very intimately
conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear
and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a
thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I
possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I
(that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am), is
®^tirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can
exist without it.
In the preceding passage, Descartes states that it is sufficient for
two things
_A and B to be ontologically distinct that he can form a
clear and distinct apprehension of _A apart from B. He then states
that he can form a clear and distinct apprehension of himself as a
thinking and unextended thing and also can form a clear and distinct
apprehension of body as an extended and unthinking thing. From this
he concludes that he is ontologically (entirely and absolutely)
distinct from his body, and can exist without it.
Descartes' classic argument is worth examining because it
illustrates so well the strengths and weaknesses of dualism. One
strength it illustrates is that dualists have a fairly easy time
demonstrating the distinctness of mind and body. Here Descartes
picks dichotomous properties: thinking and unthinking, extended and
unextended, as essential properties of mind and body. Picking
dichotomous properties makes dualism fairly easy to prove since the
same thing cannot be both thinking and unthinking or both extended
and unextended. On the other hand, Descartes really proves the
distinctness of himself from his body, not the distinctness of his
mind from his body. Only in the last sentence does he mention his
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soul, and there he says "My soul by which I am what I am". But this
IS hardly a claim of identity, and Descartes did not really think he
was identical to his soul: he identified himself with the union of
mind and body. The moral here is that even Descartes could not give
a clear and consistent account of the relation between himself and
his mind or soul.
Notice also that Descartes slips from a consideration of "my
body" to "a distinct idea of body". Descartes held that body as
such is a substance, but he still speaks of his body as "a body".
This ambiguity is paralleled in the question "What is the relation
between mind and body?". This sounds as if it asks about the
relation between mind-as-a-whole and body-as-a-whole
,
but it is
usually taken to ask about the relation between an individual mind
and an individual body. Descartes also says that he is essentially
unextended; this may be truer of his mind than of him but we do know
that he had height and that he could be touched, that he took up
space, and that he had weight. Descartes would not have to deny
this if he maintained his claim that he is the union of body and
mind, not that he is identical to mind. He would no doubt deny that
these predicates apply to his soul or mind.
Another interesting feature of Descartes' argiament is that he
needs to find a generic term which will apply both to him and to
physical objects. He chooses the French word 'chose', which we
translate as "thing", for this purpose, and says that he is
essentially a thinking and unextended thing while body is
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essentially an extended and unthinking thing
. In this way he
sidesteps the question whether or not it is essential to him that he
is a j^iving thing i.e. a being. By using the term 'thing' to refer
to himself, other persons, and physical objects, Descartes avoids
the question about the status of life and maintains a strict
mental/physical dualism.
In Chapter II I discuss an argviment proposed by Saul Kripke
which is similar to Descartes' "conceivability" argument, so I will
not comment further on this argument here. One final comment about
Descartes is that he identified mind with consciousness. While
Plato identified mind with the intellect or reason, Descartes
identified mind with consciousness and this identification has
influenced discussion of the mind-body issue since then. Descartes
also identified body with extension. Perhaps equally significant is
the fact that Descartes made mental and physical a dichotomy,
thereby making interaction between mind and body impossible to
explain. Since Descartes' time, the mind-body problem has been
discussed in the terms laid down by Descartes. It would not be
correct to say that Descartes invented dualism - that distinction
belongs to Plato - but it would not be incorrect to say that
Descartes invented the mind-body problem.
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1«3.5 Suinmary of Dualist Positions
Now that I have briefly summarized the views of the two most
important dualists, Plato and Descartes, I conclude my discussion of
dualism with a summary of several important dualistic theories. All
these theories are defined by different accounts they give of
mind-body interaction.
^nteractionism. Interactionism is the view that mind and body
interact; that mental phenomena sometimes cause physical phenomena
and physical phenomena sometimes cause mental phenomena. Descartes,
who set up the problem of interaction, was himself an
interactionist. Interactionism has been defended in this century by
C. D. Broad and has been advocated by C. J. Ducasse.^^ I
discuss the problem of interaction as a problem for dualism in some
detail in Chapter VI.
Occasionalism
. On the occasionalist view, causal interaction
between mental and physical does not occur, but there are recurrent
sequences. Occasionalists such as Arnold Geulinx and Nicolas de
Malebranche proposed that God is the intermediary between mental and
physical phenomena. When I will to move my arm, this is the
occasion for God to move my arm. Occasionalists held that God's
intervention is necessary for causal interaction, even between
physical objects. They used the analogy of two clocks that keep in
phase not because they have direct causal connection but because
they have the same maker.
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Parallelism. According to psychophysical parallelism, mental
and physical phenomena are correlated in a regular way but without
any causal connection. Leibniz took the occasionalist "two clocks"
analogy and made them perfect mechanisms synchronized by God at
their origin so that they remain forever in phase without
intervention in virtue of the pre-established harmony. While
parallelists relieve themselves of the burden of explaining causal
interaction, they now have the burden of explaining constant
correlation.
Epiphenomenalism . According to epiphenomenalism, the causal
connection between body and mind goes only in one direction: from
body to mind, or from physical to mental phenomena. This theory
avoids the problems presented by accounting for the action of mind
on body, but still has to account for how bodily action can produce
mental phenomena. Mental events are sometimes compared to the smoke
of a steam engine or to a movie on a screen. One way to explain the
causal efficacy of mental events is to say that when a mental event
seems to cause a physical event, as when a sensation of pain causes
a wince, the same brain event which causes the pain also causes the
wince. Epiphenomenalism has been defended by T. H. Huxley^^ and
18
George Santayana.
29
1.3.6 Conclusion
This concludes my discussion of dualism. First, I looked at
Greek conceptions. Especially noteworthy here is the fact that the
early Greeks did not have a word corresponding to our 'mind' but
they did distinguish what today we would call several elements of
the mind from bodily elements. I next discussed Plato, saying that
he was the architect of dualism in that he identified the soul with
the intellect of man or mind and argued that the soul exists before
birth and also survives death. The discussion of Descartes took
note of Descartes' unclarity about the relation between himself and
his mind. It also credits Descartes with being the inventor of the
mind-body problem in that he laid down the categories of mind and
body in terms of which this problem is still discussed today.
Finally, I summarized four types of dualistic theories which are
distinguished based on the account each gives of interaction between
mind and body. I now discuss materialism.
1.4 Materialism
Another important view on the mind-body problem is monism.
Monism is the view that there is fundamentally one type of entity or
phenomenon in the universe. Materialistic monism, or materialism
.
holds that this type of entity or phenomenon is material or physical
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in nature. Like dualism, however, materialism has a conceptual and
an ontological interpretation. Ontologically
, materialism can be
stated as follows:
M(o). There is fundamentally one type of entity in the
universe and that type of entity is physical or
material.
M(o)
. There is fundamentally one type of phenomenon in
the universe and that type of phenomenon is
physical or material.
Conceptually, materialism can be stated as follows:
M(c) . The term 'mind' as applied to phenomena represents
a category of the same type as is represented by
the term ' body '
.
M(c)'. The term 'mental' as applied to phenomena
represents a category of the same type as is
represented by the terms 'physical' and 'material'.
I now discuss three philosophers who advocated some version of
materialism: Aristotle, Hobbes, and La Mettrie.
1.4.1 Aristotle
It should not be surprising that in a philosopher whose works
are as extensive as those of Aristotle that we should find that he
advocates more than one conception of "soul". However, it is the
views Aristotle defends in De Anima that are generally identified as
representing his mature and most characteristic thought.
Consequently, I mainly discuss Aristotle's De Anima views in this
section.
Aristotle states the view that the soul is the form of the body
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in the following passage:
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But since It IS also a body of such and such a kind, viz.,having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the
subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hencethe soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a
natural body having life potentially within it. But
substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of
a body as above characterized. Now the word actuality has
two senses corresponding respectively to the possession ofknowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge. It is
obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense,
VIZ. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and
waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these
waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to
knowledge possessed but not employed, and, in the history
of the individual, knowledge comes before its employment
or exercise.
. .
.
We have now given an answer to the question. What is
soul?—an answer which applies to it in its full extent.
It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the
definitive formula of a thing's essence. That means that
it is assigned the 'essential whatness' of a body of the
character just assigned. Suppose that what is literally
an 'organ', like an axe, were a natural body, its
'essential whatness', would have been its essence, and so
its soul; if this disappeared from it, it would have
ceased to be an axe, except in name. As it is, it is just
an axe; it wants the character which is required to make
its whatness or formulable essence a soul; for that, it
would have had to be a natural body of a particular kind,
viz. one having in itself the power of setting itself in
movement and arresting itself. Next, apply this doctrine
in the case of the 'parts' of the living body. Suppose
that the eye were an animal—sight would have been its
soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye
which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the
matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no
longer an eye, except in name— it is no more a real eye
than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure. We must
now extend our consideration from the 'parts' to the whole
living body; for what the departmental sense is to the
bodily part which is its organ, that the whole faculty of
sense is to the whole sensitive body as such.
Aristotle here is espousing a view quite different from the
identity theory; in fact, he dismisses the mind-body question as we
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understand it today as meaningless:
32
We can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether
the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to
ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp
are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of
which it is the matter,
Aristotle's view is materialistic in that he does not regard the
soul as a substance existing apart from body and does regard it as
incapable of existence apart from body. The form of a body is for
Aristotle the essence which makes it the type of body it is. Just
as sight is the form or essence of the eye, so the faculty of sense
is the form or essence of the body. The soul, then, is dependent on
the body for its existence and is not an independent substance but
it is the soul which makes the body the type of body it is.
It should be clear from this discussion that the type of
contemporary materialism Aristotle's views are closest to is
functionalism. Today we would say that sight is the function of the
eye instead of the form of the eye. Because functionalism is the
subject of Chapter IV, there is no need to critically evaluate
Aristotle's views here. Before leaving Aristotle, however, I make
several more comments.
In the above paragraph, Aristotle distinguishes between a
natural and an artificial body. In Chapter VI I draw the same
distinction and say that artificial objects (artefacts) have an
essential property which is mental since it is essential to
artefacts that they have a certain function which makes reference to
a metal phenomenon such as an intention. For example, it is
essential to a cup that it be used for drinking or that someone have
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intended that it be used for drinking. Clearly, this is an
Aristotelian claim. However, I do not take it as a materialistic
claim for the following reason. If a statement of the function
essentially involves reference to a mental phenomenon such as an
intention, then whether this function is mental or physical depends
on how one analyzes the mental element. Aristotle would analyze
this intention as the form or function of some bodily state whereas
I regard an intention as irreducibly distinct in kind from a bodily
state. Hence a functional analysis of artefacts or even of neural
states or mental states can be materialistic, dualistic, or even
pluralistic depending on the ontological status of the entities
involved.
Aristotle's concern with living organisms and with biology gave
him a very different perspective on person, mind, and body from our
contemporary Cartesian perspective. Although Aristotle's views are
most correctly described as materialistic, his materialism is not of
the same type as the identity theory. We could even classify his
theory as dualistic in that the form (soul) of the body is viewed as
distinct from the body. Aristotle also was aware of the importance
of accounting for the organism or person as distinct from the mind
or body. He also recognized the importance of the distinction
between living and non-living things. However, my purpose here is
to briefly sketch Aristotle's view on the mind-body problem and to
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say what contemporary theory his theory most resembles. Since I
have accomplished this purpose, I proceed to a consideration of a
more modern materialist: Thomas Hobbes.
1.4.2 Hobbes
Hobbes' political philosophy was more influential than his
philosophy of mind. However, his philosophy of mind merits
discussion since it represents a simple, uncompromising form of
ontological materialism that is similar in spirit to the views of
those who advocate the identity theory today. Hobbes was a
contemporary of Descartes, and was the author of the Third Set of
Objections to the Meditations
. In Objection II, he quickly objects
that one cannot infer from "I am exercising thought" to "I am
thought", just as one cannot infer "I am the walking" from "I am
T 1 • II 21walking . Descartes replies that he meant what is endowed with
the faculty of thinking i.e. mind, but it still does not follow that
Descartes has shown his self to be identical to his mind. Hobbes'
next conclusion is less sagacious. He says that Descartes'
demonstration that he is essentially a thinking thing shows that
that which thinks is material rather than immaterial. His reasoning
is that knowledge of "I exist" depends on knowledge of "I think",
which in turn depends upon the fact that we cannot separate thought
22from a matter that thinks
23
There are several sources for Hobbes' psychology. However,
Book I of the Leviathan gives a good idea of his basic principles.
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He begins the Introduction to the Leviathan with a statement more
characteristic of mechanism than of ontological materialism.^^
Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the
World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so
in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial
Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the
beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why
may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move
themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an
artificial life? For what is the Heart
, but a Spring ; and
the Nerves
,
but so many Strings ; and the Joynts
, but so
many Wheeles
,
giving motion to the whole Body, such as was
intended by the Artificer? goes yet further, imitating
that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.
In the first chapter he speaks of sensible qualities and makes clear
that his view is that they are nothing but bodies in motion:^^
All which qualities called Sensible , are in the object
that causeth them, but so many several motions of the
matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely.
Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else
but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but
motion.) .But their appearance to us is Fancy, the same
waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or
striking the Eye makes us fancy a light; and pressing the
Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies we see, or hear,
produce the same thing by their strong, though unobserved
action.
Finally, in Chapter VI he reiterates his view that sensation is
bodily motion. Today, materialists would say that sensation is
u • 26brain processes:
There be in animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to
them: one called Vitall ; begun in generation, and
continued without interruption throughout their whole
life; such as are the course of the Bloud
,
the Pulse
,
the
Breathing
,
the Concoction
, Nutrition , Excretion , &c.; to
which Motions there needs no help of Imagination. The
other is Animall motion
,
otherwise called Voluntary
motion ; as to to speak , to moye any of our limbes, in
such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense,
is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body.
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caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c; And
that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion,
remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first
and second Chapters.
Part I of the Leviathan is an attempt to give an account of man
which prepares the way for his account of the state in Parts II and
II. It is interesting to note the contrast with Plato: Plato based
his account of the tri-partite nature of the soul in part on his
analysis of the state and society. Hobbes, by contrast, uses his
account of the psychology of human beings as the basis for his
account of the state. Hobbes thought that men are naturally
competitive, diffident, and glory-seeking, and this leads to a state
of nature in which it is to everyone's advantage to lay down some
27liberty and form a commonwealth. The psychology Hobbes develops
in Part I is somewhat like that developed by Descartes in Passions
of the Soul in that it is an attempt to classify some of the
passions and other mental phenomena and show how they relate to each
other. Much of this is independent of Hobbes' materialism, and is
of interest in its own right.
I have already said that Hobbes' views most resemble those of
today's identity theorists. Because I discuss the identity theory
in Chapter II and VI, I move on to briefly consider a different sort
of materialist: the mechanist La Mettrie.
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1.4.3 La Mettrie
In the next section I distinguish five type of materialistic
theory. One of these, mechanism, seems to be of a different type
from the other four. Mechanism is the view that human beings are
machines or machine-like, and that their behavior can be described,
explained, and predicted using mechanical principles. The
difference between mechanism and other forms of materialism is that
these other forms of materialism are theories about what type of
entity or phenomenon a mental entity or phenomenon is. These
theories hold that a mental entity or phenomenon is identical to a
physical entity or phenomenon, or can be reduced to or is a function
of some physical entity or phenomenon. Mechanism is a theory about
the explanation, description, and prediction of mental phenomena
which does have implications about their nature. However, one might
be an identity theorist or a functionalist and still hold that
mental phenomena are to be explained on organic principles or even
psychological laws - maintaining that these are reducible to
physical but not necessarily mechanical laws.
Those who today argue for computer models of the mind would do
well to read Julien La Mettrie. La Mettrie's L'Homme Machine
, first
published in 1747, is a classic defense of the mechanistic view
which today is associated with cybernetics and computer models of
the mind. La Mettrie's view was that man is a machine and that his
behavior can be explained on mechanical principles. It is surely
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great ironies of history that Descartes should be the
doctrine that is quite contrary to his own philosophy.
However, Descartes' view on animals was that they are machines, and
It is not difficult to see how this view could be extended to hu.an
beings. This is what we find in the following quotation:^®
Let us then permit the so-called Mr ch^rr. t u
philosophers who regard animals as ^achlnL. Cer?alnly“^
respLtab[r?n“r ' Descartes as a man who isespectable in every regard. if he had not been born in aentury so in need of enlightenment he would have earned
an^th
emphasis on experience, observation,d the danger of setting them aside. But let me make a
all ihor^r^^r ^^^e sake ofthose little philosophers, bad jokers, and poor
the birth of
instead of laughing impudently at
Descartes, would would be far better offrecognizing that without him the field of philosophy, likethat of the spirit without Newton, might be largely
undeveloped. ^ ^
It IS true that this celebrated philosopher made many
errors; no one denies that. Yet he did come to know the
nature of animals, and was the first to perfectly
demonstrate that animals are pure machines. After adiscovery of such importance, and one that requires such
sagacity, the least we can do is forgive him all his
er rorsl
In my opinion he compensates for all his errors with this
major recognition. For while he makes much of the
distinction between the two substances, it is obviously
simply a skillful device, a stylistic ruse, to make
palatable to the theologians a poison hidden in the shadow
of an analogy which strikes everyone, and which only they
fail to see. For it is truly this striking analogy that
forces all intellectuals and true judges of mankind to
admit that these proud and vain creatures, more
distinguished by their pride than their name of Man
despite attempts to raise themselves, are fundamentally
only animals, and machines that crawl perpendicularly.
They all have this marvelous instinct that becomes spirit
through education, and which is seated in the brain, or in
its place, if this is lacking, or becomes ossified, in the
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elongated marrow, and never in the cerebellum; for I have
seen it considerably damaged.
. .without causing the soul tocease its functions.
Here La Mettrie credits Descartes with the view that animals are
machines, and extends this view to human beings. His concluding
remarks begin as follows:^^
We therefore boldly conclude that man is a machine; and
there is in the entire universe only a single substance
that is diversely modified.
La Mettrie, then, was ontologically a materialist, but his form of
materialism was mechanism.
I have already said that La Mettrie's mechanism has
implications for the nature of mental phenomena. However, it is far
from clear that these implications take the form of logical
entailments. Aram Vartanian, a recent interpreter of La Mettrie,
believes that La Mettrie has provided a picture or mechanical model
of the human mind but not its essence.
La Mettrie himself neglects, it is true, to discuss directly or
to fix with care the scope and meaning of the materialism
present in I'homme machine—a fact that has helped many of his
critics to go astray. Nevertheless, he has scattered in the
text a sufficient number of clues to reveal to a circumspect
reader the spirit of his thought. Perhaps the most telling of
these is the assertion that "la Nature du mouvement nous est
aussi inconnue que celle de la matiere." If such is the case,
then the nature of the "machine" with which man is
hypothetically equated would likewise be unknown, and there
could be no question of raising the correspondence between
organic and psychic phenomena to the level of identity—an
opinion which, in fact. La Mettrie nowhere attempts to
establish. . .
.
The homme machine idea gives us, therefore, no more than a
mechanical model, or a picturable analogy, of the mind—not its
essence.
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La Mettrie should not be thought of as a forerunner of identity
theory but rather of contemporary philosophers and psychologists who
construct mechanical models of the mind, particularly computer
models.
There also seems to be some unclarity on the part of those who
construct or argue for computer models of the mind on whether they
are stating the essence of mind, saying what mind is, or merely
providing analogies and models for the mind, saying what mind is
like. Participants in these discussions seem to regard theories
according to which the mind works like a computer as being
materialistic; yet it does not seem contradictory to be
ontologically a dualist and yet hold that the mind works like a
computer or employs computer-like methods. One might hold, for
example, that the brain stores memories in a way similar to the way
a computer stores memories on a disk, and that the search procedure
for recalling memories is similar; the brain is mapped out into
addressable locations and a particular location is accessed
according to its address. Such a model or picture does not
logically require ontological materialism: the states which result
from these searches do not have to be brain states. One might even
be a dualist for computers and hold that certain internal computer
states such as the computer's analyzing this week's payroll is not
identical to a state of the hardware but rather is a distinct type
of state. Hence, the association of mechanism with ontological
materialism may be due more to the fact that most advocates of
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mechanism and computer models of the mind are materialists rather
than due to any logical entailment of one by the other.
Mechanism as a philosophy of mind and computer models of the
mind do not play a major role in later chapters. Nevertheless, La
Mettrie's work is important to take note of in this historical
survey, both in virtue of its links with present day discussion of
computer models of the mind and in virtue of its links with
Descartes. We have already seen that the idea of I'homme machine
originated in Descartes' view that animals are machines.
1.4.4 Five Types of Materialism
The discussion of La Mettrie concludes my historical discussion
of materialism. The purpose of this discussion has obviously not
been to trace the history of materialism from Homer to the present,
but rather to pick out several important philosophers from earlier
periods and show how their views resemble views being discussed
today. Of the three I have discussed, Aristotle's theory is closest
to what today we call functionalism, while Hobbes' theory most
closely resembles the identity thesis. Hobbes was apparently also a
mechanist. La Mettrie was a mechanist, as we have seen, and his
views most closely resemble those of philosophers today who
construct and defend computer models of the mind. I said that La
Mettrie's mechanism, and mechanism in general, does not logically
entail materialism; I have classified it as a materialist view
because it is generally regarded as a form of materialism and
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because most mechanists are materialists. Even it a mechanical
model of the mind does not give the essence of mind, it does give a
material model.
The three forms of materialism discussed in detail in later
chapters are the identity theory, anomalous monism, and
functionalism. I have discussed Aristotle as an antecedent to
functionalism and Hobbes as an antecedent to the identity theory.
My survey seems to provide no historical precedent for anomalous
monism, Donald Davidson's materialistic theory which is the subject
of Chapter III. Spinoza is the closest historical antecedent to
Davidson, and while his theory is monistic, it is not a form of
materialism. Hence I discuss Spinoza's theory as a separate type of
monism in the next section. First, however, I distinguish five
types of contemporary materialism.
The Identity Theory . According to the identity theory, mental
events are identical to brain events. This thesis can also be
formulated as the view that any individual mind is identical to some
brain, or that the person is identical to his body. This theory was
popular in the 1960 's, and was defended by philosophers such as J.
31 32J. C. Smart and D. M. Armstrong. Philosophers advocating
3 3this view used a notion they called "strict" identity according
to which mental-physical identities satisfy the condition of
34
Leibniz's Law. Criticisms of the identity theory led some
philosophers to retreat to theoretical materialism, functionalism.
or eliminative materialism.
43
Theoretical Materialism
. According to theoretical materialism,
statements of identity between mental and physical events resemble
certain identifications found in physical theories. One example
sometimes used is the identification of temperature with mean
molecular energy. This type of identity is sometimes called
contingent identity since these statements are supposed to be
contingently true, not necessarily true. Thomas Nagel defends this
type of view in "Physicalism" and Jaegwon Kim critically
discusses it in "On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory". This
theory could be considered a different formulation of the identity
theory, with a weaker sense of identity. It is this form of
materialism that Saul Kripke argues against in Naming and
M -u 37Necessity
.
Functionalism
. According to functionalism, mental states are
correctly accounted for by giving a functional analysis or account
of physical (brain) states. Functionalism was developed in part in
response to the objection that a creature unlike human beings might
have similar mental states even though its neural structure is quite
unlike ours. The functions of its brain states might still be
similar. Functionalism was developed also in response to computer
3 8models of the mind, and has been defended by Hilary Putnam and
39Daniel Dennett. I discuss Dennett's version of functionalism in
Chapter IV.
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Eliminative Materialism
. According to eliminative materialism,
terms which refer to apparently mental phenomena in fact refer to
physical phenomena. Just as the progress of science revealed that
there are no witches, so progress in describing and explaining
mental phenomena will reveal that phenomena which were thought to be
mental are really physical. In this way, talk of mental phenomena
will be eliminated from our vocabulary. Probably the chief defender
view is Richard Rorty
. Since I do not discuss this
version of materialism in later chapters, I will point out here that
the analogy it draws between mental phenomena and witches and demons
does not withstand serious examination. This does not mean that
there is never any circumstance in which a mental term is replaced
or is found to be inapplicable. We have already seen that the
Homeric conceptions of thymos
,
noos, and psyche were replaced in
Plato's time by a conception according to which these elements are
elements of a unity called "soul" or "mind" rather than being
separate organs which are no part of a greater whole. But to admit
this analogy is quite different from admitting an analogy whereby
all our mental terminology could be eliminated.
Mechanism
. Mechanism is the view that human and animal
behavior is to be explained, predicted, and described according to
mechanical principles. In La Mettrie's time philosophers used
clocks as models of human behavior and mental phenomena; today they
use computers. Because this theory is about explanations and models
of what human beings do rather than about the nature of mental
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phenomena, it is not logically inconsistent with dualism. However,
it is generally considered to be a materialistic theory, perhaps
because most of its advocates are materialists. We saw that Hobbes
was a mechanist, and that La Mettrie is the classic exponent of
mechanism. A mechanical concept of mind has been defended in recent
times by A. M. Turing"^^ and by Hilary Putnam.
1.4.5 Summary
This completes my discussion of materialism. I discussed
Aristotle as a forerunner of contemporary functionalism, Hobbes as a
forerunner of the identity theory, and La Mettrie as a mechanist and
a forerunner of theories which involve constructing computer models
of the mind. I also distinguished five different materialist
theories: the identity theory, theoretical materialism,
functionalism, eliminative materialism, and mechanism. I now
discuss the the views of another monist whose form of monism is not
materialistic: the plural aspect monism of Benedict de Spinoza.
1.5 Plural Attribute Monism
In my discussion of dualism, I made a distinction between
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dualism of substance and dualism of properties. I then went on
to state my intention to use the term 'phenomena' as a general term
to cover properties, events, states, conditions, abilities,
capacities, and other phenomena other than entities that can be
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either mental or physical. Of course, there are still important
distinctions within the class of phenomena as I have described it.
There will still be occasions when we need to pick out some subclass
of this class for special attention. We still may wish to single
out dualism of properties or dualism of events, for example.
Such is the case in relation to Spinoza, who held a view best
described as plural attribute monism. I have selected Spinoza for
discussion because his view is an antecedent of Donald Davidson's
view, which is discussed in Chapter III. Though Spinoza defended an
ontological form of his theory, I state both an ontological and a
conceptual version of plural attribute monism;
A(o)
.
Minds and bodies are modes of the attributes of
thought and extension. They are two of many
attributes, all of which attributes are attributes
of a single underlying substance.
A(o) .' Mental and physical attributes are two of many
types of attributes, all of which attributes are
attributes of a single underlying substance.
Conceptually, plural attribute monism can be stated as follows:
A(c). The terms 'mind' and 'body' represent two
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
attribute modes. These are two of many such
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
attribute modes. There is a single conceptual
category of substance which these conceptual
categories of attribute modes apply to.
A(c)'. The terms 'mental' and 'physical' represent two
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
attributes. These are two of many such
irreducibly distinct conceptual categories of
attributes. There is a single conceptual category
of substance which these conceptual categories of
attributes apply to.
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1»5.1 Spinoza
Spinoza lived from 1632 - 1677. placing him between Descartes
and La Hettrie. He was heavily influenced by Descartes and, like
.nany philosophers of his time, developed many of his views in
response to those of Descartes. His form of monism cannot be
described either as materialism or idealism, but it is only a form
of ontological monism. He did believe that there is only one
substance in the universe, and he identified this substance with
God. He held that this one substance, God, has infinitely many
attributes, including mind and body. It is his view that God has
infinitely many attributes that makes him a plural asr.ect monist.
Spinoza's view of substance is central to his philosophy. He
held that the essence of a substance Involves existence:^^
PROPOSITION VII. It pertains to the nature of siihsranca
to exist,
Demonstration
. There is nothing by which substance can be
produced.
.. .It will therefore be the cause of itself, that
is to say... its essence necessarily involves existence,
or, in other words, it pertains to its nature to
exist.
—Q.E.D.
He denies that man is a substance in these remarks
PROPOSITION X. The being of substance does not pertain to
_yie essence of man
,
or, in other words, substance does not
constitute the form of man.
Demonstra t ion. The being of substance involves necessary
existence.,.. If, therefore, the being of substance
pertained to the essence of man, the existence of man
would necessarily follow from the existence of
substance.,., and conseguently he would necessarily exist,
which... is an absurdity. Therefore the being of substance
does not pertain, etc.--Q.E.D.
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Finally, he makes it clear that God is the only Substance:^^
PROPOSITION XIV, Besides God no substance can be nor can
be conceived. ~ “
Demonstration
. Since God is Being absolutely infinite, of
whom no attribute can be denied which expresses the
essence of substance.
.
. ,
and since He necessarily
exists..., it follows that if there were any substance
besides God, it would have to be explained by some'
attribute of God, and thus two substances would exist
possessing the same attribute, which is absurd; and
therefore there cannot be any substance except God, and
consequently none other can be conceived. For if any
other could be conceived, it would necessarily be
conceived as existing, and this (by the first part of this
demonstration) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no
substance can be nor can be conceived.
—
Q.E.D.
Spinoza not only held that an individual mind, an individual
body, and an individual person are not substances, he also held that
mind as a whole and body as a whole are not substances but rather
attributes of the one infinite substance; God. This is clear from
47the following propositions:
PROPOSITION I, Thought is an attribute of God, or God is
a thinking thing.
PROPOSITION II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God
is an extended thing.
Spinoza is probably the only philosopher I discuss who would
understand the question "What is the relation between minds and
body?" as a question about the relation between mind-as-a-whole and
body-as-a-whole rather than as a question about the relation between
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an individual mind and an individual body. He says that "the
49
human mind is a part of the intellect of God". Although Spinoza
does seem to recognize the existence of individual minds and bodies.
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these individuals are not substances and ace correctly understood
modes of the attributes of thought and extension, which are
attributes of God.
Spinoza's definition of 'attribute' is as follows:^^
IV. By attribute I understand that which the intellectperceives of substance as constituting its essence.
He applies this definition to thought and extension in these
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remarks
:
as
Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the
same substance, which is now comprehended under this
attribute and now under that ... .Whether we think of Nature
under the attribute of extension or under the attribute ofthought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall
discover one and the same order or one and the same
connection of causes, that is to say, in every case the
same sequence of things when things are considered as
modes of thought we must explain the order of the whole of
Nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of
thought alone, and when things are considered as modes of
extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be
explained through the attribute of extension alone, and so
with other attributes.
Spinoza's view, then, is that God can be conceived either under the
mode of thought or under the mode of extension. Extension is an
attribute of God as conceived under this mode and thought is an
attribute of God as conceived under the mode of thought. Today we
might say that the categories of mental and physical represent two
points of view in terms of which persons or objects can be described.
I maintain during discussion of Davidson that Spinoza's view is
an ancestor of Davidson's anomalous monism. This is so for the
following reason. Davidson has referred to his view as a
5 2combination of conceptual dualism and ontological monism. He
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does not employ the notion of a point of view, but he does introduce
the idea of a conceptual domain. Davidson thinks that the mental
conceptual domain is irreducible to the physical conceptual domain,
and vice versa. This is similar to Spinoza's view that extension
and thought are two distinct modes for conceiving substance.
However, Davidson is a conceptual dualist, not a conceptual
pluralist: he does not recognize the existence of conceptual domains
other than the mental and physical conceptual domains. Furthermore,
his form of monism is materialism; he does not believe that his
conceptual dualism implies ontological dualism and he argues for the
identity theory. For Spinoza, on the other hand, his one substance
has infinitely many attributes and it is not just extended and
thinking but also necessarily existing, indivisible, etc. The true
sense, then, in which Spinoza is a monist is that he held that there
is only one substance but he is a pluralist in that he held that
this one substance has infinitely many attributes.
1.6 Idealism
Idealism is a radically different form of monism in that
according to idealism the single type of substance in the universe
is mental rather than physical. The classic defense of this view is
53given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge . The spirit
of idealism is still alive today in the form of phenomenalism, an
epistemological theory which attempts to reduce material objects to
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sense-data. Phenomenalism has been defended in this century by
54 ^Bertrand Russell and by A. J. Ayer. Because I do not
discuss either idealism or phenomenalism in later chapters, I do not
discuss them further here. Notice, however, that both materialism
and idealism depend on the existence of the mental-physical
distinction for the very statement of their respective theories.
1. 7 Pluralism
Pluralism is sometimes identified with the view that there are
many irreducibly distinct individuals in the universe. While few
philosophers would be inclined to deny this today, we have just seen
that Spinoza held that there is only one substance in the universe,
and this substance is God. Descartes held that what we might think
of as individual bodies are modes of one extended substance. The
view that there are many irreducibly distinct individuals in the
universe is pluralism of individuals
.
This view might also be
described as pluralism of entities or substances. Even a
materialist who believes that there is only one type of entity in
the universe, viz. material entities, might still hold that there
are many such individual entities. Such a person would be a monist
in types of entities and a pluralist of individual entities.
The type of pluralism which is of most interest in relation to
this discussion of the mind-body problem is pluralism in types of
entities and phenomena. 'his is the view that there are many
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fundamentally distinct types of entity or phenomena in the universe,
where this number is greater than two. Like monism and dualism,
pluralism of types has an ontological and a conceptual
interpretation
:
P(o). There are many fundamentally distinct types of
entities in the universe.
P(o)'. There are many fundamentally distinct types of
phenomena in the universe.
Conceptually, this view can be formulated as follows:
P(c). The terms 'mind* and 'body' represent two of many
irreducibly distinct categories or conceptual
domains which apply to entities in the universe.
P(c)'. The terms 'mental* and 'physical' represent two of
many irreducibly distinct categories or conceptual
domains which apply to entities in the universe.
P(c)''. The terms 'mental' and 'physical' represent two of
many irreducibly distinct categories or conceptual
domains which apply to types of phenomena in the
universe
.
We have just seen that Spinoza would deny P(o) since he held
that there is only one substance in the universe. He would ascribe
to P(o)', however, in light of his view that here are infinitely
many attributes in the universe. Just as he would deny P(o), he
would deny P(c), reading "substance" for 'entity'; however, he would
accept P(c)'. We can say, then, that Spinoza accepted conceptual
and ontological plurality of phenomena but denied conceptual and
ontological plurality of substance. Spinoza would say that he
accepted plurality of attributes.
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1.7.1 Leibniz
I have already made note of the fact that Leibniz was a
parallelist in section 1.3.5. since Leibniz held that bodies are
phenomenal in nature he is often counted as a phenomenalist or
idealist. My concern here is not with either of these strains of
his thought, but with his view on points of view: Leibniz was a
pluralist with respect to points of view or perspectives.
Leibniz held that each monad has a different point of view:^^
'^his connection of all created things with every
single one of them and their adaptation to every single
one, as well as the connection to every single one, as
well as the connection and adaptation of every single
thing to all others, has the result that every single
substance stands in relations which express all the
others. Whence every single substance is a perpetual
living mirror of the the universe.
57. Just as the same city regarded from different sides
guite different aspects, and thus appears
multiplied by the perspective , so it also happens that the
infinite multitude of simple substances creates the
appearance of as many different universes. Yet they are
but perspectives of a single universe, varied according to
the points of view , which differ in each monad.
58. This is the means of obtaining the greatest possible
variety, together with the greatest possible order; in
other words, it is the means of obtaining as much
perfection as possible.
Leibniz's view that each monad has a different point of view both
provides a principle of individuation for monads and provides a
basis for plurality of monads and substances. Leibniz says that the
same city viewed from different sides offers different aspects so
he, like Spinoza, can be described as having a plural aspect view.
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unlike Spinoza, he held that there is an infinity of individual
substances, so he held that there are infinitely many individual
substances each having infinitely many aspects.
1* 8 Conclusion
To summarize, I began this historical survey with an
introduction to the mind-body problem as a philosophical problem.
The main body of the chapter was concerned with an examination of
dualism, three types of materialism, and pluralism. In section 1.3
I described the views of Plato and Descartes as examples of
conceptual and ontological dualism. In section 1.4 I identified
Aristotle as a historical antecedent of contemporary functionalism,
and Hobbes as a historical antecedent of the identity theory. I
discussed the views of both these materialists. I also considered
La Mettrie as the classic exponent of mechanism. In section 1.5 I
considered Spinoza as a historical antecedent of anomalous monism.
After taking note of idealism, I considered Leibniz in section 1.7
as a pluralist in points of view.
This concludes my historical survey of the mind-body problem.
The main purpose of this survey has been to show that the four
contemporary theories on the mind-body problem which I examine in
succeeding chapters: dualism, the identity theory, anomalous monism,
and functionalism are all contemporary formulations of traditional
theories on this problem. Hence, many of my criticisms of
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contemporary views should apply to these traditional theories as
well. A secondary purpose has been to show where these four
theories stand in relation to other theories on the mind-body
problem. In some cases, criticisms of a version of one type of
theory such as the identity theory apply to other versions of the
same type of theory such as functionalism. Hence, I believe that
the discussion in the remaining chapters represents a fairly broad
discussion of the mind-body problem which has implications beyond
its implications for the four particular theories I examine.
56
FOOTNOTES
Obviously, there are many problems traditionally discussed byphilosophers in non-philosophical contexts which are not
philosophical problems. The main point here is to introduce
e mind-body problem as a philosophical problem rather than apractical problem.
I take dualism to be a claim about what types of entities orphenomena there are in the universe
. Philosophers sometimes
use the term 'world' in what I take to be a synonym for
^universe^ For example, there is talk of "possible worlds",
in which it is imagined that history remains the same except
that one event or sequence of events is different. These kinds
of discussions sometimes occur in relation to considering
counterfactuals. Since the history of our earth includes its
relations to other entities in the universe, such examples are
about possible universes, not merely possible earths or
possible solar systems. A mind-body theory which limited
itself to saying what entities or phenomena exist on our earth
but had nothing to say about the rest of the universe would be
of only limited interest. In this chapter and in succeeding
chapters, I use the term 'world' as a synonym for 'universe'
unless I specify otherwise or unless the context makes it clear
that I am using it in some other sense.
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An exception to this is Gareth Matthews. In an early version
of a paper entitled "Life and Death as the Arrival and
Departure of the Psyche", he says "This paper is part of a
rather ambitious project aimed at recommending the traditional
concept of the psyche as an alternative to the Cartesian
concept of mind. Here are two crucial differences between the
concept of a psyche and the (Cartesian) concept of a mind: (1)
whereas a psyche is an animator, a mind has nothing essential
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CHAPTER II
SAUL KRIPKE'S DEFENSE OF DUALISM
2 • 1 Introduction
Dualism is one solution to the mind-body problem that has had
many capable defenders in the past, including Descartes, Locke, and
Hume. Like many other theories, dualism has been more popular at
some times than others. It has not been a popular theory in this
century, however, interest in dualism has increased in the past ten
years, partially in response to criticisms made of materialism and
behaviorism. Dualism has also recently found a capable exponent in
Saul Kripke, whose views ate a consequence of his views in theory of
reference and proper names.
In this chapter, I state two related arguments for dualism that
Saul Kripke presented recently in Naming and Necessity .^ Because
these arguments follow from Kripke's theory of proper names, I begin
by explaining this theory. I then examine some important criticisms
of these arguments advanced by Fred Feldman in several recent
^
- 2
articles. In the last section, I discuss what I take to be the
most serious problem for dualism: the problem of interaction. I
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conclude with several observations which seem to show that mind and
body are more closely related than they might appear to be at first
sight
,
2*2 Kripke's Theory of Proper Namps
In Mining and Necessity, Kripke presents an argument against
several versions of the identity thesis. This thesis as it is
usually formulated is a form of materialism which claims either that
a person is identical to his body, that each mind is identical to
some body, or that mental states or events are identical to brain
states or bodily states or events. The claim that mental states or
events are identical to brain states or bodily states is sometimes
formulated in terms of particular states, and sometimes in terms of
states of some kind. Kripke's argument makes use of some concepts
that he developed in order to formulate his theory of proper names.
Because these concepts play a key role in Kripke's argument against
the identity thesis, I begin by explicating Kripke's theory of
proper names and general terms.
Kripke's theory of proper names represents a break from the
tradition of Gottlieb Frege^ and Bertrand Russell,^ according to
which proper names are abbreviated descriptions; Kripke's theory is
much closer to John Stuart Mill's, who held that names have
denotation but no connotation. Kripke's theory is actually somewhat
complex, and for our purposes it is sufficient to discuss those
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aspects that relate directly to the mind-body argument. Those
related aspects particularly include the view that names and some
general terms are rigid designators, that identity statements
between rigid designators are, if true, necessarily true, and that
the origin of a thing is an essential property of that thing.
Names and Some General Terms are Rigid Designators
I begin by discussing designators. Kripke makes the following
^
6
comments
:
One of the intuitive these I will maintain in these talks
is that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem
to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above; although
someone other than the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g.
Humphrey might have)
,
no one other than Nixon might have
been Nixon. In the same way, a rigid designator rigidly
designates a certain object if it designates that object
wherever the object exists.
The distinction Kripke draws here is between a rigid (necessary)
designator, which designates the same object in every world in which
the object exists, and a non-rigid (accidental) designator which may
designate different objects in different possible situations (or
"possible worlds"). Kripke holds that proper names, such as
'Nixon', are rigid designators, while definite descriptions, such as
"The U.S. President in 1970", are non-rigid. One difference is
that, while one can imagine situations in which the term 'The U.S.
President in 1970' does not denote Nixon, the term 'Nixon' always
refers to the same man in every imaginable situation.
Kripke also apparently believes that some general terms, such
7
as 'gold' and 'tiger' are rigid designators. He says that:
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According to the view I advocate hh^:^n <-kinds are much closer ho nr^r.
' terms for natural
supposed. The old term
names than is ordinarily
appLprlate fL predicL.r“°^."“"’
kinds, such as 'cow' or ' tige^ natural
also, however, to certain m«s ^er!, apply
such as
.gold', 'water.: arthfukef
Elsewhere, he says:^
the kind^cai b^i^nt if ied^'bi^ *
-~t kind of thin^, where
is not s»ethingl!c::d^::tV:n"gr“:trvfd"^r-definition, ^ ^ Huantative ictionary
Kripke rejects the view that 'tiqer' h;^c: =0 •i- c g nas as its meaning a
conjunction or disjunction of properties, of which some or all must
the term to be applicable to something. Rather, certain
general terms refer to some kind of thing, where the kind of thing
can be shown by example, and where the kind remains uniform across
all possible worlds.
In order to elucidate this claim, Kripke contrasts "fixing the
reference" of an expression with "giving the meaning" of it. Using
the Wlttgenstelnlan example of the standard meter, he states that
someone who stipulates that a stick s which is to serve as a
standard of length for the term 'meter' is not laying down a
definition of 'meter', but, rather, fixing its reference. Hence,
the phrase 'one meter' is not synonymous with the phrase 'the length
of S at t"; rather, 'one meter' denotes the same length in all
possible worlds.
The importance of Kripke's view that some general terms are
rigid designators will become apparent shortly when I consider his
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claim that 'pain' is a rigid designator. For now, I summarize his
view as
1 .
2 .
follows
:
Names and some general
A rigid designator is a
object in all possible
terms are rigid designators.
term which denotes the same
worlds.
3. A rigid designator is not synonymous with a definitedescription denoting its reference or with some c usterOf properties; but its reference can be fixed via rdefinite description. ^
Statements Between Rigid Designators are
Kripke not only holds that names and some general terms are
rigid designators, but he also holds that Identity statements
between rigid designators, if true, are necessarily true. Kripke
9tells us:
old the following about the general case. First, that
characteristic theoretical identifications like 'Heat isthe motion of molecules'
,
are not contingent truths but
necessary truths, and here of course I don't mean just
physically necessary, but necessary in the highest degree
- whatever that means.
Elsewhere Kripke says that 'heat' is a rigid designator, so "Heat is
the motion of molecules" is apparently an example of a necessary
truth between two rigid designators. The difference between
necessarily true identity statements and contingently true identity
statements is that, for the latter, at least one of the terms on
either side is an accidental designator, and hence does not denote
the same object in all possible worlds. But if the terms are rigid,
then, they must designate the same object in all possible worlds,
and hence the identity is necessary. An example of an accidentally
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true Identity statement is
-Benjamin Franklin is the inventor of
bifocals
, while an example of a necessarily true identity statement
is "Hesperus is Phosphorus",
Kripke's view that Identity statements between rigid
designators are necessarily true plays a key role in his argument
against the identity thesis. For the moment, his view can be
summarized as follows:
4. An identity statement of the form 'a = b' is, if true
necessarily true, if
-a* and 'b' are rigid designators.
5. An identity statement of the form 'a = b' is, if true
accidentally true if either 'a* or 'b' is a non-rigid'
designator.
Q^^i’^in is an Essential Property
Another aspect of Kripke's metaphysical views that have
implications for his mind-body argument is his view that the origin
of a thing is an essential property of the thing. Considering the
example of a wooden table, Kripke comments:^^
In the case of this table, we may not know what block of
wood the table came from. Now could this table have been
made from a completely different block of wood, or even of
water cleverly hardened into ice - water taken from the
Thames River? We could conceivably discover that,
contrary to what we now think, this table is indeed made
of ice from the river. But let us suppose that it is
not. Then, though we can imagine making a table out of
another block of wood or even from ice, identical in
appearance with this one, and though we could have put it
in this very position in the room, it seems to me that
this is not to imagine this table as made of wood or ice,
but rather it is to imagine another table, resembling this
one in all external details, made of another block of
wood, or even of ice.
Kripke also considers the question whether Queen Elizabeth could
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have been born of different parents from the parents from whom she
actually came. He concludes that "Anything coming from a different
origin would not be this object".“ Kripke cites these cases as
examples of examples of essential properties, and does not attempt
to state a general theory about origin and essence. However, it
does seem clear that he endorses the following principle in these
(and related) passages in Naming and Necessity ;
6. The origin of a thing is an essential property of the
thing.
This principle will become important as I consider questions about
the origin of mental and physical events. However, I will now
summarize the general discussion of Kripke' s metaphysical views and
then turn to a consideration of his arguments against the identity
thesis.
2.2.4 Summary of Kripke' s Metaphysical Views
I have now formulated six general principles that Kripke
endorses in Naming and Necessity
, and that relate to his view on the
mind-body problem. These principles are as follows:
1, Names and some general terms are rigid designators.
2. A rigid designator is a term that denotes the same
object in all possible worlds.
3, A rigid designator is not synonymous with a definite
description denoting its reference or with some cluster
of properties; but its reference can be fixed via a
definite description.
4. An identity statement of the form 'a = b' is, if true,
necessarily true, if 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators.
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5. An identity statement of the form 'a = b' is if trnp
^
'
thing!‘"'"
"" essential property of the
I do not discuss criticisms of these principles now, or questions
about their meaning or their precise formulation. Rather, I move on
to a consideration of Kripke's argument against the identity thesis.
While keeping these principles in mind.
K.J^ipke's Arguments Against the Identity Theses
In this section, I state two different arguments that Kripke
formulates against the identity thesis. The conclusion of the first
argument is that a person is distinct from his body, while the
conclusion of the second argument is that a feeling of pain is
distinct from a brain state. I consider some criticisms which have
been made of these arguments in section 2.4.
jjt.ipke's Argument that a Person is Distinct from his Body
One form the identity thesis takes is the claim that a person
is identical to his body. Kripke states an argument against this
19
claim in the following passage:
Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person
or mind is distinct from his body, since the mind could
exist without the body. He might equally well have argued
the same conclusion from the premise that the body could
have existed without the mind. Now the one response which
I regard as plainly inadmissible is the response which
cheerfully accepts the Cartesian premise while denying the
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Cartesian conclusion. Let 'Descartes' be a name, or rlaldesignator, of a certain person, and let 's' be a rigiddesignator of his body. Then if Descartes were indeedIdentical to B, the supposed identity, being an identitybetween two rigid designators would be necessary, andDescartes could not exist without B and B could not exist
the an
is not at all comparable to
GeLral^wrth^th
l'3®"tity of the first Postmasterneral wit t e inventor of bifocals. True, thisIdentity obtains despite the fact that there could havebeen a first Postmaster General even though bifocals had
never been invented. The reason is that
-the inventor ofifocals IS not a rigid designator; a world in which no
facto a world in whichFranklin did not exist. The alleged analogy therefore
collapses; a philosopher who wishes to refute theCartesian conclusion must refute the Cartesian premise,
and the latter task is not trivial.
Here Kripke presents the following argument:
1. If 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators, then statements
of the form 'a = b' are, if true, necessarily true.
2. Let 'Descartes' be a rigid designator of Descartes.
3. Let 'B' be a rigid designator of Descartes' body.
4. Hence, if "Descartes = B" is true, it is necessarily
true. (1,2, and 3)
5. (xHy)(If X can exists at some time t and y does not
exist at t, then "x = y" is not necessarily true).
6. It is possible for Descartes' body to exist at some
time t even though Descartes does not exist at t.
7. Therefore, "Descartes = B" is not necessarily true.
(5,6)
8.
Therefore, "Descartes = B" is not true. (4,7)
The above argument is, as Kripke acknowledges, a contemporary
formulation of a "conceivability-type" argument for dualism which
originates with Descartes. In a famous Sixth Meditation passage.
Descartes argues from his ability to form a clear and distinct
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conception of himself or his mind as distinct from his body to the
conclusion that he or his mind really is distinct from his
body.“ Here Kripke simply argues that he can exist without his
body, and that his body can exist without him. while this type of
argument has been variously criticized,“ it does represent one of
the strongest possible arguments lot dualism: hence, it is worth
considering in some details. Before I do so, however, I will look
at a similar argument, formulated in terms of mental events.
2,3.2 Event Identity
The identity thesis is also formulated as a theory about the
relation between types of physical events and types of mental
events, as well as a theory about the relation between particular
mental events and particular physical events. The identity thesis
asserts that this relation is one of identity. Kripke formulates an
argument against the identity thesis, conceived as a claim about the
relation between particular mental and physical events:^^
Let 'A' name a particular pain sensation, and let 'B' name
the corresponding brain state, or the brain state some
identity theorist wishes to identify with A. Prima facie,
it would seem that it is at least logically possible that
B should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in
exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones
feeling any pain at all, and thus without the presence of
A. Once again, the identity theorist cannot admit the
possibility cheerfully and proceed from there;
consistency, and the principle of identities using rigid
designators, disallows any such course. It A and B were
identical, the identity would have to be necessary.
The above argument can be formulated as follows:
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1 . f a and b are both rigid designators,
statement of the form 'a = b', if true is
true. '
then any
necessarily
2 . Let 'A' be a rigid designator for
sensation.
a particular pain
3. Let 'B' be a rigid designator
state.
for a corresponding brain
4. Hence, "A
and 3)
B"
, if true, is necessarily true. (1, 2,
5. (x)(y)(lf it is possible for x to exist at some time t
and y does not exist at that time, then "x = y" is not
necessarily true)
.
6. It is possible for B to exist at some time t even
though A does not exist at t.
7. Therefore, "A = B" is not necessarily true. (5, 6)
8. Therefore, "A = b" is not true. (4, 7)
Because both of the above arguments will come into clearer focus
when I consider criticisms of them, I now consider some criticisms
of these two arguments which have been raised in the literature.
2 . 4 Feldman's Criticisms
In this section, I consider several criticisms of Kripke by
Fred Feldman. Feldman is writing from a materialist perspective,
and his criticisms primarily focus on premise 6 in the above two
arguments.
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Feldman formalizes two versions of Kripke's argument that a
person is distinct from his body (the first of the two arguments
just presented), and refers to them as
-Argument A- and
-Argument
B". He then goes on to comment:^^
Arguments A and B are valid. Furthermore, in each casethe conclusion is inconsistent with person-body
materialism. Nevertheless, neither argument is verypersuasive: in each case anyone predisposed to believe inperson-body materialism would be right to claim that theargument either begs the question or else is based on aallure to understand what person-body materialism amounts
u o •
Person-body materialism is the doctrine that people areIdentical to their bodies. In other words, anything thatIS a person is identical to the body of that person:
7 . (x)(t)(Pxt '-3>Oy)(Byt & Oyxt & x = y) )
Any clear headed proponent of this view would undoubtedly
say that death usually does not make people cease to
exist. Since, on this view, people are their bodies, the
conditions of survival of any person must be the same as
those of his or her body. This is not to say that anyone
adopting materialism would be saddled with the view that
there must be some sort of life after death. Far from it,
this form of materialism doesn't even imply that people
continue being people after they die. But what's
important here is that, on this view, the property of
being alive is an accidental property of the things that
have it. Something can have it for a while, and then
cease to have it, without thereby ceasing to exist. Thus,
the things that are people can continue to exist after
death.
Here Feldman is attempting to refute premises in his arguments A and
B which are equivalent to premise 6 in the first argument above:
6. It is possible for Descartes' body to exist at some
time t even though Descartes does not exist at t.
It is curious to see an advocate of materialism advocate a view
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which many have argued is unintelligible, and which is usually
associated with the strong form of dualism: the view that a person
can survive his own death! I now consider the doctrine motivating
this view: that a person is identical to his body.
The first point to make about Feldman's comments here is that
he implicitly appeals to a distinction he does not explain: a
distinction between being alive and existing. Being alive is the
mode of existence which characterizes a certain type of thing,
namely, an organism. Of course, some things can exist without being
alive (e.g. tables and chairs), but if Feldman wishes to claim that
I can exist without being alive, then he should provide an account
of this distinction.
Secondly, Feldman claims that being alive is not an essential
property of the things that have it. If Feldman wishes to make such
a claim, then he should make it clear what his view of essential
properties is. Kripke gives the following criterion for essential
properties
:
If we can t imagine a possible world in which Nixon
doesn't have a certain property, then it's a necessary
condition of someone being Nixon. Or a necessary property
of Nixon that he [has] that property.
Here Kripke advocates an " imaginibility" criterion for essential
properties: if we can't imagine something without a property, then
that property is essential to it (here I am interpreting 'necessary
condition' to refer to essential properties). Kripke goes on to
18
say:
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For example, supposinq Nixon i <? i n = u
.J.^ronrL:rre:; r^sr„eing Then it will be a necessary fact about Nixon thatin all possible worlds where he exists at all ho 1or anyway he is not an inanimate object!
Here Kripke explicitly rejects the possibility that a person could
be an inanimate object (e.g. a corpse). l think he would, on the
same basis, also reject the possibility that a person could exist
without being alive. Hence, if Feldman wishes to take this view
about essential properties, he owes us an explanation of what his
view is.
Of course, some dualists do believe that a person can survive
death. However, such persons often identify the person with an
immaterial substance or soul which can survive the dissolution of
the body. It is not clear whether such theorists would regard being
alive as an essential or accidental property of a person; but
clearly Feldman cannot appeal to this type of view to support his
argument since this is the type of view he is arguing against.
Third, there are strong reasons for rejecting the
identification of a person with his or her body. One reason is that
we often attribute to the body functions we do not attribute to the
self, or person. For example, my body circulates the blood, digests
food, and fights infection. These are all things my body does on
its own, not things I do. The fact that we distinguish in this way
things our body does from things we do is a strong reason for not
identifying a person with his body.
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Likewise, we attribute properties to ourselves which we don't
attribute to our bodies. For example, a person can be sick even
though there is nothing wrong with his body. I can be tired even
though my body is not, and I can be a cold person even though my
body is normal temperature, or is feverish. These are all examples
of properties we attribute to ourselves and not out bodies, and
provide an additional reason for not identifying a person with his
body.
Finally, if I am identical to my body, then my body is the
subject of all my psychological states. Thus, even if we don't
ordinarily say this, it should make sense to say "My body is angry"
instead of "I am angry", or "My body is bored" instead of "I am
bored". But these substitutions yield statements with no clear
meaning. And, in some cases, this would result in quite different
meanings; for example to say "You are boring" is quite different
from "Your body is boring". And desiring another person's body is
quite different from desiring the other person himself or herself.
Of course, it might be that a materialist could satisfactorily
deal with all the above objections. But the general point here is
that Feldman is no better off than he claims Kripke is, since all he
has done is to state some very controversial consequences of
materialist doctrine in reply to Kripke. Feldman claims that
Kripke's argument begs the question, but it seems clear that his own
comments, by making use of the unexplained distinction between being
alive and existing, and by appealing to an unexplained notion
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essential property
,
are as question-begging as Kripke's.
Furthermore, there are strong reasons for rejecting Feldman's
identification of person and body, which Feldman does not take into
account. Hence, I conclude that these comments by Feldman fail to
provide any reason for rejecting Kripke's argument.
Of course, it might be that a materialist could satisfactorily
deal with all the above objections. But the general point here is
that Feldman is no better off than he claims Kripke is, since all he
has done is to state some very controversial consequences of
materialist doctrine in reply to Kripke. Feldman claims that
Kripke's argument begs the question, but it seems clear that his own
comments, by making use of the unexplained distinction between being
alive and existing, and by appealing to an unexplained notion of
"essential property", are as question-begging as Kripke's.
Furthermore, there are strong reasons for rejecting Feldman's
identification of person and body, which Feldman does not take into
account. Hence, I conclude that these comments by Feldman fail to
provide any reason for rejecting Kripke's argument.
19Feldman does say:
The problem with Kripke's arguments, then, is that in each
case the argument seems to presuppose that at death the
person literally ceases to exist, whether the body does or
not
.
Feldman is right if he means that Kripke's argument does imply that
the person ceases to exists after death, although I don't believe
that Feldman has given us a single good reason to doubt this claim.
However, I defer for now the question whether Kripke needs to argue
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for this slain,, or whether he has saeoeeded in establishing it. For
now, I turn to Feldman's second line of reasoning.
Perhaps Feldman senses the implausibillty of the position he
ascribes to 'any clear-headed proponent of [materialism]’, lor he
now shifts ground as follows:^^
Perhaps Kripke or someone wishing to defend these
arguments would say that the property of being alive is anessential property of the things that have it. We can
understand this to mean that everything that is alive issuch that, necessarily, for any time t, if it exists at t,then It IS alive at t:
(8) (x) (t) (Axt O D(t' ) (Ext' O Axt' )
)
From this it would follow that, when Descartes dies, heliterally ceased to exist. This might be thought toprovide support for (8).
Feldman goes on to object;
Surely, Descartes's body was alive when Descartes was. Ifbeing alive is essential to the things that have it, then,just as death marked the end of Descartes, so must it have
marked the end of his body as well. On this view the
corpse must be construed as a new entity, brought into
existence by "substantial change". Hence, far from
providing support for it, the claim that everything is
alive is essentially so actually lends overwhelming
support to the denial of [premise 6].
The Kripkean thus has to say, if he wants to adopt this
line of defense for [premise 6], that being alive is not
an essential property of his body, even though it is a
property his body has. Hence, the body can survive death,
while Descartes cannot.
Feldman is right in saying that someone who wishes to defend a
dualistic position might argue from the fact that a person is
essentially alive and the body is not to the distinctness of person
and body. But Feldman claims that such a defense makes Kripke's
argument superfluous. He then shows that one can also construct an
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arg^ent to the conclusion that a person is distinct fro™ his body
by making use of Leibniz's Law:^^
9. d has the property of being essentially alive.
10. b does not have the property of being essentially alive.
11* X = y iff (F)(FX iff Fy)
.
12. d / h.
Feldman is right that premises 9 and 10 can be used either in
defense of premise 6 or as premises in an argument employing
Leibniz's Law. The difference is that, in Kripke's argument,
statements 9 and 10 are used in support of a premise which is
conjoined with other statements in such a way as to prove the
desired conclusion independent of Leibniz's Law. This does not
render Kripke's argument superfluous; it simply means that there may
be more than one way to prove that a person is distinct from his
body.
Feldman also claims that "no argument has been given for 9 "^^
(the statement that d has the property of being essentially alive).
While Feldman may be right that Kripke has not given an argument for
this claim, we saw above that Feldman has not given a single good
reason to reject this claim. And no serious dualist would accept
Feldman's "intuition" that "Surely, Descartes' body was alive"; he
would say that Descartes' body was a living thing, but this is not
to say that his body was alive. Hence, Feldman's comments up to
this point represent little more than philosophical name-calling.
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Criticisms of Kripke on Event Irt^nni-Y
Feldman also considers Krlpke's argument against the identity
thesis formulated in terms of the identity of mental events and
brain events. Feldman quotes the following passage from Naming and
23 ^Necessity :
Pr ima facie
.,
it would seem that it is at least logicallypossible that b should have existed (Jones's brain could
''' question)
without Jones feeling any pain at all, and thus withoutthe presence of [a]. Once again, the identity theorist
cannot admit the possibility cheerfully and proceed fromthere; consistency, and the principle of the necessity of
rue] Identity [i Jes using rigid designators disallows any
such course. ^
Feldman formulates Kripke' s argument, which he calls argument H, as
follows. Here 'Oxt' means "x occurs at t" and 'Pxt' means "x is a
pain-event at t"
:
(28) <>(3t)(0bt &.r^(3x)(Pxt & Oxt))
(29) (t)(Oat DPat)
(3 0) ^(3t)(Obt &-^Oat) (28,2 9)
(31) O(5t)(0xt &
-^Oyt) ^0(x y)
(32) C (a / b) (30,31)
Feldman objects that "(28) and (29) do not entail (30)-. He
r.
• 24
continues
;
It does not follow, from the fact that there is a possible
world in which b occurs without anything that is there a
pain-event, and the fact that a is a pain-event in this
world, that there is a world in which b occurs without a.
For if a, which is a pain-event in this world, occurs in
other worlds without being a pain-event, then perhaps a
does occur wherever b does. So the argument turns on the
question whether a, which is a pain-event in the actual
world, is a pain-event in every world in whi oh
rifesientiany^fp^^''"'^'''' question^wheth^rxi> eijsenciaiiy a pain-event.
Feldman is correct in saying that Kripke's claim that
is essentially painful is crucial to his a
a pain-event
say that: 25
rgument. He goes on to
enh. recognize that his view
oai^ev T is of the essence of ap in- ent. Pain-events are experienced as they are onlyas a result of contingent laws of nature.
. .Certain
contingent that they are
He finally concludes that Kripke's argument "turns on an undefended
controversial premise that materialists have, and should have,
rejected"
.
Kripke's argument, according to Feldman, depends on the
unsupported intuition that being a pain is an essential property of
a feeling of pain. Feldman does not refute this claim; he contents
himself, once again, with pointing out that this intuition is
inconsistent with a materialist point of view. However, I believe
that there is a serious difficulty in Kripke's argument. Can
Kripke's argument be stated in a way which does not seem simply to
appeal to our intuitions?
Kripke apparently believes that an appeal to intuitions is one
of the most forceful ways of presenting a philosophical argument.
However, I believe that, with respect to the mind-body problem,
one s intuitions are influenced by his philosophical point of view.
Hence it may be that, if the truth about the mind-body problem
rests, in the final analysis, on intuition, that it cannot be solved
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Furthermore, I see some merit in Feldman's objection that it is
not an essential property of a feeling of pain that it is painful.
Pains certainly vary in intensity, and one characteristic of pain is
that it often involves an "overload" of our nervous system. Thus,
we can put pressure on a certain part of our body, and slowly
increase the pressure until it becomes painful. In a situation like
this, I don't think it is implausible to argue that we have the same
feeling all along, but that it suddenly becomes painful. First, it
might be a feeling of pressure on our hand, but as the pressure
increases, the feeling becomes painful. On this analysis, the very
same feeling at first is not painful, but then, as the pressure is
increased, that very feeling becomes painful. Hence, a single
feeling can at one point not be painful, and then become a feeling
of pain. If this is right, being painful is merely a contingent
property of some feelings, which a feeling might have at one time t
and not have at another time t'. On this view, then, painfulness is
a merely contingent property of feelings.
I believe, however, that Kripke's argument can be stated in a
way that avoids this difficulty. For, even if pain is a merely
contingent property of some feelings, a feeling which is at one time
painful and another time is not is still a feeling of some kind.
Hence, even if painfulness is not an essential property of feelings,
at least being a feeling is an essential property, and Kripke's
argument can be stated as before, except that instead of "pain"
being an essential property, "being a feeling" is an essential
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property, so even it „e grant Feldman's claim that painfulness is a
contingent property of some feelings, we can formulate Kripke's
argument, substituting
-being a feeling- for
-painfulness- as the
essential property.
Feldman grants that, if we change 29 to 29' :
(29)') Q(t)(Oat o Pat)
that Kripke's argument is valid. Let us reformulate Kripke's
argument to accomodate the above point, substituting (Fa) ( "a is a
feeling-) for (Pa) ( "a is a pain-event");
(28) <>(3t)(0bt & rv(3x)(Fxt & Oxt) )
(29) Q(t)(Oat 3 Fat)
(30)
'0(^t)(Obt&''^Oat) (28) (29)
( 31) O (3t) (Oxt & '^Oyt) 3<i-(x y)
(24) <^(a Z' b) (3Q)
^
Perhaps Feldman would not be convinced by this reformulated
argument. His general strategy seems to be, to argue for a
candidate essential property p of x, that p is really an accidental
property of x, since what appears to be x is really fundamentally y,
and p is an accidental property of y. Thus, he argued that a person
is only accidentally alive, and that someone might continue to exist
after death, event though he or it was no longer a person. Feldman
might be expected to reply there that a feeling is just a kind of
event, and that some events are and others are not feelings.
Furthermore, he might say, the very same event that is a feeling in
one world is not a feeling in another world; hence, being a feeling
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is a merely contingent property of some events. This argument would
parallel his argument on pain.
^ Z^l<3man's Three Conceptions of Events
Feldman does make an argument similar to the one just sketched
elsewhere. In a recent paper, he distinguishes three conceptions of
what an event is. While he concedes that, on the first two views he
considers, the propositional" view and the "structural" view, the
identity thesis does not seem plausible, yet, he maintains, on the
"concrete" events view, Kripke's argument does not succeed. Feldman
tells us very little about concrete events, except to say that
events are more coarse~grained" on this conception than they are on
other conceptions. The idea seems to be to treat each event as a
concrete individual.
? ftAfter introducing this concept, Feldman argues as follows:
If a^ and ^ are concrete events, then, so far as I can see,
Kripke's point can not be established. Event ^ is a case
of someone being amused. But why should it be essentially
so? It is as concrete an individual as Jones himself.
Surely no one would say that Jones is essentially someone
who is amused. Just as being amused is a contingent
property of Jones, so being a case of someone being amused
may be a contingent property of a^.
If we are to have a coherent version of the contingent
psycho-physical event identity theory, then it seems most
reasonable to assume that the events in question are
concrete events. And if we do this, then Kripke's
argument loses its foothold. He has no way to show that ^
is essentially a case of someone being amused. For all we
know, that very event could have occurred without anyone
being amused. Hence, the fact that we can imagine ^
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occurring without anyone being amused does not
wUhou^ri!'" b occurring
If we substitute "Jones' having a feeling- for "Jones' being
amused", we get the claim that the very event of Jones' having a
feeling could occur without anyone having a feeling. But surely
this IS not the case. It is easy to see how Jones can exist
unamused; it is not easy to see how the event of Jones' having a
feeling could exist if no one had a feeling, it might be somewhat
plausible to argue that being amused is a merely contingent property
of certain feelings; it is not at all plausible to argue that being
a feeling is a merely contingent property of certain events.
In order to see why this is so, consider what a feeling is on
the concrete events view, of the structural view, Feldman says:^^
According to the structural view, events are structures of
property, individual, and time. They ate individuated by
reference to their components. We have the same event if
and only if we have the same property, individual and time.
Concrete events are apparently like structural events, except that
they are more "coarse-grained". I interpret this to mean that the
for what counts as the same event are less rigid. For
example, Feldman says that the very same concrete event could make
both the following statements true:
1. Jones is very amused.
2. Jones is amused about what happened to the chickens.
Concrete events still appear to be a structure of an individual, a
property, and a time; the difference seems to be that the criteria
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for
-same property- (and perhaps also for "same individual- and
•same time-) are less rigid (looser).
Using this conception of an event, it is easy to see how
Feldman might become convinced that being amused is a merely
contingent property of certain events which consists in a person's
having a feeling at some time t. For if the same event can make
-being very amused- and
-being amused about what happened to the
chickens- true, then perhaps the very same event could make
something similar true like
-being entertained by the story about
the chickens', which perhaps does not imply being amused, but is
nonetheless similar. In such a case, it might seem plausible to
argue that Jones' being amused is a contingent property of the event
which makes both 'Jones is entertained' and 'Jones is amused" true.
Hence, there is a world in which this event occurs without anyone's
being amused.
However, if the property involved is not "being amused" (having
a particular feeling) but "having a feeling", i do not see how
Feldman s argument can be made. For Feldman has to argue that the
^®ty same event which constitutes Jones' having a feeling can occur
without anyone' s having a feeling. Perhaps Feldman would argue that
Jones' having a feeling is an accidental property of some event more
generally described, such as Jones' having a perception. But
feeling, if it is a form of perception at all, is a very different
form of perception from other forms of perception such as seeing and
hearing, and no plausible criterion of event identity would be so
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broad that seeing a chair makes
-I have a feeling- true (unless
'feeling' has been given a greatly expanded sense). The problem
with Feldman's argument is that it must be possible for the very
same event which consists in Jones' having a feeling at t to occur
even though Jones has no feeling at all. Perhaps he sees a chair at
t instead. But Jones' seeing a chair is a different event
altogether from Jones' having a feeling; if no one has a feeling at
t, then certainly Jones doesn't either, and the event of Jones
having a feeling doesn't occur. Hence, this is not an example of a
possible world in which the very same event occurs but Jones does
not have a feeling.
Feldman is perhaps right that for any candidate essential
property of some individual a, it is possible to redescribe a in a
more general way to that e appears to be a merely accidental
property of b, the newly described a, and then claim that b is
really a. It is this type of reasoning according to which being
alive and even being a person is a merely contingent property of
someone (or something), who might continue to exist after death even
though he (or it) is no longer alive or a person. (Of course,
Feldman does not say what I really am if I am not a person)
. While
this type of reasoning might work at a fairly specific level of
description, it does not continue to work indefinitely. For
eventually, the redescription becomes so general that it is no
longer plausible to maintain the identity between the old
individual, a, and the newly described individual, b. Thus, in the
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case of having a feeling, it is implausible to maintain that having
a feeling is really just an accidental property of a mote generally
described event such as having a perception. For even if feeling is
a form of perception, it is a very specific type of perception, and
seeing a chair (a different form of perception) could not possibly
count as the very same event as having a feeling of pain on any
reasonable criterion of event identity.
I conclude, then, that Feldman's "de-essentialization by
redescription" does not work in every instance, and hence that
Kripke's premise 2, if construed to read "having a feeling- instead
of -having a feeling of pain", is not susceptible to Feldman's
refutation.
Furthermore, Feldman states that Kripke's argument rests on an
undefended intuition about essential properties. One might just as
well point out that Feldman's argument rests on a poorly defined and
unclear conception of events, and that, if he is going to be
successful in refuting Kripke's argument, he owes us a better
explanation of his conception of "concrete events".
2. 6 Other Issues Relating to Duali sm
Even if I have shown that Feldman has failed to refute Kripke's
premise 5, of course, I have not demonstrated that either argument
is sound. My defense of premise 5 constitutes indirect support for
it. However, premise 2 is also important: the claim that certain
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terms which designate mental states are rigid designators. This
question seems to turn on the question whether being a pain is an
essential property of a feeling of pain, while we saw that this may
not be the case, yet being a feeling does seem to be an essential
property, so the argument works with 'feeling' substituted for
' pain'
.
The Problem of Interaction
Even if Kripke's argument B is sound, however, it at most
constitutes an argument for some form of property dualism, a dualism
of events, not the "full-blooded" substantial dualism which
Descartes advocated. However, even if an argument for a theory
cannot be refuted, if the theory has insuperable difficulties
elsewhere, then the best possible argument will not get us very
far. It is believed by many people that interaction is such an
insuperable problem for dualism, so that even if one can give a
sound and apparently non-trivial argument for dualism, yet the
problem of interaction has sometimes frightened away even the most
loyal of defenders.
There are several different arguments which purport to show
that interaction between mind and body cannot be explained on a
dualist account. One is the argument from conservation of energy.
Michael Levin states one formulation of this argument in the
30following passage:
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Another traditional argument.
. .does seem to showdecisively that the causal relations between the mind as
OrJoinanf it and the body are impossible!o iginally my leg, which has mass w, is motionless ThenIt moves distance d. Enough work was done rrmo^^a m!Lw a distance d. where did the energy come £10!?%^ t
empirical tact, the law o£ the conservation orenergy
does U%omrir =°'"^“here, and not o^lyT i preceding physical event, no
possibly supply mechanical
^ apply no physical force to the leg
•
contraction of the hamstring muscle supplieslust the right amount - and the bodily event jus^irLmotion of an object of mass w through distance d. ~husthe contraction of the muscle is the cause of e. if therewere non-physical causes of physical events, the energy inthe universe would increase.
The main point is that an immaterial object cannot impart motion to
a material object. If a thought is an immaterial object with no
material properties, then it seems impossible to conceive that a
thought could impart physical motion to my arm, or to any physical
body. Of course, interaction seems to be an undeniable fact of
life. A thought of embarrassment can make my face turn red, while
my poor physical condition can cause me to become depressed. Yet,
it seems, this interaction cannot be accounted for on dualist
principles.
Why is interaction seemingly unsolvable within a dualist
framework? The chief reason for this is that dualists and
materialists both accept a common conception of what mind or a
mental event is and what a body or physical event is. They then
proceed to debate whether, based on these conceptions, mind and body
are identical or distinct. Often, these conceptions are Cartesian
in nature: body is extended, material, and exists in space while
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mind is unextended, inmaterial, and does not exist in space. Given
these assumptions, it is no wonder that the mind-body problem seems
unsolvable, or that interaction presents a problem for the dualist.
For, by accepting these conceptions of mind and body, the dualist is
forced to argue that something which essentially has a property
(e.g. a material object), can interact with something which
essentially lacks that property (e.g. an immaterial object). This
might be possible if either object had other properties through
which they might interact, but, unfortunately, mental and physical
events are often conceived as having only one essential property (in
fact, that this is so was a cardinal doctrine of Descartes). This
conception of mind and body makes it possible to use Leibnix's Law
to quickly demonstrate distinctness of mind and body. However, the
price of having such a conception of mind and body is that
interaction is difficult if not impossible to account for.
Of course, a dualist is simply committed to the distinctness of
mind and body, or of mental events and physical events. It is not
inconsistent with the principles of dualism to draw the mind-body or
mental-physical distinction in such a way that it marks out a
dichotomy. Because I believe that it is fruitless to try to solve
the problem of interaction until the mental-physical distinction
itself is examined more closely, I defer further discussion of this
issue until Chapter 6, after I discuss the mental-physical
distinction in Chapter 5.
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~ Consequence of Kripke's View.<. on
unfortunately, Kripke does not, to my knowledge, comment on the
problem of interaction. Furthermore, he does not say how he thinks
the distinction between mental events and physical events should be
drawn. However, it is worth pointing out one apparent consequence
of his theory that the origin of something is an essential property
of that thing. It seems fairly clear that some mental states
originate in the body. For example, a headache might originate in a
pinched nerve, and a toothache originates in a tooth. Furthermore,
it seems that we distinguish between mental states according to
their different physical origins. Thus, a headache which originates
in a different pinched nerve is counted a different headache, even
if It is roughly in the same phenomenal location as the first.
Likewise, toothaches that originate in different teeth are different
toothaches. If Kripke is right that the origin of something is one
of Its essential properties, then it may turn out that some mental
states have at least one physical property essentially, viz. that
they originate in some particular part of the body. Furthermore,
this consequence seems consistent with the way we do in fact
individuate mental events such as feelings. If this is correct,
then Kripke may be committed to a more complicated view than
straight-forward dualism.
The relation between a feeling and the bodily state in which it
originates is typically described as being that of cause and
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effect. For example, it might be said that a pinched nerve causes
my headache, instead of saying that my headache originates in a
pinched nerve. It is not clear that these claims are consistent,
although origin and 'cause' are not synonymous. One difference is
that the origin of x is sometimes the very first of a chain of
events which ultimately lead to x, while the cause of something
usually immediately precedes x. Thus, questions about the origin of
man sometimes focus on a "missing link" which would bridge the gulf
between man and beast; if such a missing link were discovered, it
would not be described as the cause of mankind, although it would be
plausible to claim that mankind originated in this creature. From a
poiut of view, of course, human life originated in the
Garden of Eden.
If it is objected that the above consequence of Kripke's views
about origin depend on an undefended and controversial distinction
between the physical cause and the physical origin which Kripke
might not accept, I reply that Kripke does explicitly argue that it
is an essential property of a person that he came from the sperm and
egg that he in fact came from. And a sperm and egg would ordinarily
be taken to be physical things (at least they have physical
properties: whether they are "purely" physical depends on how one
analyzes the fact that they are living things) . Hence, Kripke is
certainly committed to the claim that a person has at least on
essential property which is physical: viz. that he came into being
in virtue of the union of two particular physical things, i.e. a
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certain sperm and a certain egg. Furthermore, Kripke seems to
accept a general similarity between the types of arguments which
purport to show person-body distinctness and mental-physical
distinctness. Hence, I believe he would accept this consequence for
mental states as well (that they essentially originate in some
particular bodily state).
once this consequence has been pointed out, it begins to appear
that
-mental- and
-physical- are more Intimately intertwined than
the formulations of the mind-body problem would lead us to believe.
To use another example of this, let us consider premise 3 in
Kripke's argument for dualism:
3. Let 'B' be a rigid designator of Descartes' body or of
some bodily state.
The problem here is that, in an argument purporting to show the
distinctness of Descartes from his body, Descartes' body is
Identified by reference to Descartes. While it might be thought
that Descartes' body could be identified in some other way (e.g.
ostensively)
,
the problem is even greater when one considers the
problem of saying which bodily state one wishes to designate by
'B'. If one says "the bodily state associated with some feeling of
pain", then he has relied on the feeling of pain to individuate the
bodily state. But this is to assume their distinctness. For if x
is identical to y, then y cannot be the individuating principle of
X. In other words, nothing can be its own individuating principle.
This problem is usually side-stepped in favor of some
description such as "C-fiber firings". However, it is a generally
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accepted fact that it is not possible to find a physiological state
Which correlates strictly with pain. Hence, the description of
-C-fiber firings- to pick out the bodily state is based on a
misconception. Furthermore, even if C-fiber firings did correlate
with pain, it would be necessary to specify which C-fiber firings
one wanted to pick out as being correlated with some particular
feeling of pain. And one would also have to specify what other
parts or states of the body he wished to include in the reference of
•bodily state B'. The only way to distinguish among bodily states
IS by picking out those that contribute in some way to the feeling
of pain. But, once again, this is to use the mental state whose
distinctness from the bodily state is being proved as a principle of
individuation for the bodily state. Of course, one might say "the
total bodily state", but then the issue would be formulated as being
whether a particular feeling of pain is identical to or distinct
from the entire bodily state of some body. But no clear-minded
materialist would want to identify a feeling of pain with a total
bodily state — for then if any other mental events were occurring
simultaneously, there would be nothing to identity them with. And
now one must still specify the state of which body he wishes to
identify with pain. But this is the same type of circularity we
were trying to avoid]
The problem of identifying some bodily state which "correlates"
with pain may appear to be a problem for Kripke in stating premise
3, but it's really more a problem for the identity theorist. For
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Kripke-s argument can apply to any bodily state the identity
theorist wishes to choose, while the latter must specify some bodily
state to identify with any feeling which might be considered. This
creates a serious problem for the Identity theorist because there is
no non-circular way of specifying which brain state is to be
identified with (e.g.) pain. Either he uses some mental criterion
(e.g.,
-the bodily state correlated with pain-), or he doesn't, if
he uses a mental criterion, then he has already conceded the
argument to dualism, for the individuating principle must be
distinct from x, otherwise it could not serve as a rigid
designator. One the other hand, if he doesn't rely on a mental
criterion of some kind, he will never succeed in picking out the
right brain state, for then the materialist must devise some purely
physical criterion for picking out the brain state. Because there
is no bodily state that correlates strictly with pain, I do not see
how this can be done.
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CHAPTER III
DONALD DAVIDSON'S ANOMALOUS MONISM
3 • 1 Introduction
some philosophers have rejected both dualism and materialism in
favor of views which try to find a middle ground between these two
positions. Donald Davidson is an example of such a philosopher.
While Davidson is well-known for his work on action theory and on
causation, he has also published several articles which relate
directly to the mind-body issue. In this chapter, I discuss these
articles. While I mainly discuss "Mental Events", I also refer to
"Philosophy as Psychology" and "The Material Mind".^
Davidson's primary purpose in "Mental Events" is to show how
three principles he believes are true can be rendered consistent
with one another. In section 3.2, I state these three principles.
Davidson believes that these principles can be reconciled by
adopting what he calls anomalous monism. This view can roughly be
stated as saying that no mental descriptions instantiate a strict,
deterministic scientific law. I formulate this principle of
anomalous monism in section 3.2 and show how it resolves the
apparent inconsistency.
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Most Of this chapter is devoted to examining the merits of
anomalous monism as Davidson formulates It. In section 3.3, i
formulate what I take to be Davidson's main argument for anomalous
monism. This argument has as its conclusion the claim that there
are no psychophysical laws, from this conclusion one can derive
anomalous monism with only a few additional assumptions.
One factor on which the plausibility of Davidson’s defense of
anomalous monism depends is the correctness of and way in which he
draws the distinction between mental and physical events. I discuss
this issue in section 3.4. l argue that Davidson's conception of
mental events is too restricted and that his criterion that an event
is mental just in case it falls under a mental description leads to
unacceptable results.
Davidson's argument for anomalous monism also depends for its
soundness on the claim that any scientific law must draw on a
homonomic domain. This claim, together with Davidson's claim that
the physical conceptual domain is homonomic, has important
consequences for Davidson's theory and for scientific law. I
examine this claim and these consequences in section 3.5. One
consequence is that the physical conceptual domain includes only the
languages of chemistry and physics and does not include the
languages of biology and neurology which are heteronomic. It also
means that Davidson must identify mental events with molecular
events rather than with brain events. I discuss these and other
consequences in this section.
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In section 3.6 I place Davidson's claim that a scientific law
must draw on a homonomic domain within the context of his argument
that there are no psychophysical laws. The claim that there are no
psychophysical laws is the main result he needs to justify anomalous
monism. I conclude that since Davidson does not argue for the claim
that scientific laws must draw on a homonomic domain, and since
there are reasons for doubting that this is so, that he has failed
to establish anomalous monism and that there are good reasons for
doubting that anomalous monism is true. Furthermore, since it is by
adopting the principle of anomalous monism that Davidson reconciles
the apparent inconsistency in the three principles he believes to be
true, I conclude that Davidson has failed to establish that his way
of reconciling these principles is correct. This is not, however,
to deny that he has provided a way of reading these principles which
renders them logically consistent with each other.
Davidson also gives a demonstration of the identity of mental
and physical events. In section 3.7 I formulate this demonstration
as an explicit argument. I conclude that this demonstration fails
because it depends on two claims which Davidson has not established
and which seem very dubious. The first claim is the one discussed
in section 3.4 which states that an event is physical just in case
it has a physical description. The second claim is the principle of
anomalous monism, which is discussed in section 3.5.
In section 3.8 I briefly summarize the chapter. I conclude
that Davidson has failed to establish either the "anomalous" part or
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the monism" part of anomalous monism,
reasons for doubting anomalous monism.
Furthermore, there are good
^•2 Davidson's Views in "Mental Events*
In "Mental Events", Davidson formulates three principles
he believes to be true but which seem to be inconsistent with
2
other. These principles are as follows:
I. At least some mental events interact causally with
physical events (the Principle of Causal Interaction).
II. Where there is causality, there must be a law: events
related as cause and effect fall under strict
deterministic laws, (the Principle of the Nomological
Character of Causality)
.
III. There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of
which mental events can be predicted and explained.
(the Anomalism of the Mental).
Although the inconsistency is not formal and explicit in the
above three statements, it can be made explicit as follows:
1. There exists at least one mental event m and physical
event p such that m causes p, and there exists at least
one physical event p' and mental event m' such that p'
causes m'
.
2. For any events x and y, if x causes y or y causes x,
then there exists some strict deterministic law L such
that X and y fall under L.
3. There exists no strict deterministic law L such that
any mental event falls under L.
4. Therefore, there exists some strict deterministic law
L' such that mental event m and physical event p fall
under L'
. (1,2)
which
each
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statement 4, which contradicts statement 3, follows from statements
1 and 2.
Davidson attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency in the
above three principles by revising li, the principle of the
Homological Character of Causality, and III, the Anomalism of the
Mental. Fundamental to his solution is his claim that events are
mental only as described. Davidson believes that a single event can
have both a physical description and a mental description, and that
whether an event is mental or physical depends on how it is
described. This allows him to say that principle III applies to
events only described as mental. He then reads principle II as
saying that when events are related as cause and effect, they have
descriptions that instantiate a law.
I now reformulate Davidson's principles to show how the
inconsistency is eliminated:
I'. At least some mental events interact causally with
physical events, (the Principle of Causal Interaction).
II'
. For any events x and y, if x causes y or y causes x,
then, there exists a strict deterministic law L and a
description d(x) such that d(x) and d(y) instantiate L.
• There is no strict deterministic law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
Now I' and II' together only imply that:
IV. There exists a description d(x) and a description d(y)
and law L such that d(x) and d(y) instantiate L.
IV does not contradict III', since IV does not assert that d(x)
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and d(y) must be ment^ descriptions, m fact, as „e shall see
Davidson maintains they must be physical.
Davidson's Argument for Anomalou.<^ Mnnicr.
In order to reconcile the three principles which he cites,
Davidson adopts a position he calls anomalous monism. He
characterizes this position as follows:^
Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that
all events are physical, but rejects the thesis, usually
considered essential to materialism, that mental phenomena
can be given purely physical explanations. Anomalous
monism shows an ontological bias only in that it allows
the possibility that not all events are mental, while
insisting that all events are physical.
Davidson has characterized his position as a combination of
conceptual dualism and ontological monism.^ It is conceptual
dualism in that he does not believe that mental descriptions can be
reduced to physical descriptions, or vice versa. It is
ontologically monistic in that he believes that mental events are
identical to physical events. The form of monism is materialism; he
believes that, ontologically speaking, mental and physical events
are physical events, even if they have mental descriptions.
In addition to conceptual dualism and ontological materialism,
Davidson's anomalous monism involves the view that there are no
psychophysical laws. A psychophysical law for Davidson would be one
which formulates a lawlike connection between a psychological event
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and a physical event, m fact, principle in' as formulated above
explicitly states this view:
<^®terministlc law L and descriptiondU) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
in this section, 1 primarily discuss Davidson's argument for III'.
Davidson devotes much of "Mental Events" to defending in'.
While he does not formally state his argument, it is possible to
construct a formal argument on the basis of several passages. These
•
>
.a
5include
:
In our daily traffic with events and actions that must beforeseen or understood, we perforce make use of the
sketchy summary generalization, for we do not know a more
accurate law, or if we do, we lack a description of the
particular events in which we are interested that would
show the relevance of the law. But there is an important
distinction to be made within the category of the rude
rule of thumb. On the one hand, there are generalizations
whose positive instances give us reason to believe the
generalization itself could be improved be adding further
provisos and conditions stated in the same general
vocabulary as the original generalization. Such a
generalization points to the form and vocabulary of the
finished law: we may say that it is a homonomic
generalization. On the other hand there are
generalizations which when instantiated may give us reason
to believe there is a precise law at work, but one that
can be stated only by shifting to a different vocabulary.
We may call such generalizations heteronomic.
I suppose most of our practical lore (and science) is
heteronomic. This is because a law can hope to be
precise, explicit, and as exceptionless as possible only
if it draws its concepts from a comprehensive closed
theory. This ideal theory may or may not be
deterministic, but it is if any true theory is. Within
the physical sciences we do find homonomic
generalizations, generalizations such that if the evidence
supports them, we then have reason to believe they may be
sharpened indefinitely be drawing upon further physical
concepts: there is a theoretical asymptote of perfect
coherence with all the evidence, perfect predictability
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f total explanation (againunder the terms of the system). Or perhaps the ultimatetheory IS probabilistic, and the asymptote is less thanperfection; but in that case there will be no better to be
Elsewhere, he says:
There are no strict psychophysical laws because of thedisparate commitments of the mental and the physical
schemes. It is a feature of physical reality thatphysical change can be explained by laws that connect it
with other changes and conditions physically described.
It is a feature of the mental that the attribution of
mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of
reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the individual. There
cannot be tight connections between the realms if each isto retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence.
Based on the above passages, the following argument can be
constructed
:
1 . For any scientific law L which exists, there exists a
set of terms and descriptions which forms a closed,
homonomic domain whose elements are drawn on by L.
2. There exist scientific physical laws.
3. Therefore, there exists a set of terms and descriptions
which forms a closed, homonomic (physical) domain which
physical laws draw on. (1,2)
4.
If there exists a scientific psychophysical law L',
then there exists a set of terms and descriptions which
forms a closed, homonomic domain which is drawn on bv
L'
.
^
5. The set of terms and descriptions
psychophysical law is not a closed
6. Therefore, no psychophysical laws
Does this argument, whose conclusion
psychophysical laws, provide a defense of
no mental descriptions instantiate a law?
claim that there cannot be psychophysical
drawn on by a
, homonomic domain.
exist. (4,5)
is that there are no
III', the principle that
Davidson says that the
laws "is not quite the
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principle of the
assumptions entai
follows
:
anomalism of the mencai, but on reasonable
Is it-.^ Such an argument can be constructed as
* ^ ^ deterministic law L and description
wherP^dfT-^'"^''^
"" instantiates L,
e (x) IS a mental description of x, only if L is apsychophysical law or a psychological law.
8. There are no psychophysical laws.
9. There are no psychological laws.
10 . Therefore, there
description d(x)
instantiates L,
X. (7,8,9)
IS no strict deterministic law L and
of any event x such that d(x)
where d(x) is a mental description of
Davidson would undoubtedly give the same argument for 9 that he
gives for 8: that psychological laws do not draw on a homonomic
domain. Hence, statements 1 - 10 together constitute an argument
for III', the principle of anomalous monism. Clearly, however, the
argument for the claim that there are no psychological laws
(statement 6) is the most important part of the argument. Hence, I
now consider the argument for this claim, statements 1 - 6 above.
There are several important issues and claims relating to this
argument. One is the issue regarding how to draw the distinction
between mental and physical events and between mental and physical
descriptions. Another is Davidson's claim that a scientific law
must draw on a set of concepts and descriptions which forms a
closed, homonomic domain. He also claims that the set of physical
concepts and descriptions does, and the set of mental concepts and
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descriptions does not, form such a closed homonomic domain, i
discuss these issues and claims in the following two sections.
^Q^J-dson's View o f Mental and Physical Events
One fundamental assumption which seems implicit in most
discussions of the mind-body problem, including Davidson's, is that
there is a definite and definable distinction between what is mental
and what is physical, and between the terms 'mental' and
•physical'. Davidson explicitly directs his discussion towards
mental and physical events, but similar questions arise in relation
to distinguishing between mental and physical descriptions,
substances, processes, states, attributes, objects, subjects,
phenomena, causes, effects, and properties. Even those who admit
that they cannot provide a satisfactory way of drawing "the"
mental-physical distinction nevertheless insist it can be done, at
least "in principle".
How someone who discusses the mind-body problem draws the
mental-physical distinction is very important in relation to the
discussion. For there is a variety of mental phenomena, and it is
easy for someone to make the mistake of thinking he or she has given
and account of all mental phenomena, when what is said applies only
to one type. For example, supporters of the identity thesis tend to
use sensations as their "paradigm" mental phenomenon; if they
considered emotions they would find that their arguments are less
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compelling. Davidson restricts his discussion to mental events.
indeed to ones having intentionality. Like many philosophers, he
assumes the primary problem is to characterise "the mental-, while
characterizing the
-physical- is a secondary problem which follows
naturally from solving the primary problem.^
I now consider Davidson's attempt to distinguish between mental
and physical events. He begins by suggesting that "an event is
physical if it is describable in a purely physical vocabulary,
mental if describable in mental terms'.^ He rejects this
criterion if it means that an event is physical if some physical
predicate is true of it. He does so on the grounds that:^^
Every event is truly describable either by 'x took place
at Noosa Heads' or 'x did not take place at Noosa Heads'.
Next Davidson offers the following criterion for distinguishing
mental verbs from non-mental verbs:^^
We may call those verbs mental that express propositional
attitudes like believing, intending, desiring, hoping,
knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so on.
Such verbs are characterized by the fact that they
sometimes figure in sentences with subjects that refer to
persons, and are completed by embedded sentences in which
the usual rules of substitution appear to break down.
He then offers an example to show that it includes many events we
would intuitively accept as physical:
However, the criterion actually covers not only the
havings of pain and afterimages, but much more besides.
Take some event one would intuitively accept as physical,
let's say the collision of two stars in distant space.
There must be a purely physical predicate 'Px' true of
this collision, and of others, but true of only this one
at the time it occurred. This particular time, though,
may be pinpointed as the same time that Jones notices that
a pencil starts to roll across his desk. The distant
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stellar collision is thus Uie event x such that Px and xIS simultaneous with Jones's noticing that a pencil starts
collision has L bee^
Tmenf
mental description and must be counted asa me tal event. v-tJUMi.eu db
Davidson correctly concludes that
-this strategy will probably worK
to show every event to be mental",
A similar strategy shows every event to be physical. Simply
reverse the example and take as an intuitively mental event Jones'
noticing that a pencil starts to roll across his desk. Suppose that
there is a purely mental predicate 'Mx' true of this act of
noticing, and of others, but true of only this one at the time it
occurred. This particular time, though, may be pinpointed as the
same time two stars collide in distant space. The act of noticing
is thus Uie event x such that Mx and x is simultaneous with the
collision of two distant stars. This act of noticing has now been
picked out be a physical description and must be counted as a
physical event.
Davidson's criterion seems to leave us with the conclusion that
every event is mental and every event is physical. This may not be
an undesirable result, but it requires further examination.
Ordinarily, "x is mental" is thought to rule out "x is physical";
they are regarded as being mutually exclusive categories. Davidson
appears to accept this conception of the relation between "mental"
and "physical". Commenting on the strategy which shows every event
to be mental, he says "it would be instructive to try to mend this
14trouble". I now consider how this could be done.
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According to Davidson*s criterion, an event is cental if and
only if it can be picked out be a mental description or open
sentence, where this is one which contains at least one mental verb
essentially. Often a description picks out some property or feature
Which an event can have or relation it can stand in, and ascribes
this property, feature, or relation to the event. One reason
Davidson's criterion doesn't work is because mental events can stand
in relations to physical events, and physical events can stand in
relations to mental events, m Davidson's example, the distant
stellar collision stands in the relation of simultaneity to Jones'
act of noticing that a pencil started to roll across his desk.
Likewise (though this reciprocity doesn't hold for all relations),
Jones' noticing act stands in the relation of simultaneity to the
distant stellar collision. Hence, the distant stellar collision can
be picked out by a description which specifies this relation of
simultaneity to the act of noticing, and vice versa.
These examples are not idiosyncratic; in fact, every mental
event and every physical event stands in many types of relation.
Some are more trivial than others, but this does not mean they do
not obtain. A new Rolls Royce which is the grand prize in a drawing
might be the object of the desires of hundreds, thousands, or even
millions of people. An astronomical event such as a solar eclipse
can be viewed by millions of people; this event is the object of
perception by them. We can pick out a physical object by saying
Ill
It s the one I'm lookinq at" in i t-u>!ing
. I all these examples, mental and
Physical events stand in relations to each other.
It might be suggested that we rule out descriptions which
ascribe relations to events in our criterion for mental and physical
events. Besides being arbitrary, it would often be difficult to
specify location or place. For example, suppose a group of
identical bottles (identical in type) is being processed through a
bottling plant. The most natural way, and perhaps the only way, to
distinguish them is by their position or their relation(s) to some
other thing. For example, one might say "The bottle in the front
row, second from the left". This is to identify the bottle by
appealing to its position in the row. Of course, sometimes we can
identify objects without specifying a relation, as if only one
bottle is cracked, we can say "the cracked bottle". But in cases in
which a number of objects look the same, we rely on relational
ascriptions.
The suggestion that we rule out relational ascriptions is even
less attractive when applied to mental events. For Davidson makes
intentionality his criterion of the mental, and intentional verbs
carry a relational component. This is sometimes expressed by saying
they have "aboutness", or they are "about" something. If I think
that I might take the train and I think that I might take my car,
the difference between these thoughts us that one is about the train
and the other is about my car. The train and the car are the
objects of my thought. Likewise, I might be angry at Jones, or have
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love for my best friend, while philosophers have debated the nature
of intentional objects, it seems clear that in many cases at least,
Identifying a mental event requires making a relational ascription.
Often the relation ascribed is to the object of the mental event,
which is physical in many cases.
It seems, then, that we cannot fix Davidson's criterion by
ruling out descriptions of relations from the set of eligible
descriptions. This still leaves us with Davidson's original
criterion, which seems to have unacceptable consequences. Bernard
Katz spells out another, though similar, consequence of Davidson's
15
criterion in these remarks:
Suppose m, a mental event, caused or was caused by p, a
physical event. Then there will be a physical description
P which designates p, and m will be describable as 'the
cause of P' or 'the effect of P'
. So if we accept the
additional claim that every mental event either caused or
was caused by a physical event, it will follow almost
immediately that every mental event has a physical
description. This procedure for providing physical
descriptions to mental events is, no doubt, a trivial
one. It does, however, accomplish the task Davidson sets
out for a proponent of the identity theory. Of course, if
this is what the identity theory comes to, one wants to
know who ever denied it.
Here Katz demonstrates another way of showing that it follows from
Davidson's criterion that events which we intuitively take to be
mental are physical, and vice versa; indeed, that all events (or at
least all those with physical or mental causes or effects) are both
mental and physical.
Davidson is certainly right in saying about the problem with
his criterion that "it would be instructive to try to mend this
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trouble-. For what trying to mend this trouble show is that the
very assumption that the ontological distinction between mental and
physical events can be correctly drawn by a linguistic criterion is
suspect. Indeed, Davidson's assumption that one can make the
effortless inference from "x has a mental description" to "x is a
mental event" has unacceptable consequences. Bernard Katz points
out two consequences of this assumption, which he characterizes,
following Davidson, as "an event is mental only under a
description". One way of reading this, he says, is "an event is
mental only if it is correctly described by means of a mental
description". He says:^"^
Suppose M, a mental description, and P, a physical
description, are singular terms which designate the same
event. On this interpretation 'M is a mental event' will
be true, while 'P is a mental event' will be false. A
consequence of this would be that mental events do not
form a well-defined set of events. (If there were such a
set, the event designated by M would be a member of it,
while the event designated by P would not; which is to say
one and the same event would both be a member and not be a
member of the set.) Another consequence would be that the
central thesis of the identity theory - that every mental
event is identical with some physical event - would not
make clear sense. That claim, understood literally, could
be put as follows;
(Vx)(x is a mental event —^ (3y)(y is a physical
event A x = y)
The truth conditions of this quantified sentence make
reference to the set of events which satisfy the
antecedent of the open sentence obtained by deleting the
initial quantifier. That set, of course, is the set
defined by the open sentence 'x is a mental event',
have just seen, however, there is no such set.
Katz goes on to consider a different reading:^®
As we
114
A different reading of the claim that events are mental
only as described might be that mental events are justthose events which have mental descriptions; that is
mental events form the subset of events which have mentaldescriptions. If this is what is intended, however, it
seems odd to say that events are "mental only asdescribed": surely a mental event will be mental (that is,
a member of the relevant subset) regardless of how it isdescribed. In any case, a problem with Davidson's use ofthis understanding of "mental events" is that it should
come as a conclusion toward the end of an argument in
favor the identity theory, and not as a premiss at the
outset. The assumption that there really is not any
ontological distinction to be made at all, or that [the]
mental/physical distinction is only a linguistic one, begs
the question. For it presupposes the truth of an
important part of what is in dispute - namely, that
interesting forms of dualism (versions which assert
ontological as opposed to linguistic dualism) are mistaken.
As Katz says, by assuming in advance that the mental-physical
distinction is only linguistic and not ontological, Davidson assumes
the falsehood of ontological dualism. But this is precisely the
question at issue.
I conclude, then, that Davidson has failed to provide an
adequate criterion for distinguishing mental from physical events,
and that attempts to mend his criterion only further undermine the
assumption underlying it: that it is possible to provide a
linguistic criterion for making the ontological distinction between
mental and physical events. Not only does this assumption have
unacceptable consequences, but it also seems to beg the question
against the ontological dualist.
One fact which does emerge from the above discussion, however,
is one already alluded to in chapter II; namely, that the concepts
"mental" and "physical" are much more closely interconnected than
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most discussions of the mind-body problem indicate. For these
discussions generally presuppose, as Davidson's does, that there is
a clearly definable set of mental events, objects, properties, etc.
which is distinct from a clearly definable set of physical events,
objects, properties, etc. In fact, it is this assumption which has,
in large part, made the mind-body problem seem unsolvable. In
chapter V I discuss several attempts to find a single criterion for
identifying mental phenomena. In chapter VI, i distinguish three
conceptions of what is physical. If there are three conceptions of
what is physical, then there is not one clearly definable set of
physical events, objects, properties, etc.
^ ^ Ds^idson's Mental and Physical Domains
The first premise of Davidson's argument for premise III, which
formulates anomalous monism, reads as follows:
1. For every scientific law L there exists a set of
concepts and descriptions which forms a closed,
homonomic domain whose elements are drawn on by L.
This is the key premise in Davidson's argument, since, once this
premise is accepted, he goes on to argue that physical laws satisfy
this condition while psychophysical laws do not. Davidson
apparently believes that there is a physical domain drawn on by
physical laws; this domain is homonomic. The mental domain is not
homonomic, so any "laws" which must draw on this domain do not
116
satisfy a necessary condition of scientific laws. Hence, they are
not scientific laws. In this section, I discuss premise 1.
I argued in section 3.4 that Davidson has not provided an
adequate or accurate way of distinguishing mental from physical
events. Arguments in section 3.4 also cast doubt on his assumption
that the ontological mental-physical distinction can be drawn by a
linguistic criterion. The task in this section is linguistic rather
than ontological: to consider whether there is a homonomic physical
domain made up of physical concepts and descriptions which is
distinct from a mental domain made up of mental terms and
descriptions. Then I will consider whether a scientific law must
draw on a homonomic domain.
First I consider whether there is a homonomic conceptual domain
of the physical made up of physical terms and descriptions. This
question turns on whether there is a set of physical terms and
descriptions which is homonomic in Davidson's sense. I begin by
considering whether there is a set of physical terms and
descriptions.
Unfortunately, Davidson does not make any positive attempt to
characterize what is "physical". He says this problem is
"recessive" in relation to characterizing what is "mental".
Davidson characterizes mental events by way of mental descriptions,
and mental descriptions are ones which contain at least one mental
19
verb essentially. He says that "we may call those verbs mental
that express propositional attitudes like believing, intending.
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desiring, hoping, knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so
«
20
on . He admits that his criterion does not include "events that
have often been considered paradigmatic of the mental"^^ such as
feeling a pain or having an afterimage. However, he does not choose
to modify his criterion.
If Davidson is right that characterizing a physical vocabulary
IS
-recessive" in relation to characterizing the mental vocabulary,
then we might suppose he means that all verbs which do not exhibit
intentionality are physical. This does not seem acceptable,
however, even apart from mental verbs he admits do not fit his
criterion such as 'to feel' as in "to feel a pain" and "to see",
when what is seen is an afterimage. There are other verbs such as
'to be', 'lack', 'live' (as in "He lives"), 'function', 'grow',
neuter', 'boom', 'crash' (both of which two can apply to the stock
market), evolve', 'has', and 'pump' which are not intentional but
do not seem physical" either. Let us see whether we can give a
positive characterization of a physical verb, or, more broadly, a
physical vocabulary.
When some philosophers talk about a physical vocabulary, they
mean "the language of physics". However, since Davidson's
discussion is directed towards the human brain and body, I doubt
whether he wants to restrict his description of neural events to
descriptions of mechanics, heat, acoustics, optics, electricity,
magnetism, and atomic structure. If he does, the physical events
would be molecular in nature, and certainly no one has succeeded in
reducing neurology to physics similarV. jiybi . b considerations rule out
saying "the language of chemistry and physics", such a
ohacactetization would leave the statements of the neurologist in
limbo between the mental and physical domains.
Perhaps Davidson means be a physical vocabulary "the language
Of the physical sciences'. Let us suppose this, and suppose what i
not obvious: that biology and neurology, as well as physics and
chemistry
,
are included in this domain.
What about the "vocabulary" or "domain" part of our attempt to
define a physical vocabulary or domain? Davidson originally draws
the homonomic/heteronomic distinction as being between two types of
generalizations, but his talk of a physical "vocabulary" makes it
clear that a conceptual domain is a subset of a broader language.
Hence, a conceptual domain must include certain logical and
mathematical terms which are neither physical nor mental, it will
22also have a syntax. This leaves the descriptive terms as being
the ones which make a conceptual domain of a certain type. The
physical domain, then, will contain at least the following elements
1. Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if, etc.)
2. Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.). The
mathematics chosen can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.
3. Syntactic rules.
4. Physical terms which are descriptive. These terms can be
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.
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Obviously, it is condition 4 which makes the above a description of
a physical domain; it is possible to construct a description of a
mental domain (and perhaps of other types as well) by replacing the
term 'physical' with the term 'mental' (or some other term).
Given this conception of a physical domain, I now consider
whether this domain is a closed, homonomic domain. For the moment,
at least the languages of physics, chemistry, biology, and neurology
are included within this domain (these are among the physical
sciences); hence, the question turns on whether the descriptive
terms and generalizations of these sciences are homonomic.
^ fi^st consider biology. A widely accepted conception of
biology is that it is the study of living things or organisms.
Biologists study human beings, animals, and plants. One descriptive
terms that occurs in biology is 'organ' . Examples of organs are
sense organs such as the eye, ear, nose, and the touch and taste
receptors. Terms for biological organs exhibit a feature that is
common among biological terms: they are functionally defined. This
means they apply by definition to things which perform a certain
function. And in the case of a sense organ, the terms apply to
particular types of tissue that perform a mental function. For
example, the ear is by definition a tissue of a certain type whose
function is to enable the organism to hear. Likewise, the eye is by
definition an organ whose function is to enable the organism to see.
etc. Hence, certain fundamental descriptive terms of biology
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contain an implicit reference to the mental domain, and could not be
allowed in a purely physical vocabulary.
Of course, the term 'eye' does refer to an organ which has a
physical aspect. The eye is a mass of tissue, and perhaps it can
also be considered as simply a piece of matter. But if biologists
were only to study the eye as a piece of matter, independent of its
mental function, they would really be treating it from the viewpoint
of physics. And from this viewpoint they would be unable to account
for most of its interesting properties. Hence, proposing to save
the homonomic nature of biological terms and generalizations by
stripping these terms of their implicit mental reference would be to
strip biology of much of its explanatory and descriptive ability.
The following quotation from a discussion of human vision helps
2 3
substantiate this point:
Hubei and Wiesel suggest that the interaction between
simple and complex cells may be important for the
allowing] issue:... the perception of patterns
irrespective of where they fall on the retina. Take a
vertical line--or an object with vertical edges--that is
located in front of you. The vertical edge (or the line)
will excite a population of simple cells and a population
of complex ones, each with a vertical axis of
orientation. A slight (saccadic) movement of your eye or
of the object will call into play a new population of
simple cells (because these cells are very sensitive to
the exact position of the line in the receptive field).
However, for a small movement the stimulus will still
excite the original population of complex cells (because
these cells are less sensitive to movement within the
receptive field)....
The following discussion of color vision by Peter Gouras also shows
how important the use of terms containing a mental reference are in
24describing and explaining how human and animal eyes work:
Animals with color vision simply have great perceptual
capability, and this presumably has great survival value.
Think for a moment of a black and white version of a workby a colorist such as Turner, Monet, or Renoir; almost a
million nuances of contrasting shapes are lost by an
achromatic rendition of one of their works. This high
degree of discrimination in color vision can actually be
understood in quantitative terms. The subjective
experience of color can be broken down into three
semi-independent sensibilities: (1) hue, (2) saturation,
and (3) brightness. All color experience is composed of
these three psychological impressions.
has the strongest effect on color and is the major
determinant of principal colors such as red, yellow,
green, and blue. It is what we ordinarily mean by
color . This impression is determined by the proportion
in which the three cone mechanisms are activated by the
object and its background. The brain must keep track of
how much each of the three photoreceptor systems
contributes to the detection of an object. Most of us
have names for only a family of hues, but actually about
200 varieties can be distinguished. The second distinct
quality of color is saturation
, which reflects how much a
hue has been diluted by grayness; this is determined by
the degree to which all three cone mechanisms are
stimulated in common by the object and by the background.
There are about 20 distinguishable steps of saturation for
each hue.
The third quality of color, bright ness
, is a sensation
shared with achromatic visual systems. It is due to the
total effect on all three cone mechanisms of an object
relative to its background. We shall see later that one
of the three cone mechanisms (the so-called blue
mechanism) makes little or no contribution to brightness.
It is the brightness factor that turns orange into brown
and gray into black or white. There are about 500
distinguishable steps of brightness for every hue and
grade of saturation. In contrast to achromatic vision
with only 500 steps, color vision has more than 1 million
gradations with which to detect the contours of shapes in
the external world.... It is no wonder that natural
selection uncovered its power.
By the latter part of the eighteenth century it was
realized that the ability to experience myriad different
colors might not be due to an equivalent number of
detectors in the retina but to a minimum
number--three--with every color determined by the
proportions in which each of these three detectors
responds to light.
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The issue raised here regarding the use of terms with a mental
reference in biology is related to a more general issue discussed at
some length in the literature of the philosophy of science. This
issue is the one of functional explanation within science.
There is also discussion of whether biology can be "reduced" to
physics. One important consideration in relation to any such
reduction" is whether it is possible to give a physical explanation
or definition of the concept of "life", a fundamental concept in
biology. While I won't pursue these more general questions here, I
believe the discussion does show, as did the discussion in chapter
II, that 'mental' and 'physical' are more closely interconnected
than they appear to be. This result is examined in more detail in
chapter VII.
A more specific conclusion is that Davidson cannot include the
language of biology within his physical domain and also maintain
that this domain is homonomic. Perhaps he could provide a
conception of "physical" which somehow disallows the above
objection. But since he has not even provided a concept of what is
"physical", I conclude that either Davidson's physical domain is not
homonomic or else it does not include the language of biology.
Because the basis for Davidson's argument for anomalous monism is
his claim that the physical domain is homonomic, I believe he would
prefer to shrink his domain than to give up the homonomic nature of
the physical domain. However, this leaves the language of biology
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in a nebulous middle domain between the mental and the physical
domains.
Similar considerations show that the descriptive terms of
neurology cannot be included in Davidson's homonomic physical
domain. The brain itself can be defined as the part of the central
nervous system associated with thought, perception, and emotion.
This is a definition in terms of a mental function. Also, specific
parts of the brain are defined in relation to the mental functions
they perform. The cerebrum is the part associated with conscious
mental processes. Other parts of the central nervous system such as
the touch and heat receptors are defined by their mental function.
Hence, the language of neurology cannot be included in Davidson's
homonomic physical domain either.
This problem is related to one raised at the end of chapter
II. Here I pointed out that if a materialist wishes to specify some
brain state to be identified with a mental state, he must either do
so via a mental criterion or a physical criterion. If he uses a
mental criterion (e.g. "the bodily state correlated with pain"),
then he has already acknowledged the distinctness of pain from the
bodily state (since the individuating principle of x must be
distinct from x). However, he cannot use a physical criterion since
there is no bodily state which correlates strictly with pain. It
seems clear that a neurologist, who must succeed in picking out
neurological structures, does so in many cases via a mental
criterion. Once he has picked them out, he can proceed to study how
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they function in relation to the rest of the body, and in relation
to other mental functions.
Perhaps Davidson would reply that many of the terms for the
mental functions such as 'seeing', 'hearing', 'touching', and
'tasting' by reference to which certain organic structures are
defined do not exhibit intentionality and hence do not fit his
criterion for being mental terms. If this is so, then terms which
implicitly refer to these supposedly mental functions will still be
homonomic since the reference will still be to the physical domain.
If Davidson wished to argue in this fashion, it would be surprising,
since he lists 'perceiving' as a mental verb.^® However, this
reply mostly shows the inadequacy of his criterion since any
criterion which makes terms such as 'seeing', 'hearing', and
'feeling' (which Davidson admits are paradigmatic of the mental)
non-mental is almost certainly wrong. Finally, not all the examples
I have given are of non-intentional verbs; for example, the cerebrum
was defined as being the part of the brain associated with conscious
mental processes. Actually, many of these terms have intentional
and non-intentional uses (as Davidson acknowledges), so that
Davidson's criterion makes it difficult to decide whether a given
term is in an abstract conceptual domain or not.
Davidson might also reply that it is incorrect to view "the
organ of hearing" as a definition of 'ear'
,
and so on for the other
examples; that these are at most true descriptions of these organs.
While I don't accept this reply, it wouldn't help Davidson defend
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the homonomic character of biology and neurology, since, on his own
principles, any event with a mental description is a mental event.
Hence, generalizations such as "The function of the ear is hearing-
and
-The function of the cerebrum is to enable the person to think-
will not be a part of the physical domain because they are not
homonomic. However, we saw earlier that a biology or neurology
stripped of all reference to mental events would really be physics
and would be so impoverished that it would not accomplish the
purposes of its science.
If the languages of biology and neurology are not to be
included in the physical domain, we seem to be left with the
languages of chemistry and physics. (Of course, there are other
physical sciences; I am picking representative examples). The
question whether the conceptual domain consisting of the languages
of chemistry and physics is homonomic depends on whether the
descriptive terms of the fields are homonomic in the sense that they
do not contain a reference to any non-physical domain. Examples of
such terms are 'kilogram', 'mass', 'energy', 'calorie', 'proton',
'gas', 'wave', 'particle', 'heat', 'field', 'watt', mile', etc. The
objection raised for biological terms does not apply here since
these terms are not defined by reference to a mental function. I
believe that one can raise important questions about these
phenomena; for example, they don't all fit the standard Cartesian
conception that physical things are extended. Force fields, waves.
and rays do not seem to be extended in any obvious sense. However,
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I Win not discuss this issue here and win grant that the language
of chemistry and physics forms a closed, homonomic domain.
Let us recall the premise under discussion:
1. For every scientific law L there exists a set of
concepts and descriptions which forms a closed,
homonomic domain whose elements are drawn on by L.
Now that I have discussed in some detail what a homonomic conceptual
domain might look like, and have tried to determine what Davidson's
homonomic physical domain is, I will look at Davidson's more general
claim that every scientific law must draw on a homonomic domain.
Davidson's Claim that Every Scientific Law Must Draw o n
a Homonomic Domain ~~ ~~
—
Davidson does not argue for the claim that every scientific law
must draw on a homonomic domain, but it has some interesting
consequences. One is that there are no scientific laws of biology,
neurology, psychology, history, sociology, or economics since these
disciplines all draw on heteronomic conceptual domains. Davidson
acknowledges this consequence in "Psychology as Philosophy"
The nomological i rreducibility of the psychological means,
if I am right, that the social sciences cannot be expected
to develop in ways exactly parallel to the physical
sciences, nor can we expect ever to be able to explain and
predict human behaviour with the kind of precision that is
possible in principle for physical phenomena.
Davidson also saysi^S
VJhen the world impinges on a person, or he moves to modify
his environment, the interactions can be recorded and
codified in ways that have been refined by the social
sciences and common sense. But what emerge are not the
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strict quantitative laws embedded in sophisticated theory
that we confidently expect in physics, but irreducibly
statistical correlations that resist, and resist in
principle, improvement without limit.
This quotation invites the observation that Davidson may be
operating with an outmoded conception of physical laws. Since the
advent of quantum theory, scientists have come to believe that many
laws of physics are statistical in nature; if this is so, the
deterministic model of scientific law may be incorrect or only
partially correct. Davidson says elsewhere of this that "perhaps
the ultimate theory is probabilistic and the asymptote is less than
perfection; but in that case there will be no better to be
29had". But if his basis for rejecting psychological laws is that
they are only statistical and cannot be improved without limit, then
perhaps probabilistic laws in physics should be rejected too.
Perhaps the problem is not the concept of probabilistic law but
Davidson's conception of scientific law.
The claim that scientific laws must draw on a homonomic domain
(premise 1 of Davidson's argument for principle III, which
formulates anomalous monism), is not only unargued for; it is not
3 0
self-evident or obviously true, as Ted Honderich observes:
There are then two descriptive domains or systems,
depending upon disparate connections between the systems.
There can be no psychophysical lawlike connections.
There is no gainsaying the difference between the two
domains, and the account given of the mental is perhaps
more impressive than any predecessor.... Still, we are not
given a reason for thinking that the given conclusion
follows from the description of the two domains. As
others have asked, what reason is there for thinking an
item which falls in one domain, and whose description then
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depends on X, cannot be in lawlike connection with an itemin the other domain, whose description then depends on Y?There is no clear general truth to the effect that there
cannot be lawlike connection between items whose
descriptions have different necessary conditions. There
appears to be no relevant sense in which two domains canbe said to be 'closed' and which precludes lawlike
connection without begging the question. What then is the
relevant feature of this admittedly unique pair of
domains? Davidson remarks that his argument is not
proof. It must also be said, I think, that his argument
is at least crucially incomplete.
Davidson's requirement that scientific laws draw on a homonomic
domain also has an important consequence for his claim that mental
events are identical to physical events. For according to Davidson,
if some physical event F causes a mental event, then there is a
physical description of the mental event which, together with F,
instantiates a physical law that draws on a homonomic domain.
However, we saw above that the biological and neurological domains
are not homonomic, so that the physical event which the mental event
is identical to will not be a brain event but a chemical event or an
event involving concepts from physics such as mass, weight, or
atomic structure. Furthermore, the physical event which causes the
mental event must be of this type as well. This is not a happy
consequence for someone who finds it difficult to defend the view
that a mental event is identical to some "high-level" brain event.
Identifying a mental event with some molecular event is even less
plausible.
Bruce Goldberg comments on this tension within Davidson's use
of 'physical' and concludes that he is using this term in two
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senses. He begins with a quote from Davidson:
The demonstration of identity follows easily. Suppose
m, a mental event, caused p, a physical event; then
under some description m and p instantiate a law. Thislaw can only be physical But if m falls under aphysical law it has a physical description; which is to
say It IS a physical event. 32
The difficulty with this argument is that it appears to
equivocate between two different senses of the term
•physical'. In one sense, that in which every physical
event falls under a law, it is not clear that mental
events do cause physical events. In the other, that in
which there are clear classes of mental events causing
physical ones, it is not clear that the physical events
fall under any law.
An example of the sense of 'physical' according to which
mental events cause physical events would be Davidson's
case of a physical event, namely a certain bodily
movement, causing the sinking of a ship:
...and the fact that someone sank the Bismarck entails
that he moved his body in a way that was caused by
mental events of certain sorts, and that this bodily
movement caused the Bismarck to sink. 33
But a different sense of 'physical' that in which every
physical event falls under a law, appears to be involved
in the following passage, where Davidson is concerned with
the notion of an ultimate physical theory:
Physical theory promises to provide a comprehensive
closed system guaranteed to yield a standardized,
unique description of every physical event couched in a
vocabulary amenable to law. 34
Davidson's requirement, then, that physical laws draw on a homonomi
domain entails that he use 'physical' in the sense of "physical
theory", while his attempt to solve problems of causation of mental
events leads him to use 'physical' in the sense in which the bodily
movement of a person is a physical event.
I conclude the following with respect to premise 1 (that a
scientific law must draw on a homonomic domain)
:
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1. Davidson has not established this premise since he does
not argue for it.
2. The premise is not obviously true, and there are
reasons for doubting it.
3. When this claim is coupled with Davidson's claim that
the physical conceptual domain is homonomic, the result
is that Davidson's physical domain shrinks to the
languages of chemistry and physics. This is so because
the conceptual domains of biology and neurology are not
homonomic
.
4. The premise is based on a deterministic conception of
scientific law which does not take into account the
probabilistic nature of some laws of physics and
psychology.
5. The premise has the consequence that there are no
scientific laws of biology, neurology, psychology,
history, or economics. In order to defend this
consequence, an anomalous monist would have to give a
more convincing account of laws and explanation in
these sciences than Davidson's account in "Psychology
as Philosophy".
6. This premise has undesirable consequences for
Davidson's identity claim, since Davidson is committed
to identifying mental events not with brain events but
with molecular events.
7. This claim generates a fundamental tension within
Davidson's discussion between a restricted sense of
'physical' (as in the language of physics and
chemistry) and a broader sense in which a bodily
movement made by a person is a physical event.
3. 6 Davidson's Argument for Anomalous Monism
Let us now put premise 1 in the context of Davidson's more
general argument. This premise is the first in an argument whose
conclusion is that there are no psychophysical laws:
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1. For any scientific law L which exists, there exists a
set of terms and descriptions which forms a closed,homonomic domain whose elements are drawn on by L.
2. Physical laws exist.
3. Therefore, there exists a set of terms and descriptions
which forms a closed, homonomic (physical) domain which
physical laws draw on. (1,2)
4. If there exists a psychophysical law L'
,
then there
exists a set of terms and descriptions which forms a
closed, homonomic domain that L' draws on.
5. The set of terms and descriptions that a psychophysical
law draws on is not a closed, homonomic domain.
6. Therefore, no psychophysical law exists. (4,5)
I also formulated the following four statements to make complete an
argument for principle III' :
7. There is a strict deterministic law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x, only if L is a
psychophysical law or a psychological law.
8. There are no psychophysical laws.
9. There are no psychological laws.
10.
Therefore, there is no strict deterministic law L and
description d(x) of any event x such that d(x)
instantiates L, where d(x) is a mental description of
X. (7,8,9)
Principle III', together with principles I' and II', represent
Davidson's way of reconciling three apparently incompatible
principles:
I ' . At least some mental events interact causally with
physical events, (the Principle of Causal Interaction).
II'
. For any events x and y, if x causes y or y causes x,
then, there exists a strict deterministic law L and a
description d(x) such that d(x) and d(y) instantiate L.
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III'. There is no strict deterministic law L and descriptiond(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
Without premise 1 to help justify III', i conclude that
Davidson has failed to establish III'. This does not mean that I',
II', and III' do not together form a possible resolution of an
apparent contradiction. It does mean, however, that Davidson has
failed to establish that III' is true; furthermore, there are
reasons to doubt that it is true. These reasons to doubt it are
primarily the reasons listed above to doubt premise 1 (that
scientific laws must draw on a homonomic domain) on which it is
based. These reason include the seemingly unacceptable consequences
of premise 1. Since principle III' formulates Davidson's anomalous
monism, I conclude that Davidson has failed to establish anomalous
monism, and that there are good reasons for doubting that anomalous
monism is true.
3.7 Davidson's Demonstration of Identity
The monistic part of anomalous monism is the claim that mental
events are identical to physical events. Davidson states his
demonstration as follows:^^
The demonstration of identity follows easily. Suppose m,
a mental event, caused p, a physical event; then, under
some description m and p instantiate a strict law. This
law can only be physical, according to the previous
paragraph. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a
physical description; which is to say it is a physical
event. An analogous argument works when a physical event
causes a mental event. So every mental event that is
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causally related to a physical event is a physical event.
n order to establish anomalous monism in full generalityIt would be sufficient to show that every mental event iscause or effect of some physical event; I shall not
attempt this.
We can construct the following argument based on this passage:
1. Suppose m, a mental event, causes p, a physical event.
2. If m causes p, then under some descriptions d(m) and
d(p), m and p instantiate a strict law L.
3. There is no strict deterministic law L and description
d(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
'^he only strict laws are physical laws.
5. L is a physical law. (1,2, 3, 4)
6. If m falls under a physical law, it has a physical
description.
7. Therefore m, a mental event, is identical to a physical
event
.
There are two main objections to this argument. The first has
to do with premise 7. We saw above that the quick inference from "x
has a physical description" to "x is a physical event" is
unacceptable. It is unacceptable because it is possible to give a
mental description of any physical event. Davidson sees this
problem but thinks it can be mended; on the contrary, the attempt to
mend it simply further exhibits the reasons why it is untenable. On
this criterion, most and perhaps all events are both mental and
physical. This conclusion might be acceptable to Davidson as a
conceptual claim, but not as an ontological claim. A distant
stellar collision should not be and is not a mental event. -Yet it
is, as Davidson admits, if one assumes that "x has a mental
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description- justifies the inference to "x is a mental event". This
linguistic criterion should not be mended; it should be abandoned.
Secondly, we saw above the Davidson has failed to establish
anomalous monism, which is stated as premise 3. Hence, Davidson has
not demonstrated that one can infer from the fact that "m and p
instantiate a strict law" to the claim that "that law can only be
physical". Davidson has failed to justify this crucial step in his
argument, and there are reasons for believing that this inference is
fallacious. These reasons are the same as the reasons for doubting
premise 1 above, that scientific laws must draw on a homonomic
domain.
In conclusion, it seems clear that Davidson's "demonstration"
of identity relies on two very dubious claims: that "x has a
physical description" implies "x is a physical event" and the claim
that there are no psychophysical laws. The first claim seems
clearly unacceptable, while Davidson has not established the second
claim. Furthermore, there are good reasons for believing that this
claim is false. Hence, I conclude that Davidson has failed to
demonstrate the identity of mental events and physical events, and
that there are good reasons for doubting the correctness of his
attempt
.
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3*8 Conclusion
Davidson formulates anomalous monism as a way of reconciling
three apparently incompatible principles. Anomalous monism has an
anomalous- part and a •monistic- part, and can be stated as follows:
law L and descriptiond(x) of any event x such that d(x) instantiates L,
where d(x) is a mental description of x.
2. Mental events are identical to physical events.
In this chapter, I have considered both these claims, i conclude
that Davidson fails to establish either one of them, and that there
are good reasons for doubting his arguments for both of them. Thus,
unless further, different arguments are made, there are good reasons
for doubting anomalous monism.
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CHAPTER IV
DANIEL DENNETT'S DEFENSE OF FUNCTIONALISM
4.1 Introduction
In Brainstorms, Daniel Dennett gives an account of mental
phenomena that is functional or intentional in nature, while the
book is a collection of essays, it nevertheless constitutes a
sustained, if not completely systematic, attempt to defend a theory
of mind that he at one point calls "type intentionalism" .
^
Dennett distinguishes this view from several other theories which
have been variously advocated, including type identity theory,
Turing machine functionalism, and token functionalism. Dennett
apparently regards his theory as a form of physicalism, and is
concerned to distinguish his formulation of physicalism from others
that have been offered.
Dennett characterizes type intentionalism as follows:^
If one insisted on giving a name to this theory, it could
be called type intentionalism : every mental event is some
functional, physical event or other, and the types are
captured but by any reductionist language but by a
regimentation of the terms we ordinarily use - we explain
what beliefs are by systematizing the notion of a
believing-system, for instance.
In later chapters he makes an attempt to give such a systematized
account of a number of different mental phenomena, including
138
139
consciousness, mental images, beliefs, experience, and pain. His
account of pain is one of the most interesting, since pain is what
has been called a program-resistant’ feature of mentality.^ That
is, it does not seem implausible to suppose that computers can
simulate or duplicate certain
-intellectual- features of mind such
as chess-playing or theorem-proving, it seems much less plausible,
however, to ascribe other phenomena such as feelings and emotions to
a computer.
Dennett's Flowchart of Pain
What I primarily wish to do here is to examine Dennett's
account of pain. He devotes chapter 11 to giving such an account,
and it is given in terms of the language of cognitive psychology.
Dennett begins by noting that, contrary to Turing, a computer
simulation need not be indistinguishable from what it models. He
considers the example of a computer simulation of a hurricane, which
responds to descriptions of meteorological conditions with
descr iptions of subsequent hurricane behavior. He compares to this
a computer program which responds to descriptions of painful
occurrences which happen to a person with descriptions of the pain
that person has. He goes on to say that what is needed is not a
simulation of pain but the actual synthesis of pain in a robot. In
other words, the robot must actually be in pain, not merely simulate
or describe pain behavior. Much of the rest of the paper
to a discussion of this possibility.
is devoted
Rather than claiming at the outset that he can show how to
design a pain-feeling robot, Dennett says he will attempt to
describe such a robot in terms of current physiological theory
relating to pain, and then see how close this description is to a
description of a pain-feeling robot. He proceeds to draw a
flowchart making use of notions from cognitive psychology, and then
discusses whether any system realizing this flowchart would be in
pain. While I am not so much concerned with the physiological
details of his account, I do wish to examine to what extent Dennett
has succeeded in giving an account of pain.
Dennett's flowchart looks like this:"^
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Figure 4-1. Dennett's Flowchart of Pain
Here the journey of physiological response begins at the skin with
the nociceptors. The outputs from these travel through either the
A-fibers or the C-fibers. At the Melzack-Wall gate, according to
the Melzack-Wall theory,^ the A-fibers act to inhibit the effect
of the C-fibers. The T-cell transmissions which are the output of
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this gate go either to the older portion of the brain, the limbic
system, or through the thalamus to the neocortex, the
phylogenetically newer part of the brain.
At this point, Dennett says that "we must abandon the pretence
that our boxes represent anatomically salient structures, and
proceed with a purely functional, abstract breakdown of the
system-.^ He then draws in a filtering system in the "new high"
path to account for the fact that distracting one's attention
diminishes pain. The purpose of the belief box is to account for
the fact that "when we have a pain we believe we have a pain (at
least normally)". The belief box is really a memory and belief
box, since "pains can be remembered, usually, for some time".^
The "goals and desires" box, labeled 'desire', is there in virtue of
the fact that pains are a reliable form of punishment. The
ratiocination box reflects the "oft-used myth. ..that higher controls
in human beings is accomplished by something like logical processing
of the material in the belief and desire boxes"^ Finally, the
purpose of the boxes underneath the control center is to reflect the
control center's effects on behavior.
After discussing ways in which the above model can account for
various facts about pain, Dennett makes the following remarks:^*^
A related, but somewhat different question is this: can we
locate pain, as distinct from its typical causes and
effects, on the flow chart? The flow chart gives us a
functional description at what I have called the
sub-personal level. I have labelled the various boxes
"belief", "desire", "action" and so forth, but that was
taking a liberty. The flow chart deals directly not with
a person's acts, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, but with the
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behind-the-scenes machinery that governs speech and the
convenient to talk as if the obiects ofour attention, what we pay attention to, were impulsetrains in the nervous system, to talk as if the muffled
outputs from the filter were the diminished pains, to talkas If we recognize or fail to recognize a neural signal asa pain, but this is loose talk, and the conceptual
~
confusions it invites are not inconsequential, when we
retell the subpersonal story without taking theseliberties we seem to be leaving something out.
Since Dennett has given us what is supposed to be a flowchart
description of pain, it is important to know either where the place
for pain is on the flowchart or what the relation is between pain
and the different phenomena on the flowchart.
Dennett considers the possibility of adding a "pain-box"^^
:
The silence of the sub-personal account here is due simply
to the fact that pain itself does not appear on our
flowchart, which seems to concern itself solely with the
clauses and effects of pain. As we trace through the chart
we find the causal contributions include nociceptor and
C fiber stimulation, T—cell activity, the process of
perceptual analysis and the contributions thereto of old
low path activity; and among the effects we find muscle
contraction, avoidance reactions and. . .powerful goal
modifications. The absence of a "pain" box might seem to
be a simple omission, easily corrected. The most
plausible place to insert a pain box is between the
perceptual analysis box and the higher control centers.
Isn't pain the result of perceptual analysis and the cause
of our reactions to discomfort? Let us call the inserted
the pain center . Now what does it do? If one claims
its function is simply to serve as the locus for the
transmissions just mentioned, the go-between, then
contrary to our suspicion, pain was already represented in
our model; we simply had not drawn a line around it. If
the point is rather that there is a separable and terrible
something we had hitherto left out how could possibly add
it with this box?
Here Dennett suggests that it would
- either the pain was already there
be pointless to add a "pain-box"
or the addition of such a box
would be pointless.
Dennett concludes that: 12
There is no way of adding a
sub-personal level without
mistakes, by confusing the
levels of explanation.
pain center to the
committing flagrant category
personal and sub-personal
He then suggests:!^
Let us consider instead the hypothesis suggested by it,VIZ., that we have simply not sent the woods for the
trees, that pain is not to be found in any one box of ourflowchart, but is a function or combination somehow of the
elements already present.
This appears to be the position Dennett wishes to adopt, although
this statement needs qualification. For he goes on to argue that
our intuitions about pain are inconsistent and hence that no living
creature or robot could instantiate "the true theory" of pain.
However, then he says this;^^
If and when a good physiological sub-personal theory of
pain is developed, a robot could in principle be
constructed to instantiate it. Such advances in science
would probably bring in their train wide-scale changes in
what we found intuitive about pain, so that the charge
that our robot only suffered what we artificially called
pain would lose its persuasiveness. In the meantime, (if
there were a cultural lag) thoughtful people would refrain
from kicking such a robot.
Here Dennett endorses the view that a robot could instantiate a
sub-personal theory of pain - in other words, that a robot could
feel pain. The plausibility of Dennett's conclusion depends on
whether he has succeeded in showing that our intuitions about pain
are inconsistent, and in whether it is plausible to maintain that
pain is a function of a sub-personal flowchart. I now discuss thes
two claims.
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Personal/Sub-personal Distin^Mnn
Because the distinction between the personal and sub-personal
levels of explanation Is important to understanding Dennett’s
analysis of pain, I begin by discussing this distinction. In his
account of consciousness, Dennett describes the sub-personal
level
:
Functionalist theories are theories of what I have calledthe sub personal level. Sub-personal theories proceed byanalyzing a person into an organization of subsystems(organs, routines, nerves, faculties, components-even
atoms) and attempting to explain the behavior of the wholeperson as the outcome of the interaction of these
subsystems. Thus in the present instance the shortcoming
emerged because the two access notions introduced,
computational access
_simpliciter and the computational
access of a print-out faculty, were defined at the
sub-personal level; if introduced into a psychological
theory they would characterize relations not between aperson and a body, or a person and a state of affairs or aperson and anything at all, but rather, at best, relationsbetween £arts of persons (or their bodies) and other
mgs. So far as I can see, however, every cognitivisttheory currently defended or envisaged, functionalist or
not, IS a theory of the sub-personal level. It is not at
all clear to me, indeed, how a psychological theory--asdistinct from a philosophical theory—could fail to be a
sub-personal theory. So the functionalists' problem of
capturing the person as subject of experience must arise
as well for these cognitivist theories. At best a
sub-personal theory will see to give us no grounds for
believing its instantiations would be subjects of
experience, and at worst (as we have seen) a sub-personal
theory will seem to permit instantiations that obviously
_a_re not subjects of experience. Take your favorite
inchoate cognitivist theory and imagine it completed and
improved along the lines of its infancy; is it not always
easy to imagine the completed theory instantiated or
realized by an entity--an engineer's contraption, for
instance, or some kind of inner zombie—to which we have
no inclination to grant an inner, conscious life?
Intuition then, proclaims that any sub-personal theory
must leave out something vital, something unobtainable
moreover with subpersonal resources. Intuitions can
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sometimes be appeased or made to go away, however, andthat is the task I set myself here. I propose to
oxrioitiL\h““‘h^®"®^‘^ sub-personal parts by
InLodncel. -cess already
The personal/sub-personal distinction, then, is a distinction
between two levels of description, as well as between two levels of
explanation. We can describe some event at the sub-personal level,
e.g. we can say
-Neuron N fired at time f independent of giving an
explanation of anything, or, this statement could also serve as an
explanation of why some other brain-event occurred. The personal
level involves descriptions and explanations of a person while the
sub-personal level involves descriptions and explanations of parts
Of person and their bodies.
How can we characterize this distinction more precisely? Is
every description or explanation of a person at the personal level?
It seems reasonable to say that psychological ascriptions such as "I
feel tired" or "He is angry" are at the personal level, but how
about non-psychological predicates such as "I am 5 feet 5 inches
tall" or "He weighs 148 pounds"? There are also uses of the
possessive pronouns which imply personhood—thus, "My chair is red"
is equivalent to "I have a red chair". Even statements about
seemingly sub-personal elements can carry such a personal
implication. Thus "My C-fibers are conducting impulses" is
equivalent to "I have C—fibers which are conducting impulses".
Presumably, an equivalent statement without the personal reference,
e.g. "C-fibers A, B, and C are transmitting impulses", would be at
147
the sub-personal level. Finally, Dennett writes as it talk about
pains is at the personal level, while talk about the mechanisms of
pain is sub-personal. But he also writes as if the sub-personal
level is the level of components and parts. And a person can talk
about pain as an element or component of his mind or of himself
ithout referring to himself. For example, someone might say "This
feeling of pain is intense". How, then, shall we draw Dennett's
distinction?
One difficulty with drawing Dennett's distinction is that it
seems to cut across the distinctions between the person/body and the
person/elements of a person distinction and the mental/physical
distinction. In ^ntent and Consc iousness
, Dennett contrasts "the
explanatory level of people and their sensations with the
sub-personal level of brains and events in the nervous system":^®
But when we abandon the personal level in a very real
sense we abandon the subject matter of pains as well.
When we abandon mental process talk for physical process
talk we cannot say that the mental process analysis of
£ajj\ is wrong, for our alternative analysis cannot be an
analysis of pain at all, but rather of something else— the
motions of human bodies or the organization of the the
nervous system.
Here he seems to equate the personal/sub-personal distinction with
the mental-physical distinction.
In Brainstorms
, he says:^^
Sub-personal theories proceed by analyzing a person into
an organization of subsystems (organs, routines, nerves,
faculties, components—even atoms) and attempting to
explain the behavior of the whose person as the outcome of
the interactions of these subsystems.
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He then says that a theory at the sub-personal level "would
characterize relations not between a person and a body, or a person
and a state of affairs or a person and anything at all, but rather,
at best, relations between £a rts of persons (or their bodies) and
18
other things". a reference to the faculty of sight would
ordinarily be taken to refer to something mental, not something
physical, but it also refers to an element of a person, or
subsystem. Hence it would seem that even statements about certain
mental phenomena can be at the sub-personal level, provided they are
about subsystems which are or purport to be elements of a person.
Dennett seems to be primarily interested in distinguishing
statements about persons from statements about their bodies, parts
of their bodies, or parts or elements of persons. Hence we can say
that a statement is personal, or at the personal level, if it
contains a reference, implicit or explicit, to a person. An example
of an explicit reference is "I am tired" or "Jones is tired", where
'Jones' refers to some person. An example of an implicit reference
is "My arms are tired", or "Jones' face is white". A statement is
sub-personal if it contains an explicit or implicit reference to
some person's body, to a part or state of his body, or to some
element of a set of elements of a person. Statements about physical
objects which are not bodies of persons will neither be personal not
sub-personal--we might call them a-personal. Examples of
sub-personal statements are "Neuron N is firing", "That finger is
white", and "The heart is beating". "Jones' neurons are firing" and
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"His heart ia beating" are both personal and sub-personal in virtue
o£ the implicit reference to a person and the explicit reference to
a bodily part or subsystem. Hence, these terms cannot be regarded
as mutually exclusive as applied to statements when viewed in this
way.
^• 2.2 Dennett's Account of Pain
Having briefly discussed Dennett's personal/subpersonal
distinction, I turn to a consideration of Dennett's account of
pain. Before criticizing this account at a more general level, I
wish to make some specific comments about Dennett's flowchart. One
comment is that if Dennett's flowchart does give an account of any
kind of pain, it does so only of physical pain, and not of
psychological and emotional pain. Psychological and emotional pain
are closer to being emotions than sensations and are not so directly
connected to specific neuronal events. The pain of an insult, the
pain of rejection, and the pain of knowing that you have been
betrayed by a friend are all instances of psychological and
emotional pain which are not (physical) sensations but rather
feelings of emotional hurt. Hence, this "cognitive" kind of pain
should be analyzed similarly to the way emotions are analyzed.
While I do not wish here to defend the claim that one could not give
an analysis of emotional states like the one Dennett has given of
physical pain, I believe that such an analysis would look quite
different. Hence, I believe I am at least justified in claiming
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that Dennett's account will not do for emotional ot psychological
pain. Perhaps this would not bother him, but it is significant that
the same term 'pain' is used in both contexts.
Secondly, the stimulation of the A and C fibers is not
correlated with pain. Peter Milner reports that:^^
During innocuous stimulation of the skin, both A and C
afferents are stimulated and produce a net excitatory
effect in cells of the substantia gelatinosa. These cellsdepolarize the terminals of both A and*C fibers on the
transmission cells of the dorsal horn, producing
presynaptic inhibition and preventing those cells from
being fired too vigorously. If a noxious stimulus is
presented, however, though few extra A fibers will be
recruited, many extra C fibers will fire, thus increasing
the inhibition of substantia-gelatinosa cells and reducing
the inhibition of the input to the dorsal horn cells,
which will therefore fire at a much higher rate.
While the occurrence of pain is correlated with increased C and A
fiber activity, the stimulation of these fibers is correlated with
touch and warmth, not just pain. Furthermore, Dennett's
"nociceptors" are not exclusively pain receptors. As Kenneth Casey
20
says
:
The contention of von Frey in 1895, that free nerve
endings are "pain receptors" and that excitation of these
endings or receptors resulted in pain sensation gained
widespread acceptance. Subsequent physiological and
psychophy siological experiments implicated finely
myelinated and unmyelinated fibers as subserving
"epicritic" and "protopathic" pain mechanisms. However,
current anatomical and psychological evidence indicates
that free nerve endings must function as receptors for
many other forms of somatic sensation and are not
exclusively "pain receptors". Furthermore, recent
physiological studies have shown that the small diameter
afferents do not, as a group, respond only to intense
stimuli. Indeed, the majority of those studied are quite
sensitive to thermal or mechanical stimuli, and many are
sensitive to both forms of energy.
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Finally, Donald Becker tells us that .-21
Since pain is such a ubiquitous phenomenon, this relative
° threshold units suggests that, although
than ^the'r
significantly higher th^esioj^s'
K
concept of specific nociceptor receptorsfibers can be misleading. Pain is not really amodality like touch, temperature, vision or audition.Rather, pain should be defined as an intensity
Phenomenon. Excesses of any of the specific modalities,i.e. temperature extremes or excessive pressure, mayresult in pain perception. As Noordenbos has suggested,pain IS "too much".
Hence, stimulation of the 'noolceptors- is not exclusively
correlated with pain, since receptors which are responsive
Stimuli respond to other stimuli as well.
to pain
Dennett does not explain what he means by the "instantiation"
of the flowchart, but presumably, in order for a pain to occur, a
system must not merely contain the "structures" represented by the
flowchart; rather, the C-fibers must be conducting impulses, etc.
But if the nociceptors and the A- and C-fibers are correlated with
phenomena other than pain, such as touch, then the flowchart can he
instantiated even though not pain, but some other phenomenon is
occurring. Hence, Dennett's flowchart does not distinguish pain
from certain other mental phenomena such as touch and temperature
sensations.
Dennett's flowchart also does not account for all cases of
pain. Much physical pain originates elsewhere than in the receptors
in the skin. People have headaches, and also pain which is internal
to the body. Hence, Dennett's flowchart represents only a
restricted number of cases of pain. Dennett would probably
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acknowledge this, but reply that his flowchart is merely a sketch,
and may need to be revised and supplemented. However, if Dennett is
seriously trying to give an account of pain, it is significant to
observe how close he comes to achieving this general goal, rather
than merely capturing a restricted set of cases.
Finally, Dennett uses terms such as 'thalamus' and 'nociceptor'
in his flowchart which refer to organic structures, v^hile Dennett
may feel that these entities can be functionally defined,
independent of their structures, nevertheless these terms do refer
to biochemical parts of the body. And it is not clear that
functionally analogous entities in a mechanical, non-organic
creature would have the same names. For example, something in the
center of a robot which serves as the power source of the robot but
does not pump blood but rather sends electrical impulses throughout
the robot would not be called a heart. Likewise, no fluid in a
non-living thing would be called blood, even if it were red (or
blue) and it circulated throughout the body. Georges Rey makes a
22similar point when he says:
One wouldn't suppose, that there might be machines that
engaged in digestion, but of a form quite unlike any such
processes that take place in humans and animals. If, for
example, the process they underwent for production of
their energy was something more like the processes of an
internal combustion engine, then surely that wouldn't
count as digestion (cars don' t digest gasoline) . What
gets called digestion depends on its resemblances, in
natural respects, to what gets called digestion around
here.
The general point is that certain bodily parts and functions are
essentially parts and functions of living, organic beings, and hence
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that non-living mechanical robots could not have the same parts and
functions, even if their corresponding parts and functions were
analogous in some way to those of a living, organic being.
Dennett would perhaps deny that it is essential to any part of
the human body that it be part of the body of a living thing;
probably he would claim that all these parts can be functionally
defined independent of origin and structure. And it does not seem
necessarily wrong to refer to an artificial arm, or even the
mechanical arm of a robot, as an arm. Perhaps this is not
implausible in virtue of the fact that those functions in terms of
which 'arm' is defined, such as grasping and picking up objects, can
be performed by a non-living machine. But terms such as 'heart' and
'blood' are essentially connected with life in virtue of their
functions of helping to carry food to the organism, and in virtue of
other life-sustaining functions. And some of the terms on Dennett's
flowchart such as 'nociceptor', are essentially connected with an
organism's ability to feel sensation and pain. If these receptors
did not play a role in feeling and sensation, they would not be
nociceptors. Hence, it seems that the issue of whether an organism
can feel pain and sensation needs to be settled before we draw our
flowchart, and cannot be settled in advance by stipulation.
It is doubtful, then, that a robot could be said to instantiate
Dennett's flowchart, containing as it does terms such as
'nociceptor', 'thalamus', and 'speech'. Perhaps Dennett could
construct a more general flowchart which could apply both to men and
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machines by abstracting features which are common to both. He might
use as a model, Roger Schank's attempt to construct a
“language-free* representation of meaning by attempting to reduce
the verbs of English down to fourteen primitives. The
difficulty with this is in preserving common elements without losing
any elements necessary to Insure that pain is really occurring.
4»2.3 Perceptual Analysis
Let us consider another aspect of Dennett's flowchart. One box
which he says very little about is the box labelled "perceptual
analysis". This box occurs after the "filter" box which represents
our ability to diminish or banish pain by distracting our attention
and before the "control" circle containing the "belief", "desire",
and ratiocination" boxes. The following comments by Hubert Dreyfus
suggest that we evaluate the language of the flowchart carefully.
Having distinguished between the neurological and phenomenological
levels of description, he comments on an effort by Ulric Neisser to
define an information—processing level of description:^^
As Neisser puts it, "the sensory input is not the page
itself; it is a pattern of light rays..." So far so good,
but then, Neisser goes on to bring the physical and the
phenomenological levels together: "suitably focussed by
the lens. ..the rays fall on the sensitive retina, where
they initiate the neural processes that eventually lead to
seeing and reading and remembering
. Here, however, things
are by no means obvious. There are two senses of "lead
to". Light waves falling on the retina eventually lead to
physical and chemical processes in the brain, but in this
sequential sense, the light rays and neural processes can
never eventually lead to seeing. Seeing is not a chemical
process; thus it is not a final step in a series of such
processes. If, on the other hand, "lead to" means
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necessary and sufficient condition for", then eitherseeing IS the whole chain or something totally 'differentfron, the Chain or any link of it. In either Lsf it I^nolonger clear why Neisser says we have no immediate accessto the perceptual world.
Dreyfus point here is that seeing, and hence perception in general,
IS not the final step in a series of chemical and neural processes
rather, it occurs on the phenomenological level, which
corresponds to Dennett's personal level. The relevant point here is
that the perceptual analysis" box cannot serve as a connecting link
that begins at the neural level with the stimulation of the
nociceptors. Dennett seems to acknowledge this in the following
25
remarks
:
Can we locate pain, as distinct from its typical causes
and effects, on the flowchart? The flowchart gives us afunctional description at what I have called the
sub-personal level. I have labelled the various boxes
"belief", "desire", "action" and so forth, but that was
taking a liberty. The flowchart deals directly not with a
person's acts, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, but with the
behind-the-scenes machinery that governs speech
dispositions, motor subroutines, information storage and
retrieval, and the like.
Hence the perceptual analysis box really refers not to the process
of perceptual analysis but to the physiological mechanisms which
govern perceptual analysis. For this reason, the flowchart is at
the physiological level, not the personal or phenomenological level.
The "perceptual analysis" box is significant because, in order
for input to be experienced as pain it must be interpreted or
analyzed as pain. This does not refer to a cognitive process in the
case of pain; rather, it refers to the way in which the sensation is
perceived by the person. In order for a sensation to be perceived
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as pain, rather than, for example, mere touch, it must be perceived
as hutting. A sensation becomes painful just at that point when it
begins to hurt. Dennett does not deny this; he merely denies that
it is useful. He concludes that:^^
one does not distinguish the sensations that hurt or arepainful by applying some criterion; one simply
distinguishes them. Their only distinguishing
characteristic is painfulness, an unanalysable qualitythat can only be defined circularly.
However, in my view it is useful to point out that pains are
sensations which hurt since then we have at least performed some
analysis; now it is easier to understand why we need a "perceptual
analysis" box in the flowchart. For some sensations feel good, some
pleasant, and some neither good nor bad, pleasant nor unpleasant.
Those and only those sensations which hurt are correctly called pain
Unfortunately, the preceding discussion presents a difficulty
for Dennett's flowchart. For if his flowchart, as he says it does,
represents the physiological mechanisms of perceptual analysis, and
not that analysis itself, then only the physiological mechanisms
accompanying an analysis of a sensation as hurting, in other words,
as pain, can properly be said to instantiate the flowchart. But it
is unlikely that we can identify any physiological mechanisms which
always and only accompany pain perception — we have already seen
that the trusted philosophers' friend "C-fiber stimulation" will not
do.
At this point, one might wonder to what extent Dennett has
succeeded in giving an account of pain, in telling us what pain is.
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as opposed to merely giving us the conditions under which it
occurs. Dennett concedes that the flowchart "seems to concern
Itself solely with the causes and and effects of pain".^’ He
seems to want to reject this claim, but it is not clear what his
basis for the rejection is. After rejecting a homuncular
. ng
:
hypothesis, he suggests approvingly that we do the followir
Let us consider instead the hypothesis suggested by it,
viz., that we have simply not seen the woods for the
trees, that pain is not to be found in any one box of ourflowchart, but is a function or combination somehow of the
elements already present.
To say that pain is function or combination of the elements in the
flowchart can, I believe, mean only one of two things;
1. To be in pain just is to instantiate the flowchart.
2. Instantiating the flowchart is causally or
conditionally relevant to feeling pain.
I now consider these two alternatives in turn.
What Dennett has really done is to give us a flowchart of the
physiological and neurological mechanisms of pain. But is this the
same thing as telling us what pain is? Someone could give a
detailed flowchart of the mechanisms of sound production, say by
diagramming a stereo system, but would being a sound just be
equivalent to instantiating this flowchart? What one wants to say
is that a stereo system produces sound, so that instantiating
Dennett's flowchart is being what produces pain, but is not being
sound itself. Likewise, one might say that instantiating Dennett's
flowchart is being what produces pain, but is not being pain
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Itself. In general, being a mechanism of x is not being x, but
rather being what produces x.
This leads to the second alternative. It would perhaps not be
correct to call Dennett's diagram a flowchart of the cases of pain,
since these are usually events in the world like finger-pricks and
instances of being burned. If we are asked for the cause of our
pain we generally point to some external event such as being nicked
while shaving or having our finger crushed. We don't generally cite
the physiological causes, which might better be called physiological
conditions of pain. Nevertheless, these physiological conditions
are causally relevant to feeling pain.
If Dennett's flowchart is a diagram of the causally relevant
conditions of pain, we might compare pain to the hum of a well-tuned
engine it is a noise produced by the functioning car as a whole,
it isn' t identical to or produced by any part of the car, and it is
not a mental epiphenomenon. Dennett's flowchart would then be like
a diagram of a car which, when running, produces a hum. Likewise,
when neural impulses are conducted in the brain, pain is produced.
The difficulty with this solution is that is the flowchart is merely
conceived as giving the causally relevant conditions of pain, then
ontologically we are back to the old issue of physicalism vs.
dualism — dualists don't deny that pain may have physical causes;
what they deny is that it is essentially a physical phenomenon.
Pain, they argue, unlike the hum of an engine (depending on what
ontological status assigns to sounds)
,
is essentially mental, and
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mental phenomena cannot be "reduced" to or shown to be identical to
physical phenomena. Hence it is difficult to see how Dennett's
account cuts any ice ontologically
,
if construed in this way.
^ ^ Are Our Intuitions About Pain InconsistPnh?
In the preceding I argued that Dennett's functionalist account
of pain really tells us very little about the ontological status of
pain. Furthermore, I suggested that the possibility of a robot
instantiation of a flow-chart of pain might at least run counter to
intuitions we have about the application of terms that refer
essentially to living organisms, rather than to mechanical devices.
However, Dennett does make some explicit comments about the
ontological issue, and he acknowledges that the idea of robot pain
is counter to some of our intuitions. He attributes this to an
incoherency in the ordinary concept of pain:^^
What then is this conclusion? It is that any robot
instantiation of any theory of pain will be vulnerable to
powerful objections that appeal to well-entrenched
intuitions about the nature of pain, but reliance on such
skeptical arguments would be short-sighted, for the
inability of a robot model to satisfy all our intuitive
demands may be due not to any irredeemable mysteriousness
about the phenomenon of pain, but to irredeemable
incoherency in our ordinary concept of pain.
Dennett says that our intuitions about pain are inconsistent:^^
If, as I have claimed, the intuitions we would have to
honor were we to honor them all do not form a consistent
set, there can be no true theory of pain, and so no
computer or robot could instantiate the true theory of
pain, which it would have to do to feel real pain. Human
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eings and animals could no more instantiate the truetheory of pain (there being none), which lands us with theoutrageous conclusion that no one ever feels pain. But ofcourse we do.
These remarks seem consistent with
Consciousness that 'pain' does not
his position in Content and
4T 31refer. if our intuitions
about pain are inconsistent, then there is no such thing as pain, at
least in the sense of something which satisfies all our intuitions
about pain. I now examine the basis for Dennett's claim that our
intuitions about pain are inconsistent.
Dennett gives several examples of what he considers to be
inconsistent intuitions. One example is the following:^^
1. Pains are essentially items of immediate experiences of
consciousness: the subject's access to pain is privileged
or infallible or incorrigible.
2. Pains are essentially abhorrent or awful— "Pain is
perfect misery, the worst of evils..."
Efforts to capture both of these "essential" features in a
theory of pain are bound to fail; theories that contrive
to maintain both of these claims do so only at the expense
of equally well-entrenched claims from other quarters.
Dennett proposes capturing "at least part of what is compelling
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about 1" by this condition:
3.
It is a necessary condition of pain that we are
"incorrigible" about pain; i.e. if you believe you are in
pain, your belief is true; you are in pain.
He then says;
from (3) and
4.
It is a necessary condition of pain that pains are awful
it follows that believing one is in pain is a sufficient
condition for really experiencing or undergoing (and not
merely believing one is experiencing or undergoing)
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something awful. But the belief itself is not the pain,
bfii /h- logically possible
of belLfihaJ “"“*1 earmarkselief t t one is in pain, and yet not be experiencingor undergoing something awful. Not only is this logically
anr^th*'
instanced routinely by morphine subjects
Dennett need not cite examples in which drugs
provide examples in which people believe they are
are used to
in pain but are
not experiencing something awful. Ordinary cases of pain
experienced during intense physical exercise, or even of minor pains
such as pin-pricks or minor headaches are examples of such cases. A
Dogger might feel pain in his legs from running but not mind it
because he realizes it is necessary to achieve his goal of improved
health. And minor pains may sometimes be unpleasant, but they are
not awful. But not all persons find pain either unpleasant or
awful, as the example of the masochist shows.
Unfortunately for Dennett's argument, however, these examples
are equally counterexamples to Dennett's condition 2 - that pain is
essentially awful. It is curious that Dennett should offer this as
an essential condition after he has discussed the example of
morphine. Of course, Dennett may claim that according to "our"
intuitions, pain is essentially awful, but it is no argument for the
incoherence of a concept to cite a view that someone might hold
unref lectively
. Someone who has never seen a Manx cat might hold
that it is essential to cats that they have tails, but we would not
for that reason conclude that the concept of cat is confused, or
that there are no cats. Only if they refused to apply the term
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oaf whan faced with this possibility would we have a basis for
believing that tails are essential. But descriptions of
morphine-accompanied pain unhesitatingly ascribe pain to the
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subject:
becomes
resistant to the drug. But the drug produces a variety ofdifferent kinds of effects than what we think of as
analgesia. For instance, when you talk about morphine topeople, they really don't have any concept of what
morphine does, except that it blocks pain. And the
closest experience that most people have to blockaded painIS that they go to the dentist, he shoots some gunk down
around the fifth nerve and blocks it and they're
anesthetized, and that to them is what analgesia is - theydon' t feel pain. ^
Morphine doesn' t do that at all, because under theinfluence of an opiate/analgesic drug, people feel their
pain. They just interpret it in a different way. Itdoesn't bother them, it doesn't worry them. They can go
to sleep in pain. They're comfortable about pain.
Dennett has not been sufficiently discriminating in his search for
an essential characteristic of pain; awfulness is not a likely
candidate.
The above quotation about the effects of morphine suggests a
distinction between the intrinsic quality of a painful sensation and
a person's interpretation of or feeling about this sensation or
quality. If I worry about pain, or find it unpleasant, I have
certain feelings about the pain. These feelings are distinct from
the qualities of the sensations itself. Because people's reactions
to and feelings about pain vary so widely, given cases in which
people don't mind pain or even find that they like pain, it is
unlikely that we will find an essential feature of pain among
people's reactions to or feelings about it. And awfulness is a
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feeling about pain - If i chataoterlze pain, or someone's behavior,
as awful, I am referring not to some Intrinsic property of what Is
described, but to how I feel about It. if we want to look for
essential features, we should look to the Intrinsic features of the
sensation itself,
Dennett uses the example of awfulness because he is searching
for a criterion to distinguish pain from other mental phenomena we
may be incorrigible about. If we use as our criterion the intrinsic
property that sensations must hurt in order to be painful, then his
counterexample does not work. For it is no contradiction to say,
"It hurts, but I don't mind it", or even "It hurts, and I like it".
If morphine subjects feel pain, then what they feel hurts, even if
they don't mind it. And what masochists feel hurts, even if they
don't mind it. We can still maintain incorrigibility - if someone
believes he is in pain, then something hurts, even if he doesn't
mind it. Hence Dennett fails to show here that our intuitions are
inconsistent because his example of an intuition is a poor choice
and if we replace it with a good choice we cannot generate the
counterexample.
Dennett claims to find several other cases of inconsistency in
• 1.
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our intuitions. Rather than discuss these cases in detail, I
now discuss what the implications would be if he were right. It
should not be surprising if not everyone's intuitions are the same
about a phenomenon which occurs as often and in as many forms as
pain. However, even if a "good physiological sub-personal theory of
164
pain- were developed, I doubt that if such a theory called for
revisions in our concept of pain that the revisions would make the
difference between robot pain and no robot pain. For even if we had
to drop some intuitions, such as an intuition about whether pains
can exist unfelt, or even infallibility about pains, I do not see
that this change would be so drastic as to make robot pain
possible. One reason robots cannot feel pain is that they don't
have the kind of organic structure necessary for this experience,
and until we are able to create living, organic robots I do not see
the possibility of overcoming this obstacle to robot pain. As
Georges Rey says, "this, then, would seem to be the grain of truth
in the common reaction that machines can't be persons: they don't
have our feelings because they don't possess our relevant
3 6physiology". Creating a good sub-personal theory will not make
this possible, and neither will changing our intuitions about the
existence of unfelt pains or even about the awfulness of pain.
4.4 Robot Emotions
I conclude with a few comments about the possibility of robot
emotions. Materialists sometimes prefer talking about pain to
talking about more complex mental states because it is easier to
give a physiological account of pain than of emotions such as anger
or righteous indignation. Not only is it impossible to find
physical states which are always correlated with such complex mental
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states, but these states often involve making moral judgments. For
example, if I get angry at Jones for taking my pen, then my anger
involves a judgment that his act was unjustified, and presupposes a
complex circumstance involving the existence of moral rules and
property rights. Hence it is difficult to see how anger could be
reduced to the instantiation of a physiological flowchart.
Dennett acknowledges that even the concept of pain "is
inextricably bound up with our ethical intuitions, our senses of
suffering, obligation, and evil". However, he concludes that
these considerations, even if they make some difference, "do not
3 8
make enough of a difference". Even if he is right about pain, I
think that these considerations make more of a difference with
respect to anger and other emotions. The reason is that these
emotions are not simply introspectible sensations but involve
cognitive judgments that presuppose an understanding of morality,
and presuppose that moral considerations apply to the subject of
emotions. A full treatment of this issue would involve a discussion
of the extent to which robots can be regarded as rational agents,
and the extent to which moral rules would apply to such creatures.
While I will not engage in that discussion here, it is significant
to note that results about pain are not automatically generalizable
to emotional states.
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4.5 Summa ry
I now summarize the main points in the preceding sections.
After a brief introduction, I presented Dennett's flowchart of pain
in section 4.2. In section 4.2.1, l discussed his
personal/sub-personal distinction. In section 4.2.2, i considered
Dennett's account of pain. In section 4.2.3, I argued that Dennett
has merely presented an account of the causes and conditions of
pain, and not an account of pain itself. In section 4.3, i
discussed Dennett's claim that our intuitions about pain are
inconsistent, and talked about what the implications of this would
be. Finally, in section 4.4 I suggested that an account of pain
might not be generalizable to emotional states such as anger.
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CHAPTER V
INCORRIGIBILITY AND INTENTIONALITY
:
TWO CRITERIA FOR MENTAL PHENOMENA
5.1 Introduction
Chapters 2, 2, and 4 discuss dualism, anomalous monism, and
functionalism respectively, while each theory has some merit, each
also has difficulties which may require that the theory be revised
or abandoned. The chief difficulty for dualism is in giving an
account of mind-body interaction. The chief difficulty for
anomalous monism is that internal tensions within the theory
relating to Davidson's conception of physical events and scientific
laws have the consequence that anomalous monism applies to the
entities of physics and chemistry but not to events in the brain.
The most serious difficulty for functionalism is in accounting for
the qualities of subjective experience.
The mind-body theories I have discussed so far contain implicit
or explicit conceptions about the nature of mental and physical
phenomena. What conceptions a mind-body theory contains about the
mind-body distinction and about the nature of mental and physical
phenomena has important consequences for the the theory. For
example, materialists tend to view sensations as paradigmatic of
mental phenomena, while Davidson chooses intentionality . Dualists,
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on the other hand, emphasize the private, subjective aspects of
mental phenomena. And, as became apparent when discussing Davidson,
there may be more than one correct conception of what is physical.
In this chapter, I take a look at two criteria for mental
phenomena that have been discussed at some length in this century:
incorrigibility and intentionality. In Section 5.2 I discuss
Richard Rorty's defense of incorrigibility as a criterion for mental
phenomena. I conclude that while this criterion may identify a
small subset of mental phenomena, it is not satisfactory as a
criterion for all mental phenomena. In Section 5.3 I discuss
Roderick Chisholm's three criteria for identifying intentional
sentences. I conclude that no formulation of a criterion for
intentional sentences will succeed in identifying all and only
mental phenomena. In Section 5.4 I draw some conclusions from the
earlier discussion.
5.2 Incorrigibility
The members of one group of criteria for distinguishing mental
from physical phenomena that many philosophers have discussed since
the time of Descartes have in common the claim that conscious beings
have a special way of knowing mental phenomena. This special way of
knowing is sometimes characterized as incorrigibility,
infallibility, indubitability
,
privileged access, or certainty.
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Rather than surveying all the members of this group, I have selected
incorrigibility as a representative member. The reasons lor my
choice are that incorrigibility is at least as strong a candidate as
any of the others and because there are several valuable discussions
Of this criterion in recent philosophical literature.
One of the articles containing such a discussion was written by
Richard Rorty in 1970.^ In this article, he considers
incorrigibility as the mark of the mental. In this section, I will
examine Rorty's discussion in this article and also his discussion
in his later book entitled Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.^
5*2.1 Mental Events and Mental Features
Rorty begins by distinguishing two types of mental phenomena.
He calls these types mental events and mental features. Rorty draws
this distinction in the following paragraph:^
In settling upon a mark of the mental, it is important
to begin by distinguishing between two different notions
of what counts as mental. The distinction I have in mind
is that between the sort of mental entity that is an event
and the sort that is not. In the first class fall,
paradigmatically and perhaps solely, thoughts and
sensations. By "thoughts" here I mean not beliefs, but
occurrent, datable thoughts—e.g. , the entity referred to
when one says "The thought that
_£ suddenly struck me." By
"sensations" here I mean not perceivings--not acquisitions
of beliefs--but simply the entities that are reported in
such ways as "Then I had a sensation of red" or "Then I
had a painful sensation in my leg." These two sorts of
entities make up the content of the stream of
consciousness--what one finds when one asks "What's going
on in me now?" In the second class fall all those mental
entities which are not events and which are only dubiously
"entities" at all--belief s, moods, emotions, desires,
purposes, intentions, motives, etc., etc. These might
better be called "mental features" than "mental
entities." Not only are they not events, but it strikes
peculiarly philosophical hypostatization tothink of them as particulars of any sort
.
Rorty is certainly correct in saying that it is important to
draw distinctions within the class of mental phenomena.
Furthermore, his selection of thoughts and sensations as
paradigmatic of one class and of beliefs, emotions, and intentions
(among others) as paradigmatic of the other class is a useful
starting point. Rorty characterizes the class of mental events, of
which thoughts and sensations are paradigm, as the "sorts of
entities which make up the content of the stream of
consciousness". I will first examine this class of mental
phenomena, beginning with thoughts.
Rorty describes occurrent, datable thoughts as "e.g., the
entity referred to when one says 'The thought that £ suddenly struck
me'". Perhaps he means this type of example. Yesterday I was
sitting at my desk when the thought that I am missing a meeting I am
scheduled to attend suddenly struck me. What is the entity which I
have referred to? My thought has a certain content, which is that I
am missing a scheduled meeting. This content is a proposition which
has a truth value. Presumably, Rorty is not just referring to the
content of my thought but to a sound image which is the thought and
which occurs over a brief period of time. While a sound image which
is a thought is a phenomenal occurrence, the aspect of this sound
image Rorty is pointing to is that it is occurrent rather than
dispositional.
Rorty describes sensations in a similar way. if i say
Yesterday I had a headache", I am reporting the past existence of a
feeling that hurts viz. a feeling of pain. This is also a
phenomenal mental event in that the presence of pain is the
appearance of a hurtful sensation within my mind or consciousness.
Again, however, it is the fact that a sensation is an occurrence
that takes place over time that makes it fall in Rorty's first class
of mental entities.
It is the occurrent character of thoughts and sensations that
Rorty is apparently trying to characterize when he says these
entities are the contents of the stream of consciousness".^ He
cites "beliefs, moods, emotions, desires, purposes, intentions,
7
motives, etc." as members of another class he calls mental
features. What apparently unites mental features is that they are
dispositional, not occurrent, mental entities. This has some
plausibility since, for example, it can be true of me that I love
someone at time
_t even though I am not thinking about that person at
_t. However, if I love someone, I will at times have a feeling of
love for them. At those times, I have a feeling of love which is an
occurrent, datable experience. Hence it appears that just as one
can have occurrent thoughts, so one can have occurrent emotional
feelings. It seems, then, that even emotions can be occurrent
mental entities at certain times.
Desires exhibit a similar feature. It is true of me that I
have a desire to teach philosophy even though I am not experiencing
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this desire at a particular moment. However, if i am sitting at my
desk and I suddenly have a desire for Chinese food, this is an
occurrent, datable desire. In this case, I think of Chinese food
and have a felt inclination to have some. Occurrent desires, like
occurrent emotional feelings, include occurrent thoughts, and also
have a phenomenal aspect. However, other conditions which are
present make them desires, not merely thoughts.
One way to analyze dispositional mental states is that having a
dispositional mental state is having a disposition to have some
occurrent mental state or states. For example, being
dispositionally angry at someone is having a disposition to have
occurrent angry feelings for that person. Having a dispositional
belief that £ is having a disposition to occasionally have an
occurrent thought that £. If this view of dispositional mental
states is correct, then Rorty is wrong to use broad categories such
as emotion", "belief", "emotion", and "desire" to characterize
mental features. Since many of these mental entities can be either
dispositional or occurrent, Rorty should instead try to distinguish
when these mental entities are dispositional as opposed to when they
are occurrent. Unless he can do this, Rorty has not drawn a
meaningful distinction between mental events and mental features.
Rorty seems aware that his distinction between mental events
g
and mental features is not clear-cut:
As such mental features as beliefs and desires become more
particular and limited and, thus, approach the status of
episodes rather than dispositions, they become more
incorrigible. ... Belief s and desires about momentary
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matters tend to collapse into thoughts, and momentary
emotions tend to collapse into sensations. Short-runbeliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions are less likepredictions of future behavior than like avowals of
contemporaneous thoughts or sensations. That is why they
are more like episodes than like dispositions.
Here Rorty appeals to a mathematical analogy of something drawing
near to a limit to explain how dispositions approach occurrences.
The problem with this analogy is that some desires and emotions
reach the limit and are occurrent events. In such cases, they must
be classified as mental events, not mental features. Hence, while
Rorty is pointing to an apparent and non-controversial distinction
within the class of mental entities, viz. the distinction between
occurrent and dispositional mental entities, he has not succeeded in
characterizing this distinction accurately. To do so, he must draw
the distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental entities
within broad categories such as "belief", "desire", and "emotion".
^•2.2 Rorty's Definition of Incorrigibility
Rorty draws his distinction between mental events and mental
features because he believes that only what he calls mental events
are incorrigible. However, he believes that mental features have
near-incorrigibility, so he can account for them in terms of
incorrigibility as well. I will now consider his definition of
incorrigibility.
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Rorty gives the following definition of incorrigibility:^
S believes incorrigibly that £ at t if and only if(i) S believes that £ at _t
(ii) There are no accepted procedures by applying which
It would be rational to come to believe that not-p,
given S's belief that £ at t.
Before giving this definition, Rorty makes the following
.
10
remark
:
It is customary to define incorrigibility in' terms of the
notions of entailment or logical possibility....! wish,
however, to eschew reference to logical modalities, both
because of general Quinean doubts about the existence of
necessities other than "natural" ones and because of a
particular difficulty that arises when we try to spell out
'logically possible' in this context.
This particular difficulty involves his interpretation of a myth he
attributes to Sellars. According to this myth, thoughts and
sensations were originally theoretical entities, postulated as inner
states that explained certain sorts of behavior. They were
originally proposed as theoretical entities by a man named Jones
who, in this myth, invented the concept of mind. However, Jones
proposed these sensations and thoughts not as objects of immediate
experience but as inferred entities; entities inferred from the
behavior they caused. Only after a long training process can others
make noninf erential reports of their own inner states.
Rorty comments on this myth that the sensations and thoughts
1 2have "no common intrinsic features save 'innerness'" and that
all the term 'inner' can mean is "beneath the skin".^^ He then
says that not until reports of the existence or occurrence of these
thoughts and sensations are incorrigible are these entities mental.
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He relates his interpretation of Sellars' myth to defining
incorrigibility in terms of logical possibility as follows:^'^
Suppose that, in the familiar manner, we try to spell
out the force of this term in such sentences as "It islogically impossible that I believe that I am thinking
that £, and not be" by the notion "impossible by virtue ofthe meaning of terms." We shall then arrive at the
conclusion that the meaning of the terms 'thinking' and
thought' is such that it is impossible to have incorrect
contemporaneous beliefs about what one is thinking. But
now let us recur to Jones, who uses the word 'thought'before people have learned to make introspective reports
of their thoughts, much less come to view such reports asincorrigible. Must we say that when Jones first invented
the notion of "thought," meaning by it "inner state that
can be about X, be true or false..., etc.," he did not
mean by the word what we do? Did the meaning of 'thought'
change when people came to make noninf erential reports of
their own thoughts? Did it change when these reports came
to be regarded as the last word? Would it change if
cerebroscopes came to be regarded as offering better
evidence for what someone was thinking than his own
introspective reports?
I regard these questions as unanswerable.
The preceding statement by Rorty not only explains why he chose
a definition of incorrigibility that does not invoke logical
possibility, it also explains his attachment to incorrigibility as a
criterion of the mental. Rorty argues in his later book Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature that if a society existed in which
neurology is so advanced that the members of the society report
their "mental" states by making reports of their neurological states
that no descriptive or explanatory power would be lost. In this
society, instruments such as cerebroscopes have come to be regarded
as offering better evidence for what someone is thinking than his
own introspective reports. It is Rorty's view that if these
neurological statements are not incorrigible, they are not mental.
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Hence, incorrigibility as a mark of the mental is Rorty's ticket to
eliminative materialism, a view he has defended elsewhere. In
Ph ilosophy a nd the Mirror of Nature , his statement of eliminative
materialism may appear to be more sophisticated, in that it is more
cautiously stated and is materialism without identity of mental and
physical events. Nevertheless, eliminative materialism is the view
Rorty defends.
I will defer commenting on Rorty's discussion in Philosophy and
_the Mirror o f Nature until later in this section. For the moment, I
return to his definition of incorrigibility, which I repeat here:^^
S believes incorrigibly that £ at _t if and only if
(i) S believes that £ at _t
(ii) There are no accepted procedures by applying which
it would be rational to come to believe that not-£,
given S's belief that £ at _t
Since Rorty's definition is intended mainly for thoughts and
sensation, he must intend that 'p' be replaced by a third-person
form of a statement that S makes or at least believes about his
thoughts or sensations. Thus, (i) might read:
(i)' S believes that he is in pain at £.
(ii)' There are no accepted procedures by applying which
it would be rational to come to believe that S is
not in pain at _t, given S's belief that he is in
pain at _t.
It does seem that if someone believes that he is in pain, that
there are no accepted procedures to show that he is not in pain. It
is of course important that he understand what pain is and be
sincere in his report, if he has made a report of his feeling of
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pain. However, some sensation reports that include more than a
report on a felt quality are not incorrigible. Even Rorty's
example, "Then I had a painful sensation in my leg", is shown not to
be incorrigible by Descartes' example of the person who had an
amputated arm but still felt pain where the arm would be. Such a
person might say "Then I felt pain in my arm" before being aware
that his arm had been amputated, or if he had forgotten this fact.
Here, his report that he feels pain is incorrigible, but he has
located that pain in the wrong place.
The preceding example shows that even if we are incorrigible
about whether we have a sensation, there are other features of
sensations such as their location that we are not incorrigible
about. Where a sensation is located in a person's body is something
he has to learn from experience, just as an infant has to learn that
the object in front of him is his hand. And like many other things
in life that we must learn, no one gets it right all the time. I
recently tried touching another person's toes one a time with a
pencil tip to see if she could tell me which toe the sensation was
in. When she identified the wrong toe, she was easily convinced of
her mistake by the location of my pencil. She could correctly
identify the toe the sensation was in only 50% of the time. Hence
the statement "I have a pain in my middle toe" is not incorrigible
for the person uttering it. Other similar examples are having a
feeling that seems like hunger but is really a result of being sick
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(as is discovered several minutes later) and having a feeling that
seems on the borderline between being a pain and being an itch.
If Rorty wants to provide a criterion that shows that a
person's beliefs about his own sensations are incorrigible, he must
write a more restrictive criterion that only allows beliefs about
felt qualities of the sensation. Beliefs about the location or
cause of a sensation or about what the sensation is a sign of are
not incorrigible. Such beliefs go beyond a report of a felt quality
and involve making an inference. And inferences are often mistaken.
To summarize my first criticism of Rorty's criterion, I am
saying that he may be right that a belief by a person about whether
or not he has a particular sensation or that this sensation has a
particular felt quality is incorrigible, but that beliefs which
require an inference to the cause, location, or significance of the
sensation are not incorrigible. I also stated that Rorty must add
the conditions that the person is sincere and understands the
language in which his belief is formulated. Rorty must, then, add
these three conditions to his definition:
(iii) S understands the language in which his belief that
£ is formulated.
(iv) S is sincere in his belief or statement that
(v) p is a non-inf erential first-person belief about
whether or not S is having a particular occurrent
thought or sensation or that the thought or
sensation has a particular felt quality.
Rorty acknowledges that two classes of non-mental statements
18
may be believed incorrigibly in the sense he defines:
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a) Statements knowable a priori
b) Statements about how something looks, seems, or appears
to someone
Rorty dismisses a priori statements on the ground that they are not
reports — they are not descriptions of particular states of
. 19
„affairs. Even if one grants this way of dealing with a priori
statements, there are non-mental beliefs that £ which are
descriptions of particular states of affairs such that there are no
accepted procedures by applying which it would be rational to
believe that not-£. My belief that I have a hand, that the earth is
round, and that the earth has existed for at least 100 years are
examples of such beliefs. In On Certainty
, Wittgenstein says that
"about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making
judgments is to be possible at all". Wittgenstein believes that
the truth of some empirical propositions such as the ones I have
just listed is so fundamental to our system of beliefs that no doubt
about them is conceivable. And while Rorty is talking about
incorrigibility rather than indubitability
,
if no doubt is possible
about an empirical proposition £ then there is no accepted procedure
by applying which it would be rational to believe that not-£.
Perhaps Rorty would dismiss these examples on the ground that
if S asserts "The world is round", his asserting this fact is not
part of the evidence for the truth of this proposition. This would
mean that the phrase "given S's belief that p at _t" in Rorty 's
definition asserts that S's belief is part of the evidence for the
proposition. However, Rorty says this phrase "can be ignored" for
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statements knowable a priori, choosing to rule out these statements
on the ground that they are not reports. Yet for statements
reporting mental events it is essential, since "It serves, roughly,
to summarize the fact that present procedures for adjudicating
belief claims are such that the fact of S's belief at
_t that £ is at
least as strong evidence for £ as any imaginable state of affairs
could be for not-£".^^ Apparently Rorty believes he does not need
to appeal to the condition that someone believes that £ be part of
the evidence for the truth of £ to rule out a priori statements
since he believes these statements can be ruled out on the ground
that they are not reports.
Rorty also discusses statements about how something appears,
looks, or seems to someone. He says of these statements that:^^
in their primary meaning ... they simply mark refusals to
commit oneself to making a report of a certain sort. To
say that "X looks brown" is, at the least, to express
hesitation about saying that X is brown.
Rorty is certainly correct that "seems" and "appears" statements
sometimes function as expressions of hesitation. He says they also
can be descriptions of particular states of affairs, in which case
they are mental. Rorty rules out "seems", "appears", and "looks"
statements that are expressions of hesitation on the ground that
they are expressions and not reports . While this may deal
effectively with one type of "appearance" statement, it has the
consequence that certain mental statements are ruled out as well.
There are many uses of mental statements which are expressions
rather than descriptions. It hurts", "I love you", and "I feel
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angry- are all sometimes used as expressions of feeling, rather than
as descriptions. if Rorty rules out expressions and allows only
reports, his criterion will not capture mental events which the
subject expresses but does not report.
To see more clearly why Rorty's criterion does not capture
mental events for which the subject does not make a report, consider
his revised statement of his criterion:^^
We can sum up the results of this strategy by noting that
we now have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for something being a mental event
, namely
If there is some person who can have an incorrigible
belief in some statement P which is a report on X, then
X is a mental event.
According to this criterion, a necessary condition for X to be a
mental event is that some person make statement P which is a report
on X. It follows that if a person who has pain does not make a
report on his pain, but rather suffers in silence, the condition is
not met and the event is not a mental event.
Perhaps Rorty would respond by requiring that some person have
an incorrigible belief in a possible statement, not an actual
statement. He might then phrase his condition as follows:
B. If there is some person who can have an incorrigible
belief in some actual or possible statement P which is
a report on X, then X is a mental event.
One problem with this reformulated condition involves the
phrase "can have an incorrigible belief". Suppose I am driving my
car and I feel a momentary twinge of pain in my finger. Because I
am driving in downtown Boston in rush hour, I do not think about the
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pain but continue to concentrate on driving. Can I have an
incorrigible belief that I have a pain in my finger? Perhaps I can
If I stop to think about it. Since B is a conditional, the correct
phrasing would be "I can have an incorrigible belief about a
momentary twinge of pain if I stop to think about it". But then by
the time I stopped to think about the pain, the pain is over and I
must rely on my memory. And Rorty does not claim that memories of
mental events and thoughts are incorrigible. We are often mistaken
in our memories of what we have thought and felt in the past. A
memory of a very recent event can be inaccurate just as can a memory
of a less recent event. Hence in cases of momentary twinges of
pain, we must rely on memory to generate an incorrigible belief.
And the reliance on memory denies the status of incorrigibility to
the actual or possible belief.
Perhaps Rorty would reply that a person's belief that he feels
pain is contemporaneous with his experience of pain. If we asked
this person whether he believed that he was in pain at the time he
felt the twinge of pain, he would probably reply that he did. At
issue here is what it is for a person to believe he is in pain; is
mere awareness of the pain sufficient or must a statement about his
pain occur to him? Perhaps he has an implicit belief that he is in
pain even if no statement about the pain occurs to him.
Even if Rorty could make out a conception of belief that meets
the objection advanced in the preceding paragraph, his criterion.
even if modified to allow possible statements (statement B), will
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not account for all instances of pain, it does not, for example,
account for the pains of infants who are incapable of making reports
on their feelings and can only express them. A new-born infant is
not capable of understanding language and hence cannot make a report
on his pain or believe a report about it. Since Rorty apparently
believes that only the person having a mental event can have
incorrigible beliefs about the event, no one can have incorrigible
beliefs about an infant's pain. Yet surely the pain an infant has
is a mental event.
Rorty's criterion also does not capture the pains that animals
have. Like infants animals cannot either report on their pain or
believe reports on their pain. Yet it is believed by almost
everyone that animals have feelings and can experience pain. Hence
there appears to be no reason to deny that animals have mental
events. If Rorty wants to deny this, he should certainly give an
explanation. Since animals cannot give reports of of their mental
events, the ability to give and believe such reports as a criterion
for mental events does not make the pain of animals a mental event.
5.2.3 Mental Features
Rorty concedes that we are not incorrigible about what he calls
"mental features": beliefs, moods, emotions, desires, purposes,
intentions, motives, etc. However, he says we are almost
24incorrigible:
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ut the fact that we are not incorrigible in our reportsfeatures as we are about mental events should
not blind us to the fact that we are almost incorrigible.The possibility of overriding reports about such featuresIS real, but it is actualized only rarely and with
trepidation. We are far less likely to have a report
about a mental state, even one that is not an event,
overridden than to have a report about something physical
overridden. Further, as such mental features as beliefs
and desires become more particular and limited and, thus,
approach the status of episodes rather than dispositions,
they become more incorrigible.
He goes on to defend his criterion of incorrigibility:
The two factors we have just mentioned
—the
near-incorrigibility of reports of mental features, and
their tendency to become strictly incorrigible as they
become more particular and limited—account, I believe,
for the term 'mental' having been stretched from the
paradigm cases of the nonphysical— thoughts and
sensat ions--to such things as beliefs, desires, emotions,
and intentions. If i am right in saying that strict
incorrigibility is the mark of mental events and if I was
right in saying above that it was mental events, as
opposed to mental features, which engendered the Cartesian
notion of the mental and the physical as separate realms,
then it is appropriate that near-incorrigibility should be
the basis for widening the realm of the mental. The
likeness of near-incorrigibility to strict incorrigibility
is the family resemblance that ties the various things
called "mental" together and makes it possible to contrast
them all with the physical. But the distinctness of near-
from strict incorrigibility is what makes it impossible to
find any interesting set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for mentality.
Here Rorty makes the general statement that we are far less
likely to have a report about a mental state than a physical
statement overridden. It is true that some physical statements are
more easily overridden than some mental statements. However, not
all mental statements are less easily overridden than some physical
statements. When I stand in my office, I almost always feel more
confident that there is a chair in my office than I do about what I
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want to do that evening. i often feel uncertain about how I feel
towards another person, particularly when I have conflicting
feelings. Many people are uncertain of their religious beliefs, or
are even uncertain if they have any. Sometimes when I do a good
deed, I am unsure whether my motive was generosity or simply a
desire to improve my image. All these examples show that what
mental features a person has is often far from clear to that
person. Often physical statements are more incorrigible than
first-person reports of these mental features.
The advent of Freudian psychology and the accompanying
acceptance into common vocabulary of terms such as "unconscious
belief
, unconscious motive", and "unconscious feeling" provides an
additional reason to doubt the correctness of incorrigibility as a
criterion for mental features. If I have an unconscious motive for
giving someone a gift, I am not incorrigible or nearly incorrigible
in my belief that I have it; I do not even believe that I have this
motive. Rorty does not say how he would account for unconscious
mental features, but near-incorrigibility does not explain their
mental status.
Another example of mental events that persons do not have
either corrigible or near-corrigible beliefs about is dreams. While
a dream is occurring, the events in the dream usually seem real to
the person having the dream. If I can be said to have beliefs
during a dream, my beliefs are that the dream events are actually
occurring. Yet when a person wakes up he realizes that "It's only a
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dream- and that his beliefs were in error. The beliefs we have
about the events that occur in our dreams are among the most
corrigible beliefs we have since they are usually recognized to be
false when we awaken.
Perhaps Rorty would reply that even if beliefs a person has
during a dream are corrigible, beliefs a person has about his dreams
when he awakens are incorrigible. This reply will not work for two
reasons. It is possible to remember a dream incorrectly. Suppose I
have a dream in which I am playing cards with three other people. I
initially identify one of my opponents as Jones. As I recollect
more detail about my dream, I realize that it was really Smith, and
I correct myself. Secondly, most people do not remember all their
dreams. Most people remember only a few dreams. I sometimes awaken
with the clear impression that I had a dream, but I cannot remember
it. On Rorty's criterion, unremembered dreams are not mental events
since no one has incorrigible beliefs about them. It will not work
to say "If the person remembered his dream, the resulting beliefs
would be incorrigible", since we have already seen that it is
possible to remember a dream incorrectly.
5.2.4 Conclusion about Rorty's Defense of Incorrigibility
In conclusion, Rorty's attempt to establish incorrigibility as
a criterion for mental events and to extend his criterion for mental
events to cover all mental entities by using near-incorrigibility as
a criterion for mental features fails for these five reasons:
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1 . It may be that the statement "I am in pain" uttered
sincerely by someone who understands English is
f the total number of statements about mental entitiesIS incorrigible. Many other statements about mental
entities are not even nearly incorrigible since manypersons are often uncertain about their feelings and
emotions. Dreams also provide an example of mental
events about which our beliefs are not nearly
incorrigible.
2. Rorty's criterion fails to capture the pains ofinfants, any pains or other mental entities animals mayhave, or unconscious mental entities such as
unconscious motives and unconscious feelings.
3. At best, only some very cautious non-inf erential
fi^st-person statements about mental events are
incorrigible. For example, a first-person statement
that locates pain at some place in the body can be
mistaken.
4. Rorty's criterion fails to provide us with a clear
contrast with physical entities. Some physical
statements are more incorrigible than some mental
statements.
5. Rorty s criterion is vague and difficult to spply,
since Rorty does not explain how near to being
incorrigible a statement must be to qualify as nearly
incorrigible.
^•2.5 Rorty's Argument for Materialism
Rorty's primary interest in his article "Incorrigibility as the
Mark of the Mental" apparently is to use his conception of
incorrigibility as a mark of the mental to state an argument for
2 5materialism. He makes the following statement:
It might turn out that there are no entities about which
we are incorrigible, nearly or strictly. This discovery
would be made if the use of cerebroscopes (or some similar
mechanism) led to a practice of overriding reports about
mental entities on the basis of knowledge of brain
states. If we should, as a result of correlations between
neurological and mental states, begin taking a discovery
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of a neurological state as better evidence about a
subject's mental state than his own report, mental states
would lose their incorrigible status and, thus, their
status as mental
. This possibility is a result of the wayin which we defined 'incorrigible belief. By phrasing
our definition in terms of accepted procedures, ratherthan in terms of the logical impossibility of error, weleave room for the sort of change that would confirm
"eliminative" materialism.
Rorty's claim here is that if some mechanism such as a cerebroscope
came to be regarded as better evidence for the existence of mental
states than a subject's own reports, mental states would lose their
incorrigible status and hence their mental status. Clearly the
correctness of this argument depends on whether Rorty has succeeded
in establishing that incorrigibility is the mark of the mental. I
have argued that Rorty has not established this claim. Hence, his
argument for materialism, which depends on the claim that
incorrigibility is the mark of the mental, fails.
2 6In a recent book, Rorty advances a similar argument. Here
he imagines that explorers from earth discover on the other side of
the galaxy a group of people who do not have a conception of mental
events. While they are physiologically very similar to us, they
report brain states instead of mental events such as pain. Instead
of reporting pain, for example, the members of this group say "My
C-fibers are firing". The explorers call the members of this group
the Antipodeans, making a reference to a group of Australian
materialists.
Rorty's argument in this example is more difficult to determine
than in the earlier article I just discussed since he states his
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argument less directly. However, he does say that "incorr
IS all that is at issue in puzzles about the Antipodeans"
.
Hence, he appears to be giving a more elaborate version of
argument for materialism than he gives in his first articl
argument I just discussed. Robert Schwartz also advances
2 8interpretation
:
igibility
27
the
e: the
this
[Rorty's] position is that none of our mental-state
reports are intrinsically incorrigible, although, at a
given time, there may not be settled community standards
for challenging such first-person claims. Were
neurophysiology to develop sufficiently, no state would beincorrigibly reportable; hence, no state would be on the
nonphysical side of the divide. Materialism wins out, but
it is materialism without mind/body identity. The realm
of the mental is eliminated or ontologically mental.
If Rorty's argument in this book is as Schwartz presents it, it is
no better than his defense of incorrigibility as a mark of the
mental. I have just shown that Rorty does not succeed in
establishing incorrigibility as a mark of the mental in his earlier
article. I have also given reasons for believing that this claim
cannot be established. Furthermore, Rorty's defense of
incorrigibility as the mark of the mental in Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature is mainly historical and is not as systematic or
explicit as his defense of this criterion in the earlier article.
His discussion in the book does not add additional substantive
arguments for this criterion that go beyond
earlier article. Hence, to the extent that
interpretation is correct, Rorty's argument
those advanced in the
Schwart z'
s
involving the
Antipodeans is susceptible to the same objection as his argument for
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materialism in the article. This objection is that Eorty's argument
depends on a claim he has not established: the claim that
incorrigibility is the mark of the mental.
Rorty does draw a more cautious conclusion in his book:^^
The materialist should stop reacting to stories such asthat about the Antipodeans by saying metaphysical things,
and confine himself to such claims as "No predictive or
explanatory or descriptive power would be lost if we had
spoken Antipodean all our lives."
This claim is reminiscent of claims Rorty makes more explicitly in
another article in which he defends the "disappearance" version of
the identity theory. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature .
Rorty does not want to describe his view as being a version of the
identity theory
,
though he regards his position as a form of
materialism. In spite of Rorty's attempt to divorce himself from
the identity theory, his claim in the above quotation which involves
his interpretation of the Antipodean example is susceptible to the
same objections as his earlier "disappearance" version of the
identity theory.
The main objection to Rorty's claim that no predictive or
explanatory power would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all our
lives is that in Antipodean there is no way to describe the
subjective qualities of our experiences. Even if one conceded that
Antipodeans succeed in reporting the existence of pain they cannot
report the subjective qualities of pain. To see why this is so,
suppose that we place ourselves in the position of the Antipodean.
We can even suppose that science has discovered neural correlates
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for qualities of pain such as its burning and intense qualities.
Let us call these neural correlates B and I. imagine a person, call
him Matt, connected to a machine which gives him reliable readings
of his brain processes. Matt can thus "read off" his state of mind
from the machine. Now, let us suppose that such a person makes a
report based on the sensation. If he reports "My C-fibers are
firing in ways B and I", what is he reporting? He is reporting a
brain process which has been empirically discovered to be
"correlated" with what we (on earth) call "a painful, intense,
burning sensation". But let us suppose we ask him to describe what
he is reporting. What can he say? He cannot use terms like
intense', 'painful', and 'burning' since these are terms used to
report mental events. All he can do is to give further details
about his brain process, such as its cause, location, etc. In other
words. Matt will have no way of describing his experience--he can
only report its cause.
Rorty's Antipodean example is an attempt to show that the
objective point of view from which we view another person's
feelings, thoughts, desires, etc., could replace the subjective
point of view from which each person experiences his own feelings,
thoughts, desires etc. with no loss of explanatory or descriptive
power. Such an attempt is inherently confused since the objective
point of view depends for its definition on the subjective point of
view. It is also confused in that objective criteria such as
C-fibers firing" are supposed to be criteria for something, and
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this something is not another brain state but a subjective
experience such as pain. Antipodean is in fact a very impoverished
language in which people are unable to describe what their
experiences are like. The suggestion that Antipodean is just as
descriptive and explanatory as our current language has no more
merit than the suggestion that we abandon all talk of our bodies and
brains in favor of strictly mentalistic language. In such language,
one cannot say "I have a pain in my finger". Likewise, in
Antipodean, one cannot say "I have an intense, throbbing pain."
5. 3 Intentionality
Contemporary discussion of intentionality as a criterion of the
mental begins with Franz Brentano.^^
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and
also mental) inexistence ( Inexistenz ) of an object
( Gegenstand ) , and what we could call, although in not
entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a
direction upon an object (by which we are not to
understand a reality in this case)
,
or an immanent
objectivity. Each one includes something as object within
itself, although not always in the same way. In
presentation something is presented, in judgment something
is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in
hate [something] hated, in desire [something] desired, etc.
This passage on intentionality is sometimes cited by commentators on
intentionality as the classic statement of the thesis of
intentionality, although Brentano uses the phrase 'intentional
32inexistence' rather than 'intentionality'.
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Brentano states his thesis as an ontological claim about mental
phenomena. Brentano is not making a conceptual or linguistic claim
about the language for describing mental phenomena: he is saying
that mental phenomena such as thoughts and desires have the property
of being directed upon an object. Recent discussion, by contrast,
centers on criteria by which intentional sentences or intentional
terms within language can be identified.
Much recent discussion of intentionality centers around
articles by Roderick Chisholm, responses to his articles, and
replies to these responses. In particular, Chisholm has
proposed three criteria of intentionality. In Section 5.3.1, I
state a recent formulation of these criteria. In Section 5.3.2 I
examine recent discussion of these criteria by Albert Flores^^ and
Ausonio Marras. In Section 5.3.3, I discuss a reformulation by
Chisholm of his criteria in response to criticisms by Flores and
others. In Section 5.3.4 I examine a reformulation of Chisholm's
criteria by Ansonio Marras. In Section 5.3.5 I state three
criticisms of intentionality as a criterion of mental phenomena.
5.3.1 Chisholm's Criteria for Intentional Sentences
Chisholm originally states his three criteria for
intentionality in Sentences About Believing ^^ and in Perceiving: A
37Philosophical Study
. He restates these three criteria in a
38
recent discussion:
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I had suggested a kind of criterion of the psychological.A phenomenon is psychological, I said, if we cannot
adequately describe it in our ordinary language without
using sentences that are intentional. And then Iformulated three criteria of intentionality
. (i) a
sentence is intentional if it uses a substantival
expression in such a way that neither the sentence nor its
negation imply that there is, or that there isn't
anything, to which that expression truly applies. (2) A
sentence is intentional if it has a subordinate clause
such that neither the sentence nor its negation imply thatthe subordinate clause is true or that it is false. And(3) a sentence is intentional if it has a context that is
referentially opaque. Then I added that a compound
sentence is intentional provided one of its components is
intentional.
Here Chisholm restates his three original criteria for a
sentence's being intentional. These three criteria can be
formulated as follows, together with a criterion for compound
sentences.
A sentence is intentional if:
1. It uses a substantival expression in such a way that
neither the sentence nor its negation implies that this
expression does or does not apply to any thing.
2. It has a subordinate clause such that neither the
sentence nor its negation imply that the subordinate
clause is true or false.
3. It has a referentially opaque context.
4. It is a compound sentence and one of its components is
intentional.
According to Chisholm, "a phenomena is psychological. .. if we
cannot adequately describe it without using sentences that are
39intentional". Apparently Chisholm's view is that if we must use
an intentional sentence to describe a phenomenon, the phenomenon we
are describing is psychological. For example, suppose I say:
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5. I believe that Reagan is from California.
Here I am stating a belief that I have. In this example, my belief
that Reagan Is from California is the psychological phenomenon. It
is the presence of the verb 'believe' in sentence 5 that accounts
for the intentionality of this sentence, not the presence of the
sentence "Reagan is from California'. However this sentence
expresses the content of my belief, so its presence is essential to
the intentionality of the sentence. Yet the psychological
phenomenon I am describing when I use this sentence is my belief,
not the fact that Reagan is from California.
Because the intentionality of a sentence depends in many cases
on the presence of a verb that expresses a propositional attitude,
some philosophers such as Davidson prefer to talk about mental
u 40verbs
:
We may call those verbs mental that express propositional
attitudes like believing, intending, desiring, hoping,
knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so on.
Such verbs are characterized by the fact that they
sometimes feature in sentences with subjects that refer to
persons, and are completed by embedded sentences in which
the usual rules of substitution appear to break down.
This criterion is not precise, since I do not want to
include these verbs when they occur in contexts that are
fully extensional ( 'He knows Paris, ' 'He perceives the
moon' may be cases)
,
nor exclude them whenever they are
not followed by embedded sentences. An alternative
characterization of the desired class of mental verbs
might be that they are psychological verbs as used when
they create apparently nonextensional contexts. .. .On the
proposed test of the mental, the distinguishing feature of
the mental is not that it is private, subjective, or
immaterial, but that it exhibits what Brentano called
intentionality. Thus intentional actions are clearly
included in the realm of the mental along with thoughts,
hopes, and regrets (or the events tied to these)
.
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Davidson talks here about
.ental verbs, e.g., believing, intending,
hoping, desiring, knowing, etc. whether a verb is mental depends on
its use, these verbs may not always be mental. According to
Davidson, a verb is mental when it occurs in an intentional
context. Chisholm's criteria for intentional sentences should
enable us to identify intentional contexts.
Apparently Chisholm intends each criterion to be a sufficient
criterion for identifying psychological phenomena. The criteria
cannot be individually necessary since they apply to different types
of sentences. Albert Flores cites these three sentences as examples
of intentional sentences by each of Chisholm's three criteria:^^
Criterion 1: 6. Quine looked for the proper
characterization of analyticity.
Criterion 2: 7. Othello believes that Desdemona loves
Casio.
Sentence 7 is also intentional by Criterion 3 in virtue of the truth
of the following identity statement:
8. Desdemona is the woman framed by lago.
Sentences 6 and 7 are each intentional according to the first two of
Chisholm's criteria respectively. Sentence 7 is also intentional
according to Chisholm's Criterion 3. But sentence 6 is intentional
only by Criterion 1. We can add a fourth example of a compound
sentence as an example of Criterion 4
:
9. Othello believes that Desdemona loves Casio or snow is
white.
The most correct interpretation of Chisholm's criteria, then, is
that the disjunction of the four criteria is a necessary condition
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for Identifying psychological phenomena, while each condition is
individually sufficient. This allows tor the possibility that a
sentence can be intentional by more than one criterion, but need not
be intentional by more than one.
^•3.2 Criticisms of Chisholm's Criteria
One criticism that has been raised against Chisholm's
intentional criteria for psychological phenomena is that sentences
that contain modal terms such as 'possible' and 'necessary' satisfy
one or more of Chisholm's criteria yet are not used to describe
psychological phenomena. Albert Flores cites the following
1 42example:
10. It is necessary that Alaska is Alaska.
We can assume the truth of the following identity statement:
11. Alaska is the 49th state of the union.
Substitution in sentence 10 results in the following statement:
12. It is necessary that Alaska is the 49th state in the union
Sentence 10 is intentional by Criterion 3, yet it is not used to
describe a psychological phenomenon.
Flores cites other sentences which have been cited as counter
examples to Chisholm's first two criteria:"^^
13. The fire needs some coal.
14. The frost may bring it about that the cliff will fall.
Sentence 13 is is intentional by Criterion 1 since neither 13 nor
15.
The fire does not need some coal.
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implies that any coal is available, or even exists. Sentence 14 is
intentional by Criterion 2 since neither 14 nor its negation:
16.
The frost may not bring it about that the cliff „iu fan.
implies that the truth or falsity of the subordinate clause.
Chisholm's response to examples like these and others is to
claim that the alleged counterexamples can be transformed into
equivalent non-intentional sentences
These sentences are not examples counter to our thesisAnyone who understands the language can readily transformhem into conditionals which are not intentional
... Instead
of using intentional sentences, we could have said, 'Ifthere should be any new epidemics, the patient would notbe affected by them'... I believe that any other ostensibly
non-psychological sentence which is intentional can betransformed, in an equally obvious way, into a sentence
conforming to our version of Brentano's thesis. That isto say, it will become a sentence of one of two possible
types: either (a) it will no longer be intentional or (b)It will be explicitly psychological. Sentences aboutprobability may be intentional, but, depending upon one's
conception of probability, they may be transformed eitherinto the first or into the second type.
Following Chisholm's proposal, D.H. Sanford proposes these
transformations for sentences 10 and 14: 45
17. It is necessary that Alaska is self-identical.
18. It is possible that the frost will bring it about
that the cliff will fall.
Sentence 17 has the same truth value as 10, while the negation of 18
implies the falsity of the subordinate clause. Hence sentences 10
and 14 are not intentional after all.
Flores correctly attributes to Chisholm the following
46principle
:
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A. All non-transformable intentional sentences are
psychological
.
Sentences containing modal terms and other apparently
non-psychological yet intentional sentences do not count as
intentional if they can be transformed into non-intentional
sentences. Or, if they can be transformed into explicitly
intentional sentences, they count as intentional. For example, one
might transform:
19. It is probable that there is life on Venus.
into
20. It is reasonable for us to believe that there is life
on Venus.
Flores takes 'transforms' to mean "transform into a logically
equivalent sentence". He counters that if one sentence is
intentional and the other is not, these two sentences have different
implicatory relations and hence are not logically equivalent . ^
^
5.3.3. Chisholm's Reformulated Criterion
In his response to Flores, Chisholm concedes that his original
criteria need to be reformulated. He gives the following
definitions which are intended to provide this reformulation:^^
(D14) T contains S autonymously in L = Df (i) s is a
proper part of T; and (ii) for every U, if U
results from replacing S in T by some sentence in
L, then there is a P such that P is a proper part
of U and the result of replacing S by P in T is a
sentence in L.
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(D15)
(D16)
(D17)
attributes to Chisholm the following criterion:^^
(P) A sentence containing a propositional clause S is
psychological if and only if it contains S in an
exclusively intentional context.
Marras goes on to discuss the problem of modal contexts:^^
According to (P), 'John believes that Socrates is
mortal' is psychological, whereas 'It is possible
that Socrates is mortal' is not; the latter
contains S in an intentional but not in an
exclusively intentional context. And 'It is
necessary that Socrates is mortal' is also
non-psychological since S does not even occur in an
intentional context.
As Marras says, then, Chisholm's revised criterion appears to answer
objections to Chisholm's earlier criteria based on sentences
containing modal terms.
T contains S in a propositional context in L = of
(i) S is a proper part of T; (ii) t does not
contain S autonymously in L; and (iii) for every U,if U is a sentence in L, the result of replacing s"by U in T is a sentence in L.
T contains s in an intentional context in L = Df
(i) T contains S in a propositional context in L;
(ii) there is an S' which is inconsistent with S in
L but which is such that the result of replacing S
by S' is consistent with T in L.
T contains S in an exclusively intentional context
in L - Df (i) T contains S in an intentional
context in L; and (ii) there is a U such that (a) U
is logically equivalent to S in L and (b) the
result of replacing S by U in T is not logically
implied by T in L.
discussion of Chisholm's reply, Ausonio Marras correct
Marras points out
describe psychological
however, that some sentences
phenomena are not intentional
used to
on Chisholm's
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revised criterion:
c
obviously psychological sentence
-John knows
^ 'Socrates is
1^00 ® ^ P-^°P°=itional context but not
^ntenr ?
oontext, and thus not in an exclusively
mrrtrrrwMcr"^""' " <S°crates is nL
^
^
^ inconsistent with s but which is such
with ^ Vf S by S' is not consistentT. Hence T (and many other sentence containing verbs
out to h! n
'len’etbet', •realise’, etc.) turnbe non-psychological according to (P).
Other sentences that are not intentional by Chisholm's criteria are
20,
I see that my desk is brown.
21. I remember that you attended the meeting.
22. I am aware that she is wearing lipstick.
In sentences 20
,
21
,
and 22, the result of replacing the embedded
sentence with its negation yields a sentence which is inconsistent
with the original sentence. Chisholm's revised criterion, then,
while dealing with the problems of modal contexts, appears to rule
out sentences which clearly describe psychological phenomena.
5 • 3 . 4 . Marras* Revision of Chisholm's Cri t e r i
a
Marras proposes a different revision of Chisholm's original
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criteria
:
(i) Drop Chisholm's third criterion of intentionality
in SAB [Sentences About Believing], which fails to
keep the ( de dicto ) modalities out of the
intentional domain.
(ii) Retain the first two criteria in SAB as (singly)
sufficient conditions of intentionality.
(iii) Add to those two criteria the following recursive
condition
:
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(C) Any (noncontradictory) sentence which entails a
sentence which is intentional by either thefirst or the second criterion is itself
intentional.
(iv) Let Chisholm's first two criteria in SAB
supplemented by the recursive condition (C)
constitute jointly a necessary and sufficient
condition of intentionalitv
. (it will be noticed
that modal sentences turn out to be non-intentionalby this condition, whereas 'John knows that p
'
,
which entails 'John believes that
,
turns out tobe intentional by meeting conditions (C).)
(V) Reformulate Chisholm's thesis about the
psychological as follows:
(D) A sentence is psychological if and only if it
is intentional and is not transformable into a
non-intentional sentence.
In a footnote, Marras replies to four sentences offered by John
Bacon as counterexamples to his proposal. One sentence is:
23. It is a contingent matter whether A.
In reply, Marras refers to an article published in Intentionalitv,
M_i_nd and Language. In a footnote in this article, Marras makes
these remarks:
Contingency sentences seem to be intentional by
Chisholm's second criterion. For neither "It is
contingent that (where 'contingent' means 'neither
necessary nor impossible' ) nor its contradictory implies
either that ^ is true or that is false. However, since
such contingency sentences are really abbreviations for
compound sentences (i.e., sentences containing two or more
sentences conjoined by means of such sentence connectors
as 'and', 'or', 'because,' etc.), they are as such beyond
the scope of Chisholm's second criterion, which applies
only to noncompound sentences. Chisholm also provides a
criterion of intentionality for compound sentences,
according to which a compound (declarative) sentence is
intentional if and only if at least one of its component
sentences is intentional ( Perceiving
. p. 172). By this
criterion, the compound sentence "It is neither necessary
“possible that £ (which Is the unabbreviatedform of It IS contingent that £- ) is not intentional
since neither of its component sentences is intentional.Similar considerations apply to sentences about
probability dispositions, tendencies, abilities, etc.
which may be analyzed into nonintentional sentences aboutfrequencies and/or nonintentional counterfactual sentences.
In the above quotation, Marras deals deftly with many modal
sentences. Included in his list of statements he believes he can
show to be non-intentional are sentences of probability. Marras
apparently believes that probability sentences can be analyzed intc
sentences about frequencies or into nonintentional counterf actual
sentences. The frequency interpretation is one of several accepted
interpretations of probability. However, this interpretation of
probability has difficulty accounting for the probability of unique
events. Consider this sentence:
24. It is probable that the sun will burn out in 23
billion years.
Sentence 24 is intentional by Chisholm's criterion 2. Perhaps
Marras would analyze 24 as:
25. The frequency with which suns burn out in 23 billion
years is high.
However, 25 will not do as an analysis of sentence 24 since 24
refers to a particular sun and since this claim is based on evidenc
about the sun; not on a statistical or frequency analysis of
probabilities.
• 55Chisholm addresses this issue in Sentences about Believing:
Here Chisholm says that the following sentence
26.
It is probable that there is life on Venus.
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can be transformed into sentences abont frequencies. But unique
events occur only once so that it is a mistake to suppose that their
probability is a matter of the frequency with which they occur.
Chisholm also appears to be confusing giving an analysis or
equivalent reading of a sentence with citing the evidence for it.
The evidence for sentence 26, even if it is a matter of the
frequency with which life is found on certain places, is not part of
the meaning of 26. Hence, even if the evidential sentences for
sentence 26 are non-intentional, this does not make 26
non- intentional.
Probably Chisholm and Marras would prefer an intentional
reading of sentences 25 and 26. Chisholm's other interpretation is
as follows:^^
27. It is reasonable for us to believe that there is life
on Venus.
Sentence 27 is intentional by Criterion 2. However, what is
reasonable to believe is determined by weighing the reasons for and
against a proposition, while probability is a matter of judging the
likelihood of an event's occurring. Hence it can be reasonable to
believe something to which the concept of probability does not
apply, as it is reasonable for me to believe that 2+2=4. Yet it
is not merely probable but certain that 2+2=4. Furthermore,
what is reasonable for a person to believe is relative to the
background of his beliefs and purposes, so it can be reasonable to
believe something improbable. For example, it is reasonable for me
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to believe that I can leap over a chasm if this will help me
accomplish this task even if it is improbable that I will succeed.
Perhaps Chisholm or Marras could offer another "analysis" or
"transformation" that would not be susceptible to the objections
just advanced. Unless this is done, Marras' revised criterion does
not fare better than either Chisholm's original criteria or
Chisholm's revised criteria.
Marras criterion is also notable for the psychological
sentences that are not intentional according to his criterion.
Consider once again Marras' criterion, this time with Chisholm's
first two criteria spelled out:
1. It uses a substantival expression in such a way that
neither the sentence nor its negation implies that this
expression does or does not apply to any thing.
2. It has a subordinate clause such that neither the
sentence nor its negation imply that the subordinate
clause is true or false.
3. Any (noncontradictory) sentence which entails a
sentence which is intentional by either the first or
the second criterion is itself intentional.
Condition 2 applies only to sentences that contain a
subordinate clause, so any sentence without such a clause, if it is
intentional, has to be intentional by either Condition 1 or
Condition 3. The sentences which Condition 1 are intended to meet
are sentences such as:
(6) Quine looked for the proper characterization of
analyticity
.
These sentences contain a "substantival expression" which is used in
such a way that neither the sentence nor its negation implies that
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there is or is not anything to which the substantival expression
applies. By 'substantival expression', Chisholm apparently means
-name or definite or indefinite description" to allow for examples
such as:
28.
Diogenes looked for an honest man.
In Perceiving Chisholm cites sentence 28, which originates with
Brentano, as an example of an intentional sentence according to his
57first criterion. Hence the substantival expression can be
either a definite or indefinite description, as well as a name.
In the examples Chisholm gives of sentences that are
intentional by Condition 1, the substantival expression is the
object of a verb. Chisholm does not to my knowledge address the
possibility that the substantival expression referred to in
Condition 1 might be the subject of the sentence. Hence, sentences
which neither contain a subordinate clause nor contain a
substantival expression which is the object of a verb are apparently
not covered by either Condition 1 or Condition 2. Examples of such
sentences are:
29. I am thinking.
30. He is dreaming.
31. I am in pain.
32. I am angry.
33. She is depressed.
Sentences 29 to 33 are all mental or psychological sentences.
None of these sentences contains a subordinate clause, and the only
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substantival expression In any of these sentences is the subject of
the sentence. I do not believe that Chisholm Intended the
substantival expression mentioned in Condition 1 to be the subject
Of the sentence. However, to the extent that any of these sentences
implies anything about their subjects, the implication is that the
subject exists, viz. that there is something to which the
substantival expression truly applies. This is especially true of
the first-person sentences, but it applies to the third person
sentences as well. But if Chisholm or Marras were to deny that
there is such an implication, and hence that these sentences are
intentional, it is difficult to see why these sentences would not be
intentional as well:
34. I am tall.
35. He is rich.
36. She is tanned.
These three sentences have subjects that function like the subjects
of sentences 29 to 33. The difference is that they do not contain
intentional terms. Hence Chisholm and Marras cannot account for the
intentionality of sentences 29 to 33 by appealing to Condition 1.
Perhaps Marras' Condition 3 will account for the intentionality
of sentences 29 to 33. Marras may wish to argue that:
31. I am in pain.
entails
37.
I believe I am in pain.
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iPcyclopedia of Philosophy article on " Intentionality"
,
Chisholm gives this very argument in an attempt to account for the
intentionality of pain. Chisholm does not incorporate this
consideration into his criteria as Marras has. However, it is not
clear that sentence 37 is intentional by Marras' criterion. Just as
sentence 31 plausibly can be held to imply sentence 37, so 37
plausibly can be held to imply 31. This violates Condition 2,
according to which neither a sentence nor its contradictory implies
the truth or falsity of the subordinate clause. Hence even if
sentence 31 does imply 37, sentence 31 is not intentional and
therefore mental by Condition 3.
In the case of sentence 31 implying sentence 37, which seemed
at first as if it might provide a way to argue that sentence 31 is
intentional, this implication relies on the incorrigibility of
f i^^st-person pain sentences. Hence, someone who relies on this
implication to explain the intentionality of pain sentences is
importing a different criterion from intentionality, viz.
incorrigibility, and using it to support intentionality as a
criterion of mental phenomena. However, I argued in Section 5.2
that incorrigibility does not extend to all our mental states, and
that in particular it does not extend to dream states and emotional
states. Hence, even if Marras could find a way to show that
sentence 31 is intentional, or even that sentence 29 is intentional
by Condition 3, his argument would not extend to the other three
sentences listed:
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30. He is dreaming.
31. I am angry.
32. She is depressed.
In summary, according to Marras' revised criterion of
intentionality
,
some sentences which are not mental such as
sentences of probability are intentional by Marras* criterion.
Other sentences which are mental, such as sentences 29 to 33, are
not intentional by his criterion. Whether or not Marras* criterion
is an improvement on Chisholm* s, it is not significantly more
successful than Chisholm*s in capturing those sentences which are
generally recognized to be psychological or mental.
5.3.5 Conclusion about Intentionality
I will now make some general comments about intentionality as a
criterion of the mental. First, the Chisholm-Mar ras criteria
attempt to identify certain sentences as being intentional and then
claim that what these sentences describe or refer to is mental. On
the other hand, it is clear from reading Brentano that he regarded
intentionality as an ontological feature of mental phenomena, not
merely a conceptual or linguistic one. Based on the attempts
examined in this section, it is unlikely that any conceptual or
linguistic criterion of intentionality will capture all and only
those sentences we antecedently call mental. It may be, then, that
future research should be directed upon formulating an ontological
criterion.
Secondly, it seems unlikely that any criterion, either
ontological or conceptual, could succeed in capturing all cases of
mental phenomena. If the unique feature of intentional phenomena i
that they are directed towards an object, it seems clear that not
all mental phenomena share this feature. Both sensations such as
pain and tiredness and objectless emotions such as certain cases of
depression and fear do not share this feature of intentionality
.
Also, visual images which do not represent any thing, such as spots
before someone's eyes, are not intentional. It appears, then, that
many mental phenomena do not have the feature Brentano originally
identified, that of being directed towards an object, and which has
come to be known as intentionality.
Third, it is not clear that intentionality is exclusively a
feature of mental phenomena. As Marion Knowles says:^^
It has been suggested that there are physical phenomena
which, in some sense, are intentional.
For instance, Scruton, following Goodman, points out
that one can conceive of a painting as being ' about its
object in the way that a sentence is about its subject.'
And, clearly, certain paintings are paintings of something
(e.g., portraits, landscape paintings), while others are,
in a sense, 'about' something (e.g. Picasso's 'Guernica'
is, inter alia, about war)
.
Another example is a road sign which points in a particular
direction. In these cases, the intentionality of the physical
entity is dependent on the intention of a person. Nevertheless, a
sign still points in a particular direction even if one has to
explain this fact by reference to human intentions. Any complete
account of Intentionality will take into account the intentionality
that attaches to some physical entities.
5 . 4 Conclusion
In Section 5.2 I examined Richard Rorty's defense of
incorrigibility as a criterion for identifying mental phenomena. I
Section 5.3 I examined Roderick Chisholm's criterion of
intentionality as a criterion for identifying mental phenomena. I
argued that while a small subset of first-person statements may be
incorrigible, this criterion fails to capture many other first
person and third person statements about mental phenomena. In
particular, it fails to capture many statements about what Rorty
calls mental features, including statement about feelings, emotions
and dreams. It also fails to capture statements about infant and
animal pains. Furthermore, some physical statements are more
incorrigible than some mental statements. Hence, incorrigibility
does not succeed in capturing all and only mental phenomena.
With respect to intentionality, I argued that the criteria
proposed by Chisholm and Marras make non-mental sentences
intentional and fail to capture sentences which clearly are mental.
It seems unlikely that any linguistic criterion will be successful
in capturing all and only mental phenomena. Ontologically speaking
it does not seem that all mental phenomena share the feature of
intentionality originally identified by Brentano. In particular.
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objectless emotions such as certain cases of depression and fear and
certain sensations such as those of pain and tiredness do not have
this quality of "aboutness" or intentionality
. Finally, certain
physical objects appear to have intentionality, or a feature very
much like intentionality. Hence, the criterion of intentionality
does not succeed in identifying all and only mental phenomena.
There are other criteria for mental phenomena that I have not
discussed here. It is sometimes claimed that what is unique to
mental phenomena is that they are subjective, nonspatial,
qualitative, purposive, phenomenal, mnemic, holistic, or emergent.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all these proposed
fot' identifying mental phenomena. The most comprehensive
discussion of this subject is still Herbert Feigl's classic article,
"The Mental and the Physical". Even though this chapter does
not attempt the exhaustive survey that Feigl makes, the fact remains
that incorrigibility and intentionality are two of the strongest
candidates for a criterion of mental phenomena. And neither of
these two criteria is close to being a satisfactory criterion for
mental phenomena.
Finally, it may be that the most promising course for someone
who wishes to defend incorrigibility or intentionality as criteria
of the mental is to concede that neither one is a necessary
condition for something's being a mental phenomenon and that the
criterion is one but not the only criterion for identifying mental
phenomena. Just as was the case with incorrigibility.
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intentionality does characterize a subset of mental phenomena, but
it does not characterize all mental phenomena. A logical conclusion
to draw, then, is that there may be no single criterion of what is
mental and that if there can be a successful criterion which states
a necessary condition, it will be a disjunction of criteria each of
which applies to some but not all mental phenomena.
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CHAPTER VI
MIND-BODY INTERACTION AND THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE PHYSICAL
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, l considered a form of dualism as presented by
Saul Kripke. I also considered identity theory in this chapter in
that much of the chapter was devoted to defending Kripke against the
criticism of an identity theorist, Fred Feldman. However, I noted
that the problem of interaction is a serious problem for dualism. I
devoted Chapter 3 to considering anomalous monism, a position
advocated by Donald Davidson. This position has its roots in
Spinoza's dual aspect view.^ I argued that Davidson has failed to
establish anomalous monism and that there are good reasons for
doubting that anomalous monism is true. Chapter 4 considered
functionalism as presented by Daniel Dennett. This is really a very
contemporary form of materialism, perhaps a more sophisticated form
than the identity theory. I argued in this chapter that Dennett's
functionalist account deals with the mechanisms of pain and not pain
itself, and that functionalism cannot account for the subjective
qualities of pain and other experiences. Finally, Chapter 5
considered two criteria for mental phenomena: incorrigibility and
i ntentionality
.
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The following statements formulate the results from the
preceding which are most important for future discussion:
I. The dualistic division of the world into two
ontologically distinct classes makes the
distinctness of mind from body fairly easy to
argue for. However/ dualism will not be a viable
theory until a plausible account of mind-body
interaction is given which is consistent with
dualist principles.
II. In justifying his claim that there are no
psychophysical lawS/ Davidson utilizes the claim
that the physical conceptual domain is homonomic.
The homonomic quality of the physical conceptual
domain has the result that this domain includes
only the language(s) of physics and chemistry/ and
not biology or neurology.
III. Like other forms of materialism/ functionalism
describes the mechanisms and causes of pain and
other mental phenomena/ but does not account for
mental phenomena. In particular/ functionalism/
like other materialist theories/ is unable to
account for the subjective qualities of experience.
IV. It is unlikely that any single criterion can be
found which uniquely identifies all and only
mental phenomena. It is especially unlikely that
a necessary condition for mental phenomena can be
found. If such a condition is found/ it is likely
to be a disjunction of properties rather than one
single property.
In this chapter I return to issues relating mainly to
Statements I, II/ and IV. In Section 6,2/ I discuss mind-body
interaction as a problem for dualism. In Section 6.3/ I discuss the
other half of the mental-physical distinction: the physical. I
provide three different definitions of the term 'physical' which
correspond to three distinct conceptions of what is physical. The
belief that it is possible to provide a single definition of
'physical' that covers all physical entities and phenomena is one
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reason the mind-body problem has proved so intractable, section 6.4
summarizes the chapter. I develop the Implications of the different
definitions of 'physical' and the implications for the discussion of
mind-body interaction in Chapter 7.
6.2 Dualism and Mind-Body Interaction
One formulation of dualism is the view that mental events,
states, and phenomena are distinct from physical events, states, and
phenomena. Other formulations hold that mind is distinct from body,
or that a particular mind is distinct from any particular body.
These formulations are all versions of ontological dualism,
according to which dualism is a theory about the relation between
phenomena or substances in the world or universe. Conceptual
dualism, on the other hand, is a theory about terms which refer to
these phenomena or substances. According to conceptual dualism,
terms which refer to mental phenomena or substances cannot be
reduced to or identified with terms that refer to physical phenomena
or substances. In terms of the philosophers considered in earlier
chapters, Saul Kripke (following Descartes) is both an ontological
dualist and a conceptual dualist, while Donald Davidson is a
conceptual dualist but an ontological monist.
Dualism is a view supported by what is sometimes called "common
2
sense"
,
and is suggested by many everyday locutions. Thus, we
say that a person has a mind and a body, implying that there is a
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difference, and we say "My mind is playing tricks on me". it
certainly seems as if mental phenomena such as thoughts and feelings
are distinct from brain events, when I am aware of another person-s
feelings, I do not seem to be aware of a state of his brain. Many
people also hold that every human being has a soul, and some hold
that this soul survives death and passes into another mode of
existence or being. Dualism, then, is almost certainly the
predominant view among those who have not reflected on the mind-body
problem. This should perhaps not be considered evidence for
dualism, in and of itself, but it is a fact about dualism.
At this same "common sense" level, interaction between mind and
body, or between mental and physical phenomena, seems to be an
undeniable fact. If I am stuck with a pin, it certainly seems as if
the pin-prick causes my pain. Seeing a bear in the road will cause
almost anyone to shiver with fright. If I commit a social faux pax,
my face might turn red with embarrassment. Drugs such as marijuana,
alcohol, and LSD can cause modified perceptions or entirely new
perceptions. Voluntary action is often explained as follows: my
decision to perform an act such as raising my arm is the cause of my
arm's being raised. The world is also full of artefacts such as
bridges, books, desks, and cars which are products of human minds.
There are also common sense examples of mental events interacting
with other mental events, as when a person's fear of flying causes
him to decide to take alternative transportation. In all these
cases, mental and physical phenomena appear to interact in some way
with each other.
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In spite of the prima facie evidence for mind-body interaction,
interaction has always been difficult to explain within a dualist
framework. Explaining interaction has, in fact, been the principal
difficulty for dualism, and this difficulty has provided
materialists with several distinct arguments against dualism.
Michael Levin formulates one such argument as follows;^
Armed with this notion [that a given event e has only one
cause which is the cause of e], the anti-du7list presses
what appears to be the empirical fact that for every
physical event e involving a human body, there is some
preceding physical event which is the cause of e. As far
as anyone knows there are no gaps in the sequence of
bodily events to be bridged by a mental event, or into
which a mental event might slip. There is no physical
event whose cause is mental, in the dualist's intended
sense.
Levin suggests that a dualist might give the following reply:'^
The dualist can. ..reply that the causes of some bodily
events are not purely physical. His argument here is
reminiscent of a standard defence of epiphenomenalism, the
thesis that some physical events cause mental events but
mental events have no causal efficacy of their own.
Epiphenomenalists reply to the charge that their theory
makes mentality causally superfluous by observing that if
mental event in had not occurred the physical event ^ that
caused in would not have occurred, nor any further physical
events _b was the cause of. Similarly, replies the
dualist, suppose that when I form the intention (event jn)
to move my leg (event ^) , and thereafter move it, neural
event c^ causes Assuming that the formation of an
intention is an event, both jc and jn are necessary for e^.
Had I not intended to move my leg, it would not have
moved. Consequently, c_ does not contain all the necessary
conditions for my leg's moving and is not the cause of my
leg ' s moving
.
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According to this reply, both neural event £ and mental event m
are individually necessary for my leg's moving, and if £ occurs
without m or m occurs without £, my leg will not move. Thus, m and
£ are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for my leg to
move. This makes the intention to move my leg a partial cause of my
leg s moving. Levin does not say what the relation is between
neural event £ and my intention, in, or whether they occur
simultaneously. If they occur independently of each other such that
either could occur without the other, then it is difficult to see
why the intention is also necessary. However, if they are related
in such a way that they either occur together or not at all (c
cannot occur without m or m without £) , then this reply seems
plausible. The only difficulty for a dualist, however, is that
mental events are conceived as being conceptually and ontologically
distinct from physical events, and hence a consistent dualist may
not wish to admit a relation between mental and physical events
which seems to imply that they together form a kind of
mental-physical unity. However, it may be that this type of
relation must be admitted if the problem of interaction is to be
solved.
I discuss in more detail a view according to which mental and
physical events form a kind of unity in Chapter 7. For the moment,
consider another argument which Levin advances against
5interaction
;
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nother traditional argument, however, does seem to showdecisively that the causal relations between the mind asthe dualist conceives it and the body are impossible.
Originally my leg, which has mass w, is motionless. ThenIt moves distance d. Where did the energy come from? It
IS an empirical fact, the law of the conservation of
energy, that the energy had to come from somewhere, and
not only does it come from some preceding physical event,
no immaterial substance could possibly supply mechanical
energy. The mind can apply no physical force to the leg,
while the contraction of the hamstring muscle suppliesjust the right amount - and the bodily event just is the
motion of an object of mass w through distance d. ~hus
the contraction of the muscle is the cause of e. If there
were non-physical causes of physical events, th”e energy in
the universe would increase.
[C.D.] Broad cites, on the dualist's behalf, systems whose
parts are causally related but which, allegedly, exchange
no energy. The state of the bob of a pendulum is
constantly changing, yet the shaft applies no force to the
bob. This analogy is misguided in several ways. When my
leg moves a force being applied to a physical object;
energy is being transferred. Since all the requisite
force is supplied by a change in another physical object,
any change in any other (especially immaterial) object is
superfluous. The pendulum case is at best a precedent for
a very limited number of mind-body interactions. More
damaging is the fact that energy is actually being
exchanged in the pendulum case. The shaft is exerting
centripetal force on the bob, and the bob is exerting
centrifugal force on the shaft; and at different positions
the bob is exerting and bearing different amounts of
both. The potential and kinetic energy of the bob are
constantly changing.
Levin is right that energy is being exchanged in the pendulum case
6 V
cited by Broad. He goes on to say:
The dualist may complain that this appeal to the
conservation of energy reifies energy as a kind of stuff
passed from object to object, whereas legitimate talk of
energy (and mass) is shorthand for facts about
acceleration. The conservation of energy in particular is
shorthand for an empirical fact about constancies in such
ratios. But even if energy is analytically eliminable,
the present objection stands. Suppose we 'operationalize'
energy and mass, explaining the mass of a body as its
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constant, additive) tendency to induce acceleration. Myleg, which has a constant additive tendency to induce
acceleration w, moves with average velocity v during
time interval At. it is a hard empirical fact that some
o ject with a constant additive tendency w' to induce
acceleration must ha^e moved with such an average velocity
V during At that ri/2wv2dt =- 5''^/2w' v ' 2dt
.
Since. .. immaterial objects have no tendency to induce
acceleration, it cannot have been an immaterial object
that slowed down. But the cause of my leg's moving was
the slowing down of the object with mass w'
Levin has formulated quite forcefully an argument which is
often taken to be fatal to dualism: the argument from conservation
of energy. In doing so, he cites one formulation of Newton's Third
Law
:
2 (At: 2) l/2wv dt J l/2w'v' dt. This law can also be formulated as
follows: "The force that one object exerts on a second object is
equal and opposite to the force' that the second exerts on the
first . In this example, the leg is one object, while the
object with mass w' " is the other object which is the cause of my
leg's moving. Here this object with mass w' is presumably my
hamstring muscle. Since immaterial objects cannot induce
acceleration or exert force on a physical object, the object with
mass cannot be a mental object or a mental phenomenon.
Let us examine this argument to see what, if anything, it
shows. Levin says that the cause of his leg's moving was the
slowing down of an object with mass w' . Let us look at the
physiology of the movement of limbs, to identify this object and see
9how the causation occurs:
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Prop your elbow up on a table with your fingers pointingtoward the ceiling. Turn your hand so that you arelooking at the palm. Now make a fist and alternately bendyour fist first toward you and then away from you. Whenyou bend your fist toward you, the muscles running from
the inner surface of your wrist to the inner surface ofyour elbow are contracting, when you bend your fist awayfrom you, the same muscles are being stretched
.. .when the
muscles contract, they pull on the tendons. Because the
tendons are attached to the bones, those bones that are
free to move (in this case, the bones of your hand) will
be pulled into a new position. In those places where the
bones cannot be moved (in this case, the bones of your
elbow)
,
there will simply be increased tension on the
tendons.
When the muscles are stretched (in our example, the
muscles are stretched when the muscles on the other side
of the forearm contract)
,
movable bones are pulled into a
new position. Because of that new position, they, in
turn, pull on the tendons and muscles.
When the muscles contract, they pull on the tendons which are
attached to bones. Because the bones are in the hand, the entire
hand moves. Even here we have a chain (series) of causal events,
not a single cause. But the term 'cause' is often used to designate
some event which occurs and which, together with certain preexisting
or standing conditions, is sufficient for the event to occur. Thus
the cause of the collapse of a weak bridge might be the passing over
it of an especially heavy truck even though the bridge would not
have collapsed if it had not already been weak. In our example, it
is the contraction of the muscle that causes the hand movements, and
it is muscle contractions that cause Levin's leg to move as well.
If Levin's point is simply that muscle contractions and not
thoughts or volitions cause leg movements, then his argument does
not cast doubt on dualism in relation to interaction. For no
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responsible dualist would deny this; he would maintain that there is
a series of events which originate in a thought or act of will, and
the final event in this series is the movement of the leg. The
muscle contracts in response to commands from the nervous system, so
that it is in the brain and/or mind that we should look tor the
origin of the series of events which culminate with leg movement.
Insisting that there must be only one cause and that it must be the
immediate physical cause of the leg's moving ignores the role of the
nervous system in voluntary motion.
Levin's argument is also oversimplified in that he requires
that there be a single object with constant additive tendency w' to
induce acceleration that must have moved with an average velocity v'
during t. The movement of a leg in most cases is the result of the
contractions of a number of muscles, not just one. Perhaps Levin
would say that v' represents the average velocity of the relevant
muscle contractions, taking into account the fact that some muscular
action is inhibitory.
To provide an argument against dualism. Levin's argument must
apply to the nervous system as well, since muscles contract or
stretch in response to neural commands. Neural commands which
originate in the higher portions of the brain and pass through the
spinal cord give the muscles the signal to contract. A neuron
consists of many dendrites, which carry information in to the soma,
or cell body, and an axon, which carries information away from the
soma. Figure 6-1 contains an illustration of the neuron. An action
potential is formed at the axon hillock, where th
from the soma.
e axon protrudes
Figure 6-1. An Illustration of a Neuron
It is a well-known fact that the action potential produced by
neuron is not always equal to the sum total of incoming potentials.
An axon has a threshold and it either produces a full-sized
potential or it does nothing. This principle, known as the
All-or-None Law
, is explained as follows:^^
If an extremely mild electric shock is delivered to the
dendrites or soma, the axon does not produce any action
potential. It does nothing. If the intensity of the
shock is gradually increased, a point will be reached when
the axon does produce an action potential. Therefore, we
can say that the axon has a threshold ; that is, the axon
requires a certain level of disturbance before it
reacts. And an axon either reacts completely by producing
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a full-sized action potential, or else it does nothing.An axon cannot produce a half-sized or quarter-sized
stays on; either an action potential is produced or the
ctllid^r
maintained. This characteristic isthe All-°r-None Principle: either the axon reacts
y doing all it can (producing an action potential) or itdoes nothing. If the axon is to react, the disturbance
must reach or exceed theaxon s threshold. Anything less intense will not cause anaction potential.
William Uttal also comments on the All-or-None Law in the context of
discussing sensory coding
The discovery of the all-or-none law effectively removed
the amplitude of the response of a single axonal spike
potential from the list of candidate coding dimensions.
It now seems certain that the all-or-none law is valid for
axonal spikes and that the amplitude of the individual
nerve impulse is related only to the metabolic state of
the axon and not to any characteristic of the stimulus
once the spike threshold is exceeded. However, it should
be remembered that in other parts of the neuron, it has
been equally clearly established that slow potentials of
graded amplitude and prolonged duration are the
significant information symbols.
In the last sentence, Uttal is referring to graded potentials which
also exist and whose amplitude does vary with incoming impulses.
But the important point here is that action potentials do obey the
All-or-None Law
, and that the amplitude of an action potential is
not a function of incoming impulses.
One reason for the All—or—None Law is the existence of synapses
in the brain. A synapse is a gap which serves as a point of
communication between neurons, between neurons and effector organs,
and between two muscle fibers. A single neuron may have many single
12synaptic connections, as we see from the following account:
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The axon of a neuron may terminate in only a few synapsesor in up to 200,000 synapses (Purkinje cells of
cerebellum). On the other hand, the dendrites and cellbody of a single neuron may receive synaptic contacts from
several hundred to as many as 200,000separate axon contacts. in some neurons, as much as 40percent of the surface of the cell body is covered with
An average neuron is said to make from 1000 to10,000 synaptic contacts with other neurons and may
receive synaptic input from about 1000 other neurons.
Transmission of information across synapses occurs by both
electrical and chemical means. in the chemical synapse, the arrival
of an action potential generates the release of chemical substances
known as neurotransmitters. These are released in packets or quanta
which are the minimal unit of release. These neurotransmitters can
evoke a response in the postsynaptic cell, in the electrical
synapse, the currents generated by the action potential spread
directly into the postsynaptic neuron across the synapse.
Neurotransmitters are not always released; it is the
neurotransmitters which determine whether the action potential is
continued
.
Of course, a neuron has many inputs at once. We learn more
about how it "decides" what to do from the following description:^^
Each neuron may be influenced by hundreds or thousands of
stimuli on its excitatory and inhibitory receptive sites.
The complex interplay of the subliminal excitatory
postsynaptic potentials (EXSP) and subliminal inhibitory
postsynaptic potentials (IPSP) on each neuron endows the
neuron with a variety of inputs; this provides the basis
for the great plasticity of activity. Neurons are under
continual synaptic bombardment. In this battleground of
activity, the neuron reacts and responds. If the
algebraic summation of the polarizing EPSPs and
hyper-polarizing IPSPs results in a depolarizing event at
the low-resistance, low threshold axon hillock, an action
potential is generated and conducted along the axon. On
e other hand, if the algebraic summation of the graded
subliminal potentials is not enough to stimulate the
i nitial segment sufficiently, an action potential is notgenerated in the axon.
In summary, each neuron is a miniature "integration"
center where the confluences and algebraic summation of
all the decremental spreads of EPSPs and IPSPs take place
on the dendrites and cell body in relation to their
geometric distribution and locations on the neuron. ..We
are dealing, in these central nervous system cells, with abrain in miniature. The resulting action potential is, in
effect, a code message conveying information about graded
events in the dendrites and cell body of one neuron to adistant location where a graded event can be initiated on
another neuron.
Obviously, then, whether a neuron does fire on any given occasion i
a complex matter; perhaps there is an internal rule built in to the
neuron which it operates by. in any case, whether it does fire and
the amplitude of the impulse is not simply a function of the sum
total of the inputs.
Due to the All-or-None Law
, it is ’not the case that when an
action potential is generated, some body with mass w' must have
slowed down by the amplitude or speed of the action potential. In
fact, Newton's third law does not even apply here since it applies
to bodies with mass and an action potential is not a body with
mass. An action potential is an electrical signal which passes
through an axon, a body which does have mass. Neither graded
potentials nor action potentials are bodies with mass, and both can
occur in the chain of events beginning usually in the cerebral
cortex and ending with the movement of a leg. What Levin needs to
show is that mental events such as thoughts and volitions cannot
trigger neural activity, not that mental events cannot move legs.
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Levin has taken a mechanical principle of motion applying to
bodies with mass and applied it to the human body which contains
structures whose motion is not just governed by force and
acceleration, but by codes, rules, and signals. I am not saying
that neural structures violate the Conservation of Energy Principle;
I am saying that it doesn't apply to neural impulses since they are
not bodies with mass. Neural impulses are somewhat like magnetic
fields and light waves in that they don't fit standard conceptions
of what a body with mass is. An action potential is a kind of wave
that travels through an axon; it is not a body with mass.
Levin s argument from the conservation of energy does not show
that a thought cannot initiate neural activity since initiating
neural activity does not require that some body with mass provide
the acceleration. However, perhaps we can give a similar argument.
In general, neural impulses are generated either by other neural
impulses or spontaneously, probably by factors within the neuron
itself. In the former case, a neuron receives a large number of
graded potentials or action potentials and either generates a
potential or does not, depending on its threshold and other
factors. In the case of spontaneous activity, there is no reason to
believe that an immaterial object is the cause. Hence in neither
case does there appear to be any explanatory power added by
postulating an immaterial object as the initiator of neural activity.
Perhaps a more sophisticated form of dualism which recognizes
the distinction between the action of one body with mass on another
235
as It occurs in physics and the way in which neural activity occurs
in the brain could explain interaction from a dualist viewpoint.
However, any successful explanation will have to take into account
the intentional and biological nature of the brain. The brain
operates according to signals and rules, and it is part of a living
biological system. Hence mechanical models of explanation imported
from physics will not explain neurological processes. On the other
hand, a thought has a neurological component in that it originates
in the brain. Most forms of dualism have too simple a conception of
mental" and "physical" to accurately describe or explain these
facts.
The real problem with dualism is that it divides the universe
into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. According to
dualism, one conception of what is physical can apply to all cases
in which the term 'physical' applies, while 'mental' refers to a
distinct type of phenomenon. The motivation for this way of
conceiving physical things may lie in Descartes' desire to bring
human bodies and animals under the same laws as the entities of
physics. Whatever the motivation, this view obscures important
distinctions and creates unresolvable dichotomies. On the other
hand, conceiving of a mental event such as a thought as an
immaterial entity distinct from neurological (read "physical")
events places a metaphysical synapse between them that no
transmitter will ever cross. Only by revising its conception of
236
is HiBntsl 3nc3 whst is j n •u nac IS physical can dualism hope to account for
interaction.
A conceptual revision of the dualist conceptions of what is
mental and what is physical which would possibly enable dualism to
account for the interaction of mental and physical phenomena would
have to take into account several factors. First, it would have to
take into account the intentional and biological nature of the brain
as well as the neurological aspects of mental events. Secondly, it
would have to take into account the distinctions between the types
of explanation and description in physics as opposed to neurology
and biology. Third, it would have to give a consistent account of
phenomena which appear to be non-physical and non-mental, or at
least not purely physical or mental, such as persons, social
conventions, and moral rules. As I will argue later, I do not see
how such a conceptual revision can be made without abandoning
dualism for some form of pluralism.
In conclusion, it seems that some materialist arguments against
interaction are oversimplified in that they try to import laws and
principles from physics which govern matter in motion into a
neurological context. On the other hand, in just as oversimplified
a manner, dualists accept this framework and try to reply within
it. Because the problem of interaction is based on the false
conceptions that the brain and matter as it occurs in physics are of
the same type and obey the same laws, and that mental phenomena have
no physical properties and physical phenomena have no mental
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properties, neither argument can be conclusive. Both sides need to
recognize that the universe is more complex than their theories
allow.
I conclude, then, that the problem o£ interaction will remain
unresolvable for dualistic theories unless and until a conceptual
revision in the notions of "mental- and "physical" is made. Unless
this can be done, or unless new arguments are presented, the problem
Of interaction may be fatal to dualism.
6.3. Three Conceptions of the Physical
What sort of conceptual revision is needed in the notions of
mental" and "physical" if the problem of interaction is to be
resolved? I argued in Chapter 5 that it is unlikely that there is a
single criterion for identifying all and only mental phenomena. Is
there such a criterion for physical phenomena? Is it possible to
give a single definition of 'physical' that identifies all and only
physical phenomena? I will now discuss these questions.
6.3.1 The Scientific Conception
In Chapter 3, I argued that Davidson's requirement that
scientific laws draw on a homonomic conceptual domain has the result
that the physical conceptual domain is restricted to the languages
of chemistry and physics. Yet Davidson also cites a person's bodily
movement as an example of a physical event. However, the conceptual
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domains of biology, neurology, and human bodily movement are not
homonomic since they include references to mental terms and to terms
which are functionally defined such as 'life'.^^ Hence terms that
describe human bodily movement belong to a different conceptual
domain than the scientific one.
The attempt to interpret 'physical* as meaning "belonging to
the conceptual domain of physics and chemistry" is not novel. This
is a common conception of "physical". Hilary Putnam implicitly
appeals to this in these remarks
Now, what do I mean by saying that the brain has
non-physical properties? I mean properties which are
definable i n terms that do not mention the brain's physics
or chemistry
.
According to this conception, an object has physical properties just
in case it has properties which are definable in terms which mention
the physics or chemistry of the object.
Although this conception of what is physical as being that
which is definable in terms from physics or chemistry is one that is
often appealed to or implicitly assumed in mind-body discussions, it
is too restricted to cover a number of central cases in which the
term 'physical' is used. Herbert Feigl also saw the need of
identifying this conception of "physical" as one to be distinguished
from others. In his article "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'" he
distinguishes two concepts, which he calls "physical^^" and
physical^ :
By "physical" I mean the type of concepts and laws which
suffice in principle for the explanation and prediction of
inorganic processes. If emergentism is not required for
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the phenomena of organic life,
-physical' would mean those
concepts and laws sufficient for the explanation ofinorganic as well as of biological phenomena. In
accordance with the terminology of Meehl and Sellars, I
shall henceforth designate this concept by "physicalo"in contradistinction to "physicalj^"
,
which is
practically synonymous with "scientific", i.e. with being
an essential part of the coherent and adequate descriptive
and explanatory account of the spatio-temporal-causal
world
.
Feigl sees the need for distinguishing a scientific from a
biological conception of "physical" due to the possibility of
emergent phenomena. While it is true that emergent properties are a
feature of biological and organic phenomena, they occur at the
chemical level and the physical object level as well. Hence,
emergence may not be the best choice to distinguish the two
conceptions of physical". As we shall soon see, however, there are
good reasons for distinguishing two conceptions of "physical".
Davidson, Putnam, and Feigl all agree that there is a
conception of "physical" according to which the term 'physical' is
closely related to physics and chemistry or, more broadly, to the
natural sciences. This is the conception of 'physical' which occurs
in the phrases "the physical sciences". Here 'physical' contrasts
with "non-physical sciences" such as biology and neuroscience and
other life sciences, sociology, economics, and psychology. The
reason Davidson uses this conception of "physical" is due to his
views about scientific laws, and certainly laws, explanations, and
theories are different in the natural sciences than in psychology
and sociology. If Davidson is right that the physical forms a
closed homonomic domain, then to say of something that it is
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physical in this scientific sense has a very different meaning from
saying that a bodily movement is physical.
I will now give a definition of the meaning of 'physical' which
involves physics and chemistry. Because it is far from obvious what
IS meant by phrases such as "physical state" and "physical event", i
state the definition in terms of the notions of physical property
and physical entity. I choose 'entity' rather than 'object' because
•object' contrasts with 'subject' and so is more restricted. I call
this the "scientific" conception of what is physical and denote it
as follows: (s)physical. This conception can be defined in the
following way:
P(s).
^ is a purely (s)physical property = df.
_x is a
property and is uniquely specifiable in terms
from only the languages of physics and chemistry.
P(s)'. 2^ is a uniquely (s)physical property = df. x is a
property and is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms from only the languages of
physics and chemistry.
E(s). 2^ is a purely (s)physical entity = df. 2L is an
entity and all of s essential properties are
purely (s)physical properties.
E(s)'. X is an impurely (s)physical entity = df. x is an
entity and at least one but not all of 2L's
essential properties are (s)physical properties.
The above four definitions are all ontological versions of
(s)physical. A conceptual version can be created as follows:
T(s). 't' is an (s)physical term just in case 't' refers
to some (s)physical property or (s)physical entity.
Using T(s), it is also possible to say what the (s)physical
conceptual domain looks like, based on earlier work in Chapter
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3. The (s) physical conceptual domain will contain at least the
following elements:
1. Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if, etc.)
2. Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point' etc )The mathematics chosen can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.
3. Syntactic rules.
4. (s)physical terms which are descriptive. These can be
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.
What terms qualify as "the terms of physics and chemistry"?
Some terms of physics or chemistry such as the term 'neutron' are
originally introduced into the language of these sciences as part of
an (s)physical or chemical theory. Other terms such as 'force' and
acceleration' are terms taken from ordinary language and given a
special meaning in an (s) physical or chemical theory. There is no
single rule for determining whether a term is a term of physics or
chemistry; one must consult the work of physicists and chemists and
determine what language they use in formulating their theories.
Even the term "the language of physics" is misleading since this
language is composed of many subsets of smaller languages. However,
in many examples such as 'neutron', 'force', 'mass', and 'gravity',
there is no dispute that these terms are (s)physical terms.
What properties are (s)physical properties? The following
equation, which is a formulation of Newton's Second Law, states a
1
Q
mathematical relationship using only (s)physical terms:
Force Mass X Acceleration
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Another example involves the gravitational attraction of a planet:
Force due to gravity =
Here G is the gravitation constant, M is the mass of the sun, n is
the mass of the planet, and
_r is the radius of the orbit. The
properties of force, mass, acceleration, and gravity are all
(s)physical properties, uniquely specifiable in the languages of
physics or chemistry.
What entities are (s)physical entities? Entities whose
essential properties are all (s)physical are purely (s)physical
entities. Atoms, along with protons, neutrons, and electrons are
(s)physical entities under this criterion. However, a cup is not
purely (s)physical since it is essential to an object's being a cup
that someone has intended to use it for drinking or has intended
that it be used for drinking. The term 'intention* is a mental term
and not a term of physics or chemistry, so a cup is not purely
(s)physical. However, it may be essential to a cup's being the cup
it is that it have a certain chemical makeup. If this is true, a
cup is an impurely (s) physical entity.
Other terms mix an (s)physical term with non-( s) physical
terms. The phrase 'apparent shape' refers to the shape something
appears to have. The property of apparent shape is a complex
property involving the (s) physical property of shape and a mental
property of appearance. Such a property is impurely (s)physical
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since complete specification of it makes reference to a
non- ( s) physical (in this case mental) property.
^•3.2 The Personal Conception
.
Much discussion relating to the mind-body problem centers
around the body of a person or human being. Or, it might center
around particular elements of a person's body such as his brain, a
neural state, or his arm or leg. If we describe a human body in
terms of the languages of physics and chemistry, we only describe
chemicals, molecules, and certain other properties such as weight,
mass, and heat. We can agree with Davidson that terms referring to
these entities are part of a closed homonomic domain which forms the
languages of these two physical* sciences ((s)physical terms), when
we give a physical description of a person or a human body in terms
relating to a person we use terms such as 'beautiful'
,
'well-proportioned', 'tanned', 'muscular', and 'brunette' which come
from a different conceptual domain: the domain of personal
discourse. We also speak of a person's body as the physical aspect
of a person and describe it as living, as being composed of organs
such as the heart, and as having perceptual organs such as the eye,
the ear, and the nose. These are not terms or entities of physics
or chemistry ((s)physical terms or (s)physical entities).
This does not mean that one cannot make (s) physical statements
about human bodies. This is possible, but only within the limited
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(s) physical vocabulary, one recent text defines physical science as
follows
:
cosmology.
The difference between the (s) physical vocabulary and the vocabulary
of personal discourse is one in points of view. From the viewpoint
of physics, the human body is a mass of matter which differs only
incidentally from other solid objects such as rocks and tables. As
There is. ..some conflict between what common sense regards
as one thing, and what physics regards as an unchanging
collection of particles. To common sense, a human body is
one thing, but to science the matter composing it is
continually changing.
Thus, it is possible to make (s)physical statements about the human
body, but only about the physics or chemistry of the body.
Other examples show that there is a distinct conception of
physical" from "( s) physical" which relates to human (and animal)
bodies. A person's physical needs are ones which relate to his
body's proper functioning. Physical desires are desires relating to
sexual desires and to other desires relating to fulfillment of
bodily needs. If I am physically tired, my body is tired. Physical
education involves instruction in the development and care of the
human body. Physicality is an intensely physical orientation at the
Russell says: 21
expense of the mental, spiritual, or social. A physical game (e.g.
football) is one involving much body contact. The refrain "Let's
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Get Physical- from a recent song exhorts intense body movements
(viz. dancing). m none of these cases is a statement being made
about a person's physics or chemistry, although in all cases an
implicit or explicit reference is made to a person's body.
It might seem that I should call this the biological rather
than the personal conception of "physical". This would not be
inappropriate since a person's body is his biological aspect.
However, as I have already noted, many words and concepts become
entrenched in ordinary language long before scientists acquire an
interest in studying the entities they denote. This is certainly
the case with 'solid object' and with 'physical', 'mind', and
'thought'. Scientists are interested in explaining and predicting
phenomena and events, and in giving descriptions of events which
cohere with the theories necessary to explain and predict. Thus,
words acquire new meanings in a scientific context and some
well-entrenched descriptions are found not to apply at all.
Philosophical discussion of the mind-body issue often employs
terms from science such as 'neuron' or 'brain state' but it also
discusses everyday life examples such as a person raising his arm or
drinking coffee. Thus there are terms used in this discussion which
refer to an everyday point of view of the body, and also terms which
are taken out of a highly specialized neurological or scientific
context and whose meaning is seldom understood by anyone in the
discussion. Probably the most correct view is that each science
forms a conceptual domain to itself and that ordinary language has
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its own conceptual domains which are distinct from the scientific
domains. Because I cannot argue for this view here, I will simply
define the personal physical domain in terms of properties which are
uniquely specifiable in terms which make reference to a human or
animal body or to elements of those bodies without specifying
whether it has to be in a scientific (e.g. biological or
neurological) context or an everyday life (personal) context.
Hence, the personal conception of the physical will include
biological, neurological, and ordinary language terms which refer to
the body of a person or animal.
Some terms are used both in a scientific context and in an
ordinary language context. An example is ’life' ; biology is the
study of living things, but we also speak of a living organ and of
the life of the body. Other examples are terms that refer to parts
of the body such as hand', 'heart', and 'brain'. If we describe an
event such as a heart attack, the breaking of a leg, or a case in
which someone suffers brain damage or brain-stem death as a physical
event, whether in a scientific or an every day context, we don't
mean that the properties of this event can be described in physics.
Terms such as 'life', 'death', 'health', and 'brain damage' do not
denote (s)physical properties. It is to account for the use of
'physical' in biological, neurological, and every day contexts in
which human and animal bodies are discussed that we need a second
conception of what is physical.
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In order to understand this conception of "physical", it is
helpful to notice that the term 'physical* refers to one of several
elements or aspects of a person; others are social, intellectual,
spiritual, mental, and moral. Because of the close connection
between this notion of "physical" and the notion of person, I refer
to this conception as the personal conception of what is physical,
and denote it as follows: (p)physical. However, it does apply to
animal bodies and to the bodies of human beings which are not
persons, if there are any. it also applies in biological and
neurological contexts in which human or animal bodies are discussed.
I define the personal meaning of 'physical' ( (p)physical) as
follows
:
P(p). 2^ is a purely (p)physical property just in case
is a property and x is uniquely specifiable in
terms which only make reference to the body or to
elements of the body of a person, human being, or
animal.
P(p)'.
_x is an impurely (p)physical property just in case
2^ is a property and 2i is partially but not
completely specifiable in terms which only make
reference to the body or to elements of the body
of a person, human being, or animal.
E(p). 2L is a purely (p)physical entity = df
. 2L is an
entity and all of 2i's essential properties are
(p)physical properties.
E(p)'. 21 is an impurely (p)physical entity = df. 21 is an
entity and at least one but not all of 2l's
essential properties are (p)physical properties.
We can create a conceptual version in the following way:
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T(p). 't' is a (p)physical term just in case 'f refers
to a (p)physical property or a (p)physical entity.
using T(p), we can also give a reading of the (p)physical conceptual
domain. The (p)physical conceptual domain will include at least the
following elements:
1. Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if, etc.)
2. Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).
The mathematics chosen can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.
3. Syntactic rules.
4. (p)physical terms which are descriptive. These can be
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.
Examples of (p)physical properties according to these
definitions are the property of regeneration of the optic nerve of
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amphibians, the homeostatic properties of the hypothalamus,^^
the (functional) property of the heart to pump the blood, and the
property of every living body to grow. Examples of (p) physical
entities are neurons, a human arm, leg, or bodily organ such as the
heart, and the brain. All these properties and entities are
(p)physical; none is uniquely specifiable in the terms of physics or
chemistry.
6.3.3 The Objective Conception .
There is also a third conception of what is physical which has
not been captured by either our scientific or personal conceptions.
This is the term 'physical' as it occurs in statements such as "I
can touch this thing so it must be physical" and "This table is a
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physical object". This conception might be called a "common sense"
conception of the physical, since it is the conception of "physical-
most common in everyday life. Probably the term closest in meaning
to this conception is 'objective'. To say something is objective is
to say in part that it can exist independent of any mind. Criteria
for applying the term 'physical' in this objective sense are as
follows. If an object can be both seen and touched, this is reason
to believe it is physical. Alternatively, if it can be seen and
touched by several people at once, this is even more reason to
believe that it is physical.
In everyday life, we regard physical objects as being solid,
stable entities that endure through time. Physics has a different
view of the matter. Bertrand Russell recognizes a gulf between the
world of sense and the world of physics in these remarks:^"^
Among the objections to the reality of objects of sense,
there is one which is derived from the apparent difference
between matter as it appears in physics and things as they
appear in sensation. Men of science, for the most part,
are willing to condemn immediate data as "merely
subjective", while yet maintaining the truth of the
physics inferred from those data. But such an attitude,
though it may be capable of justification, obviously
stands in need of it; and the only justification possible
must be one which exhibits matter as a logical
construction from sense-data—unless, indeed, there were
some wholly a priori principle by which unknown entities
could be inferred from such as are known. It is therefore
necessary to find some way of bridging the gulf between
the world of physics and the world of sense.
Russell's concern here is epistemological; his entire lecture is
devoted to discussing "the apparent difference between matter as it
appears in physics and things as they appear in sensation".
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Just as human bodies have properties which cannot be described
by the languages of physics and chemistry, so physical objects have
properties not describable in terms of their physics or chemistry.
According to physics and chemistry, objects are not solid at all but
are constantly changing masses of particles or waves. A table can
be described as useful, beautiful, round, solid, and made of pine.
According to the view of physics, physical objects are instances of
matter in motion; the emergent properties physical objects have in
virtue of being individual things which exist through time and which
stand in economic, social, aesthetic, and historical relations to
other objects cannot be uniquely specified in the terms of chemistry
or physics. Other properties such as smoothness, roughness, having
a grainy texture, a sensational- color
,
of weighing more than a
typewriter, and having a sweet taste are all properties we attribute
to physical objects based on our perceptions of them. These are
terms of ordinary language, not scientific language.
There are many physical objects which cannot be defined in
terms which make an essential reference only to their physics or
chemistry. For example, an artefact such as a cup is a physical
object; yet it is essential to a cup that it have been in the past
an object of the intention that it be used for drinking. And the
term 'intention' is not a part of the language of physics.
Likewise, it is essential to my copy of Our Knowledge of the
External World that it have the property that it was written by
Bertrand Russell; yet this property is not part of its physics or
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chemistry. it is essential to a tennis ball that it is intended to
be used to play tennis. Artefacts have essential properties not
definable in terms of physics or chemistry; yet they are physical
objects according to some conception of "physical".
Physics and chemistry are concerned with physical objects, but
only with certain of their aspects. In one physics text, I found
the sentence "Blow up a small party balloon and you will have an
excellent source of negative electric charge". Does this make
either 'balloon' or 'party balloon' a term of physics? Perhaps not;
but the property of being a source of negative electric charge is an
(s)physical property. Yet such a balloon will have other
non- ( s) physical properties such as frightening many people when it
blows up and being the center of attention. Is the party balloon an
(s) physical object because it has mass and weight? If we consider
having mass an essential property of a balloon, then a party balloon
is an impurely (s)physical entity because it has at least one
essential (s)physical property. However, having weight should not
be considered an essential property since a balloon in outer space
is weightless but is still the same balloon.
I call this third conception of what is physical the
"objective" conception, and denote it as follows: (o)physical.
This conception is defined as follows:
P(o). 2^ is a purely (o)physical property = df. is a
property and is uniquely specifiable in terms
which refer only to properties that can exist
independent of any mind and can be seen or touched
by more than one person simultaneously.
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P(o)'. X is an impurely (o)physical property = df. x is
a property and x is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms which refer only to
properties that can exist independent of any mind
and can be seen or touched by more than one person
simultaneously.
E(o). 2L is a purely (o)physical entity = df. x is an
entity and all of x^' s essential properties are(o)physical properties.
E(o)'. 2^ is an impurely (o)physical entity = df. x is an
entity and at least one but not all of x's
~
essential properties are (o)physical properties.
A conceptual version can be created in the following way:
T(o). 't' is an (o)physical term just in case 't' refers
to an (o)physical entity or to an (o)physical
property.
The (o)physical conceptual domain will include at least these
elements
:
1. Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if, etc.)
2. Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).
The choice of mathematics can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.
3. Syntactic rules.
4. (o)physical terms which are descriptive. These can be
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.
Examples of purely (o)physical entities are the sun, a rock, a
mountain, a tree, and other natural objects. Artefacts are impurely
(o)physical since they have an essential property that makes
reference to an intention. Since light exists independent of the
mind and can be seen simultaneously by two persons, it is purely
(o)physical. I have already said that an atom is an (s)physical
entity; however, the properties of an atom can exist independent of
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any mind. I£ any o£ these mind-independent properties are essential
and can in principle be seen or touched by more than one person at
once, an atom is impurely (o)physical. The wind is a difficult
example because while it exists Independent of any mind, its effects
can be seen but it cannot. It can be felt simultaneously by more
than one person. However, the definition says ’touch' not ’feel',
and allowing 'feel' would create even mote problems. Perhaps the
best solution is to say that the wind satisfies some but not all the
criteria for (o)physical entities and hence should not be counted as
(o) physical.
How do these definitions of 'physical' relate to each other? I
will use the phrase '(x)physical property' to mean "either an
(s)physical or a (p)physical or an (o)physical property". Some
entities have different (x)physical properties. For example, a rock
has the (o) physical property of hardness but it also has the
(s) physical property of being composed of certain chemical
elements. If it is essential to a rock that it be composed of
certain chemical elements and it is essential to it that it exists
independent of the mind, then a rock is impurely (s)physical and
impurely (o)physical. Assuming that it is an essential property of
a human body that it is the body of a person or human being, a human
body is either purely or impurely (p)physical. If it is either an
essential property of a human body that it can exist independent of
any mind, or that it can be touched, then the human body is impurely
(p)physical and impurely (o)physical. If it is also essential to a
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human body that it be composed of certain chemical elements such as
carbon or H^O, then a human body is impurely (s) physical, impurely
(P)physical, and impurely (o)physical. Hence it is likely that some
single entities are (o)physical, (s)physical, and (p)physical.
It is likely that whatever analysis is given of a human body
can also be given of a human brain, since a human brain is an
element of a human body. Hence it is likely that a human brain is
(s)physical, (o)physical, and (p)physical. If this is so, then
trying to state the relations between a mental phenomenon and a
human brain is more complex than it may appear. If a human brain is
physical according to all three meanings of 'physical', then a
mental event may stand in different relations to each of these three
elements of a human brain. However, it is likely that the most
interesting relations from the viewpoint of mind-body interaction
will obtain between a mental phenomenon and the (p)physical elements
of the brain. For it is this element that presupposes the concept
of person and thus holds the most hope of a link between mental
and physical phenomena. I discuss this subject as it relates to
mind-body interaction in Chapter 7.
6.4 Conclusion
Section 6.2 discussed mind-body interaction as a problem for
dualism. The most important conclusion from this discussion is that
the concepts of "mental" and "physical" used in the discussion of
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this issue need to be revised before an account of mind-body
interaction can be given, m section 6.3 I proposed a revision of
the concept of
-physical-, i distinguished three meanings of the
term
-physical', if ontological dualism is the view that there are
two kinds of entitles in the world, mental and physical entities,
then accepting the results of Section 6.3 requires abandoning
dualism. If the term
-physical- has three meanings, then there are
more than two kinds of entities in the world, there are at least
four: mental entities, (s)physloal entitles, (p)physlcal entities,
and (o)physical entities, since any view according to which there
are more than two fundamentally distinct kinds of entities in the
world is pluralistic. Section 6.3 is an argument for a form of
pluralism.
In conclusion, it appears that the problem of mind-body
interaction is fatal to dualism. Dualism as a philosophical view
about mind and body is caught in the following dilemma:
D. Either dualism can account for mind-body interaction
or it cannot. If dualism cannot account for mind—body
interaction, then dualism is not a viable theory. In
order to account for mind-body interaction, a
conceptual revision in the notion of "physical" is
required which involves abandoning dualism for
pluralism. Hence either dualism is not a viable
theory or dualism must be abandoned for pluralism.
In chapter 7, I show how distinguishing three meanings of 'physical'
helps give an account of mind-body interaction.
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CHAPTER VII
AN ACCOUNT OF MIND-BODY INTERACTION
^•1 Introduction
In Section 6.2 I argued that if dualists are to give an account
of mind-body interaction, they must accept a conceptual revision in
the notions of "mental" and "physical". In Section 6.3 I provided
such a revision in the notion of "physical" by distinguishing three
conceptions of the physical: the scientific (( s) physical)
conception, the objective (( o) physical) conception, and the personal
( (p)physical) conception. In Section 6.4 I argued that accepting
the view that there are three conceptions of the physical requires
abandoning dualism for a form of pluralism.
In this chapter I return to the problem of giving an account of
mind-body interaction. I return to the argument by Michael Levin
against the possibility of mind-body interaction which I discuss in
Section 6.2. I concede that Levin's argument may be successful in
showing the impossibility of causal interaction between mental
phenomena and (p)physical entities, and that a variation of Levin's
argument may show the impossibility of causal interaction between
mental phenomena and (o)physical entities. However, I deny that
either Levin's argument or a variation of it shows the impossibility
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of causal interaction between mental phenomena and (pjphysical
entities.
The main result needed to support the claim that Levin's
argument against the possibility of mind-body interaction is
unsuccessful if applied to (p)physical entities is that some
(P) physical entities have mental properties or aspects and some
mental phenomena have (p)physical properties or aspects. I support
this result by citing discussions of the visual system which show
that some neurons have properties which are uniquely specifiable by
reference to mental terms. I also cite Davidson's contention,
discussed in Chapter 3, that an event is mental if and only if it
can be picked out by a mental description in support of the claim
that (p)physical entities have mental properties. That mental
phenomena have (p)physical properties follows from the claim that
(p)physical entities have mental properties. I also cite an
independent argument for this claim according to which mental
phenomena that originate in (p)physical entities have at least one
(p) physical property: the property that they originate in a
(p)physical entity.
In Section 7.3 I give an account of interaction by using the
result that (p) physical entities have mental properties or aspects
and mental phenomena have (p)physical properties or aspects.
According to this account, when a mental entity such as a thought
causally acts on the brain or initiates a neural event, it is the
neural aspect of the thought that acts on some other neural aspect.
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This second neural aspect may or may not be associated with some
other mental phenomenon. I cite a study by Claude Ghez of voluntary
movement In support of this account. My account of interaction
applies only to mental phenomena with (p)physlcal aspects: if there
is any mental phenomenon with no (p)physlcal aspect, then my account
of interaction does not apply to this mental phenomenon.
In section 7.4 I cite views by Jack Ornstein, G. D. Wassermann,
and John Searle which are similar in one or more respects to the
View I present. In Section 7.5 I sketch a more general position
that links a plural aspect view with Leibniz's pluralism of
viewpoints. I call this position Viewpoint Pluralism. Section 7.6
summarizes the chapter, section 7.7 briefly summarizes earlier
chapters, as well as Chapter 7.
2 Levin's Argument Against Mind-Body Interaction
In Chapter 6, I discussed an argument stated by Michael Levin
purporting to show that causal relations between mind and body are
impossible. This argument appeals to the law of the conservation of
energy. According to Levin:^
Another traditional argument, however, does seem to show
decisively that the causal relations between the mind as
the dualist conceives it and the body are impossible.
Originally my leg, which has mass is motionless. Then
it moves distance Where did the energy come from? It
is an empirical fact, the law of the conservation of
energy, that the energy had to come from somewhere, and
not only does it come from some preceding physical event,
no immaterial substance could possibly supply mechanical
energy. The mind can apply no physical force to the leg.
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hamstring muscle supplies]ust the right amount - and the bodily event just is themotion of an object of mass w through distance d. ~husthe contraction of the muscle is the cause of p. Tf
were non-physical causes of physiol events', the energy inthe universe would increase.
The dualist may complain that this appeal to the
conservation of energy reifies energy as a kind of stuffpassed from object to object, whereas legitimate talk ofenergy (and mass) is shorthand for facts about
acceleration. The conservation of energy in particular isshorthand for an empirical fact about constancies in such
ratios. But even if energy is analytically eliminable,
the present objection stands. Suppose we 'operationalize'
energy and mass, explaining the mass of a body as its(constant, additive) tendency to induce acceleration. Myleg, which has a constant additive tendency to induce
acceleration w^, moves with average velocity v during
time-interval A t. It is a hard empirical fact that some
object with a constant additive tendency
_w' to induce
acceleration must have moved with such an average velocity
during At that J l/2wy2dt =- i^l/ 2w' v' ^dt
.
Since.
. .immaterial objects have no tendency to induce
acceleration, it cannot have been an immaterial object
that slowed down. But the cause of my leg's moving was
the slowing down of the object with mass w'
"7*2.1 Criticisms of Levin's Argument
One criticism of the argument Levin states in the above
quotation is that Levin's insistence that there be one cause of the
leg s moving and that this cause be the immediate physical cause
ignores the role of the nervous system in voluntary motion. The
movement of a hamstring muscle may be the immediate cause of my
leg s moving, but this muscle moves in response to neural commands.
These neural commands occur as a sequence or series of events which
culminates in an instruction to the hamstring muscle to contract.
The first event of this series or sequence of neural events is as
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important a cause of my leg's moving as the movement of the
hamstring muscle, even though it is not the immediate cause.
A second criticism of Levin's argument is that Levin has taken
a mechanical principle of motion applying to bodies with mass and
applied it to the human body which contains structures whose motion
is not just governed by force and acceleration, but by codes, rules,
and signals. Now that I have distinguished (s) physical from
(p)physical entities, I can state this criticism in relation to this
distinction. The law Levin cites, the law of the conservation of
energy, is a law of physics that is formulated in (s)physical
terms. The laws that govern neuronal interactions are formulated in
(p)physical terms. Levin's conservation of energy argument does not
apply to a sequence of neural events because whether a neuron fires
and the amplitude of the impulse in not simply a function of the sum
total of the inputs. Whether a neuron fires depends on the way in
which the neuron integrates and sums its inputs.^ The
conservation of energy argument Levin cites applies to bodies with
mass, and an action potential is not a body with mass.
After stating these criticisms, I formulated another argument
which is similar to Levin's. According to this argument, neural
impulses are generated either by other neural impulses or
spontaneously. In the former case, a neuron receives a large number
of graded potentials or action potentials and either generates a
potential or does not, depending on its threshold and other
factors. In the case of spontaneous activity, there is no reason to
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believe that an Immaterial object Is the cause. Hence in neither
case does there appear to be any explanatory power added by
postulating an immaterial object as its cause. Hence, no mental
event plays a causal role in neural activity.
If this argument appears irrefutable, it is only because the
conceptions of "mental event" and "physical event" it employs are
dichotomous and inaccurate. In Chapter 6 I distinguished three
conceptions of the physical, and gave three corresponding
definitions of "x_ is a physical property" and ” x is a physical
entity
. I called these three conceptions the scientific
( (s)physical) conception, the objective (( o) physical) conception,
and the personal ( (p)physical) conception. I now discuss how
distinguishing these three conceptions of the physical affects the
problem of mind-body interaction.
"7*2.2 Levin's Argument Applied to (s) physical, (o)physical.
and (p)physical Entities
Levin's original argument purported to show that no immaterial
object could impart mechanical energy to someone's leg. Levin says
"the energy had to come from somewhere, and not only does it come
from some preceding physical event, no immaterial substance could
possibly supply mechanical energy"."^ A human leg has impurely
(s) physical properties since it has weight and mass. A human leg
has impurely (o) physical properties since it can exist independent
of any mind and can be seen or touched by more than one person at
once. A human leg is impurely (p)physical since it is partially
264
specifiable in terms which make reference to a human being, it
seems safe to say that it is essential to a human leg that it is the
leg of a human being, some of the (s) physical properties of a human
leg are probably essential, it is probably essential to a human leg
that it have mass and that it contain certain chemical elements such
as carbon and water. It is probably also essential to a human leg
that It can exist independent of a human mind, if these (s)physlcal
and (o)physical properties ate essential, as seems likely, a human
leg IS an impurely (s) physical entity, an impurely (o) physical
entity, and an impurely (p)physical entity.
Levin's argument against the possibility of interaction seems
addressed to those properties of a human leg in virtue of which it
is an (impurely) (s)physical entity. The concept of mechanical
energy is a concept of physics, and Levin claims that no immaterial
object can supply mechanical energy to an object with mass. If we
accept the correctness of the terms Levin uses to phrase his
argument, his argument is correct. If a mental phenomenon is an
immaterial object, it is difficult to see how a mental object could
supply mechanical energy to at least a purely (s) physical object.
However, a human leg is an impurely (s)physical object, so I will
consider its non-( s) physical properties in order to determine
whether his argument succeeds.
Levin's argument could be rephrased as an argument purporting
to show that no mental phenomenon can interact causally with an
(o)physical object. If we consider an impurely (o)physical object
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si^oh as a rock, it seems clear that only the application of some
kind of physical energy can cause a rock to be moved. This energy
is (s)physical energy since it can be uniquely specified by using
terms of physics. It takes (s)physical energy to move an
(o)physical object. And no immaterial object can exert (s)physical
energy, such an argument seems to show the impossibility of
someone's moving a chair or a fork purely by mental concentration.
While such feats have been attempted,^ the correct explanation of
these feats and whether they show anything is far from clear. If
the case for mind-body interaction rests on the ability of some
people to perform these dubious feats, the case for mind-body
interaction is weak at best. However, there is one more type of
physical property to consider: (p)physical properties.
Standard examples of mind-body interaction typically involve
the interaction of a mental phenomenon with one or more (p)physical
entities. A feeling of embarrassment causes my face to turn red, or
my thought that I will move my leg causes my leg to move. Or, my
feeling of love for someone causes my heart to beat rapidly. While
my face, my leg, and my heart are all impurely (s)physical and
impurely (o)physical entities, it is the impurely (p)physical
properties of my face, my leg, and my heart that are particularly
relevant to the issue of mind-body interaction. I now consider
these (p)physical properties.
I now repeat my definition of ' (p)physical property' and
'(p)physical entity':
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P(p). ii is a purely (p)physical property = df. x is aproperty and is uniquely specifiable in“ternis
which only make reference to the body or to
elements of the body of a person, human being, or
animal.
P(p)'. iL is an impurely (p)physical property = df. x is aproperty and ^ is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms which only make reference to
the body or to elements of the body of a person,human being, or animal.
E(p). 2^ is a purely (p)physical entity = df. x is an
entity and all of x^'s essential propertie’s are
uniquely specifiable in terms which only make
reference to the body or to elements of the body
of a person, human being, or animal.
E(p)'. jc is an impurely (p)physical entity = df. x is an
entity and at least one but not all of x's
~
essential properties are uniquely speciTiable in
terms which only make reference to the body or to
elements of the body of a person, human being, or
animal.
We can create a conceptual version in the following way:
T(p). 't' is a (p)physical term just in case 't' refers
to a (p)physical property or a (p)physical entity.
Since both a human brain and a human eye are elements of a
human body, both are impurely (p)physical entities. In Chapter 3^
I argued that some terms for elements of the human body are defined
by their mental function. Examples are terms for sense organs such
as eye', 'ear', and 'nose'. I also stated that if scientists were
to study these sense organs apart from their mental function they
would be unable to account for many of their interesting
properties. Viewing sense organs apart from their mental functions
also strips science of much of its explanatory and descriptive
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ability. I now support these claims by considering an account of
how the eye works.
The visual system is a very complex system that includes many
structures both in the eye and in different parts of the brain.
Eric R. Kandel presents a schematic diagram of the visual system,
shown in Figure 1-lJ
Pulvinar
Figure 7-1. A Schematic Diagram of the Visual System
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The following selection is taken from a discussion by Kandel of
the striate cortex, a structure which plays a key role in human
. . 8
Vision:
The structure of the striate cortex is more complex
than that of the lateral geniculate nucleus. Large
numbers of cells are arranged in several different ways.
Most of the input from the geniculate comes in layer IV of
the cortex and then is conveyed to the critical layers
above and below. Paralleling the increase in anatomical
complexity, Hubei and Wiesel found an increase in
complexity of the stimulus requirements needed for cells
to respond. Small spots of light that are effective in
the retina and the lateral geniculate are not as effective
in the striate cortex. To be effective, a stimulus must
have linear properties. .. .It must be a line, a bar, or
something that has a clear edge. Hubei and Wiesel
categorized the cortical cells in area 17 into two major
groups, simple and complex. Both respond to linear
stimuli.
. .
.
Some support for the hypothesis that complex cells are
connected to simple ones comes from the finding by Hubei
and Wiesel that the visual' cortex is organized into narrow
columns (much as is the somatic sensory cortex), running
from about the surface to the white matter. Each column
is about 10-30//m wide and 2 mm deep, and in each column
there are many simple cells with almost identical retinal
position and identical axes of orientation. In any column
there are also complex cells. The properties of these
complex cells in a column could most easily be explained
by postulating that each complex cell receives direct
connections from the simple cells in the column. This
finding gives us a completely new insight into the
importance of cortical columns. In the visual system
columns seem to serve as anatomical devices for bringing
cells together so as to interconnect them and to generate,
by means of these interconnections, a new level of
abstraction of visual information. For example, the
columns allow cortical cells to generate linear receptive
field properties from a geniculate input that responds
best to small spots of light.
The discovery of columns in the various sensory systems
is perhaps the most important single advance in cortical
physiology in the past several decades and has led to a
number of related discoveries. One can ask: given that
cells with the same axis of orientation tend to be grouped
into columns, how are columns of cells with different axes
of orientation organized in relation to one another?
Detailed mapping of adjacent columns by Hubei and Wieselusxng tangential n,ictoele=troda panetrLlons, hfa "rvJaUd
^ of axis orientation. Every 20-50>/m,the electrode encounters a new column and a shift in axisof orientation of about IQO ^
In addition to columns devoted to axis of orientationthere are columns devoted to eye preference or oculardominance (properties related to binocular
interaction) Hubei and Wiesel have designated the termhypercolumn to refer to the whole set of columns for
analyzing lines of all orientations from a particular
region in space via both eyes . From these studies it is
apparent that the striate cortex carries out two major
unctions: (1) it combines the input from the two eyes, astep in a sequence of transformations necessary for depthperception; and (2) it decomposes the visual world into
short line segments of various orientations, an early stepin the process thought to be necessary for pattern
discrimination.
Hubei and Wiesel suggest that the interaction between
simple and complex cells may be important for the
f^*^^Iowing] issue:.,. the perception of patterns
irrespective of where they fall on the retina. Take a
vertical line or an object with vertical edges—that is
located in front of you. The vertical edge (or the line)
will excite a population of simple cells and a population
of complex ones, each with a vertical axis of
orientation, A slight (saccadic) movement of your eye or
of the object will call into play a new population of
simple cells (because these cells are very sensitive to
the exact position of the line in the receptive field).
However, for a small movement the stimulus will still
excite the original population of complex cells (because
these cells are less sensitive to movement within the
receptive field) ....
An unresolved question that is now receiving increasing
attention is, how far can this hierarchy go? (Is there a
grandmother cell? ) Is there a group of cells that observe
the hyper-hypercomplex cells and make one aware of the
total pattern? If so, is there a still higher group in
the hierarchy that looks at combinations of complex
patterns as these enter our awareness?
There may indeed be other higher order cells combining
the computational results of the inf erotemporal,
peristriate, and striate cortices to produce even more
elaborate abstractions. However, to discern the
relatively simple features we have thus far considered has
already required an enormous proportion of visual brain.
It would appear curious to attribute progressively more
important processing to a relatively small group of cells
enormously complex abstractionIternative to this supposition would be that at hiaherlevels the mechanism of transformation changes, so thatsingle units no longer serve to represent featirrstatLbut represent only selected aspects of the percept To
plran^r
'
^ 4 regri^e
activity in cells in
stritlT """ inferotemporal, peristriate, andiate cortices, with the cells in each area coding for aparticular aspect of the stimulus: for shape, depth^
raranel'v'"" leve/c:ils^“'„a„yp llel visual areas are likely to be involved, and theirimultaneous activity may serve as the feature detector.The states of the parts taken separately may not represent
mav
'=*’® relationship among them thaty be important. One can draw an analogy to theindividual silver halide grains of a photograph; these donot represent the photograph of a face, but the ensemble
of grains does.
There is in fact some support for this view. We have
seen that even as early as the retina, visual information
IS carried to the lateral geniculate nucleus and then to
area 17 of the cortex by two parallel systems, the X and Y
cells. Moreover, we described area 17 above as if it sent
one main projection to areas 18 and 19. Actually, s. M.
Zeki at University College London has found that area 17
sends five separate projections to area 18 alone. Zekifound that the cells in each of the five regions that
receive input from area 17 have different functional
properties, a finding that supports the idea that each
region handles a different aspect of visual information.
For example, several regions in area 18 contain cells that
code for color, other regions contain cells that code for
movement, others still for binocular disparity necessary
for depth perception. Interconnections among these
various regions could generate a very large variety of
response types suitable for analyzing in almost endless
detail the intricacies of the visual world.
Explaining and understanding the experience of color vision
also requires viewing the visual system in relation to the qualitie
of subjective experience. The following discussion of color vision
by Peter Gouras illustrates this fact:^
ThLt'for"; r"
has gre:t"s"vlv:r:fire!
by a colorLrsuch as ?urtef ToLT"^^
^
.ilUcn nuances o, conu“a^\\^;,X'/Lf
^
achromatic rendition of one of their works Thi^ h- hdegree of discrimination in color vision can actually beunderstood in quantitative terms. The subjective
^
experience of color can be broken down into three
semi-independent sensibilities* ( 1 ) huf^' (O'i o= 4-
experience is composero^these three psychological impressions.
Hue has the strongest effect on color and is the manordeterminant of principal colors such as red, yellowgreen,
_and blue. It is what we ordinarily Lin bycolor
. This impression is determined by the proportionin Which the three cone mechanisms are activated b^hiobject and its background. The brain must keep trLk ofhow much each of the three photoreceptor systems
hryp^'i
detection of an object. Most of us
27o%.Tt I " actually about
quaJti . The second distinct
hn
saturation, which reflects how much aue has been diluted by grayness; this is determined bythe degree to which all three cone mechanisms are
stimulated in common by the object and by the background.There are about 20 distinguishable steps of saturation for
each hue.
The third quality of color, brightness
, is a sensation
shared with achromatic visual systems. It is due to thetotal effect on all three cone mechanisms of an object
relative to its background. We shall see later that one
of the three cone mechanisms (the so-called blue
mechanism) makes little or no contribution to brightness.
It is the brightness factor that turns orange into brown
and gray into black or white. There are about 500
distinguishable steps of brightness for every hue and
grade of saturation. In contrast to achromatic vision
with only 500 steps, color vision has more than 1 million
gradations with which to detect the contours of shapes in
the external world.... It is no wonder that natural
selection uncovered its power.
By the latter part of the eighteenth century it was
realized that the ability to experience myriad different
colors might not be due to an equivalent number of
detectors in the retina but to a minimum
number three--with every color determined by the
proportions in which each of these three detectors
responds to light.
272
The preceding quotations fron, Kandel and Gouras show that in
describing and explaining the visual system. Including its neural
components, it is necessary to make use of concepts that contain a
reference to mental terms. Kandel' s discussion contains terms such
as 'shape', 'depth perception'
, 'binocular movement'
,
and 'color'
Which refer to aspects of visual experience. Gouras states that
•the subjective experience of color can be broken down into three
semi-independent sensibilities: ( 1 ) hue, (2) saturation, and (3)
brightness. All color experience is composed of these three
psychological impressions'
. Even the concept of a visual system
is defined by reference to vision, which is a mental phenomenon.
Someone who tried to account for the visual system in terms of only
its (s)physical or (o)physlcal properties could not explain how the
neural structures of the visual system encode a retinal image and
function to make possible the experience of sight. The neural
structures relating to color vision would be particularly impossible
to account for using only (s)physical and (o)physical terms. It
seems clear, then, that viewing the visual system and its components
apart from their mental functions strips science of its explanatory
and predictive power.
I now return to Levin's argument against the possibility of
interaction between mental phenomena and physical entities. I have
conceded that Levin's argument may show that mental phenomena do not
interact causally with (s)physical and (o)physical entities.
However, it is not clear that it shows that interaction between
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cental phenomena and (p)physlcal entities is not possible. Earlier
in this chapter^ I formulated an argument similar to Levin's
Which purports to show this. According to this argument, neural
impulses are either generated by other neural impulses or
spontaneously, in neither case is it necessary to postulate an
immaterial object as a cause. I now reconsider this argument in
light of my discussion of (p)physioal entitles and (p)physical
propert ies.
The discussion of the visual system by Kandel and Gouras makes
It clear that some neurons have properties that are uniquely
specifiable by reference to mental terms. Kandel says:^^
Several regions in area 18 contain cells that
color, other regions contain cells that code f
others still for binocular disparity necessary
perception.
code for
or movement
for depth
/
These (neural) cells that code for color have the property that they
code for color. Likewise, other (neural) cells have the property
that they code for the binocular disparity necessary for depth
perception. According to Gouras:^^
has the strongest effect on color and is the major
determinant of principal colors such as red, yellow,
green, and blue. It is what we ordinarily mean by
color". This impression is determined by the proportion
in which the three cone mechanisms are activated by the
object and its background. The brain must keep track of
how much each of the three photoreceptor systems
contributes to the detection of an object.
The three cone mechanisms have the property that the proportion in
which they are activated by the object and its background determines
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the impression of color the person experiences. These examples show
that some (p)physicai entities have mental properties.
The result that some (p)physical entities have mental
properties is consistent with the argument by Davidson which I
discussed in chapter 3 that every physical event can be picked out
by a mental description. 1 " if we accept Davidson's view that an
event is mental if and only if it can be picked out by a mental
description, the result that some (p)physical entities such as
neurons have mental properties is even less surprising. Presumably
the descriptions given by Kandel and Gouras can be used to pick out
individual neurons, or at least groups of neurons. However, these
neurons will be impurely mental since they are also (p)physical
entities.
I now define the terms 'purely mental entity', 'impurely mental
entity', 'purely mental property', and 'impurely mental property'.
M(m)
. 2^ is a purely mental property = df . x is a
property and x is uniquely specifiable in terms
which only make reference to mental phenomena.
M(m)'. 2^ is an impurely mental property = df. x is a
property and 2i is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms which only make reference to
mental phenomena.
E(m). 2L is a purely mental entity = df. 21 is an entity
and all of 21's essential properties are mental
properties.
E(m) '. 2L is an impurely mental entity = df
. 21 is an
entity and at least one but not all of 2l's
essential properties are mental properties.
I have shown that some (p) physical entities have mental
properties, and have defined 'mental entity'. Do some mental
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entities have (p)physical properties? That this is so follows from
the fact that some (p)physical entities have mental properties. if
a particular neuron has the property that it codes for a particular
experience of color, then that particular experience of color has
the property that it is coded for by a particular neuron. A
particular impression of color has the property that it is
determined by the proportion in which the three cone mechanisms are
activated by an object and its background. Hence mental entities
have (p)physical properties.
It IS possible to give an independent argument to show that
some mental entities have (p)physical properties. if i have a
toothache, it is a property of this toothache that it originates in
a particular tooth. A toothache originating in a different tooth
would not be the same toothache even if it is in the same phenomenal
location. Since this is so, the property of originating in a
particular tooth appears to be essential to the toothache's being
the toothache it is. If this property is essential, it is a
(p)physical property and a toothache is an impurely (p)physical
entity. If a feeling of love makes my heart beat rapidly on a
particular occasion, then it is a property of my experience of a
feeling of love on that occasion that it makes my heart beat
faster. It is generally believed that thoughts have a neural
basis. Hence if I have a thought about my plans for the weekend, a
property of this thought is that it is associated with some series
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of neural events. These examples show that some mental events have
(p)physical properties, some essential and some accidental.
I now return to Levin's argument as it applies to the
interaction of mental phenomena and (p)physical entities. According
to this argument, a neural impulse is generated either by other
neural impulses or spontaneously, in neither case does positing an
immaterial object have any additional explanatory power. One
problem with this argument is that it employs an inaccurate
conception of a mental phenomenon: that a mental phenomenon is an
immaterial object. An immaterial object is one with no physical
properties. However, I have just shown that some mental phenomena
have (p)physical properties. It is the conception of a mental event
as a (purely) immaterial object which is employed in this argument
against the possibility of interaction which gives the argument its
plausibility since it does not seem possible for an immaterial
object to act on a (p)physical entity. Once we realize that this
conception of a mental phenomenon is a misconception, the argument
loses its plausibility.
The conception of "physical entity" this argument employs is
equally misleading. I have conceded that the argument has some
merit as applied to interaction between mental phenomena and
(s)physical and (o)physical entities. However, (p)physical entities
have mental properties, so they are not purely (p)physical. Levin's
argument against the possibility of mind-body interaction turns on
the ability to draw a dichotomous distinction between purely mental
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(immaterial) phenomena and purely physical (non-mental) entitles.
However, this dichotomy is a false one since some (p)physical
entities have mental properties and some mental phenomena have
(p)physical properties.
7.3 An Account of Mind-Body Interaction
According to Levin's argument as it applies to the interaction
of (p)physical entities and mental phenomena, a neural impulse is
caused either spontaneously or by other neural impulses. There is
no need to postulate an immaterial object as a cause. However, if
the other neural impulses that cause some neuron N to fire are
themselves aspects of a mental phenomenon, then it is correct to
attribute a causal role to the mental phenomenon. For example, in
the case of intentional action, the neural patterns associated with
my decision to move my leg initiate the neural activity necessary to
carry out this action. This consists in sending signals to motor
neurons. My thought that I will move my leg has a neural aspect and
a phenomenal aspect, and the neural aspect of my thought initiates
the neural activity required for moving my leg.
When a mental entity such as a thought acts on the brain or
initiates a neural event, the neural aspect of the thought acts on
some other neural aspect. This second neural aspect may or may not
have an associated mental aspect. When someone is engaged in
continuous thought, neural aspects associated with thought are
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continuously generating other neural aspects associated with other
thoughts. When someone forms an intention to raise his arm, on the
other hand, the resulting neural activity may be a signal to the
motor cortex to initiate arm-raising. This motor cortex activity
need not have mental aspects.
We can picture this as follows:
"2
causes ^ No
/ 2
Figure 7—2. A Diagram of Mental— Physical Interaction
In the above diagram, is a thought having mental aspect
and neural aspect N^. is a different thought having neural
aspect N and mental aspect M . The neural aspect N^2 1
initiates causal neural activity, e.g. by firing an action
potential, resulting in neural state which is a neural aspect
of thought T^. In this way, through its neural aspect, a thought
can act directly on the brain. As I said above, there is no need
for to be an aspect of a mental event.
Neurologists still do not fully understand all the neurological
mechanisms of voluntary movement, but there have been many studies.
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One especially interesting account of several studies is given by
Claude Ghez, and it bears full citation:^^
In voluntary movements pyramidal tract and rubrospinal
neurons start firing 20-50 msec before any sign of muscle
contractions, but other groups of neurons fire earlier.
The activity of neurons in the basal ganglia and the deep
cerebellar nuclei precedes the activity of neurons in the
motor cortex and red nucleus. During many voluntary
movements activation of the basal ganglia and deep
cerebellar nuclei represent the end result of complex
processes that start hundreds of milliseconds earlier.
Kornhuber and his collaborators in Germany have shown that
changes in the potentials recorded from the human scalp
over the motor cortex begin about 800 msec before a
voluntary finger movement [Figure 7-3]. Although the
mechanisms producing these potentials remain
controversial, their occurrence underscores the fact that
activity in the nervous system begins long before movement
is actually performed. During this period the central
nervous system is thought to set up a program which
specifies how its neurons will respond to a stimulus.
Evarts and Tanji have investigated this program by
recording the discharges of pyramidal tract neurons in
monkeys that were trained to perform one of two different
responses according to a preceding signal when a sudden
perturbation was delivered to a handle that they were
holding [Figure 7-4]. The instruction to either push or
pull the handle was given by illuminating one of two lamps
in front of the animal. The signal to move was a sudden
jerk either toward or away from the animal, produced by a
motor attached to the handle itself. Pyramidal tract
neurons were recorded in the motor cortex and the
direction of limb movement with which the unit increased
its activity was also determined.
Two interesting observations emerged from these
experiments. First, the instruction itself elicited
different changes in activity in the neuron according to
the direction of movement called for. The effects also
differed according to the muscle groups whose contraction
was associated with activity in that cell. For example, a
pyramidal tract neuron that was phasically active when the
animal flexed its arm showed tonic increases in activity
after the instruction to pull (i.e., to contract the
flexor muscle) was given. This change in neural activity
was, however, not associated with any change in muscle
activity. Second, the perturbation delivered to the
handle, constituting the signal to move, elicited two
distinct bursts of discharge in the same neurons. The
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first burst, termed the reflex discharge
, occurred
whenever the biceps was stretched by sudden movement of
the handle. This burst of activity is merely the result
of the stimulus applied to the receptive field of the
neuron, a reflection of a feedback system similar to thatdescribed by Asanuma. The later burst (appearing at a
latency of about 50 msec), termed the intended discharge
,
was contingent on the instruction. The intended discharge
occurred when the animal was instructed to pull (i.e.,
contract biceps); the discharge did not occur when the
animal was to push. This intended discharge actually
produces the intended response to the stimulus. The fact
that its occurrence is dependent on context suggests that
the sensory input can be gated through the pyramidal tract
neurons by neuronal events set in motion by the
instruction. The instruction is thought to put the
nervous system in a specific state or voluntary set .
It is thought that the relationships between stimulus
and response that are appropriate to a given context or
instruction are established during an initial stage of
learning. The learned relationship determines which
muscle groups should contract and how much contraction
should occur relative to the locus and the intensity of
stimulation. Once learned, the instruction signal puts
the nervous system into the appropriate set, which in turn
operates on a neural gate and enables sensory inflow to be
channeled to the proper muscles. One of the principal
reasons for invoking a gating mechanism is that the
interval between the handle jerk and the intended
discharge of the cortical neurons is very brief. Recent
experiments suggest that similar mechanisms operate in the
quickest responses we make to any stimulus be it visual,
cutaneous, or auditory.
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Potentials Recorded Before a Voluntary Finger Movement
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Push Pull
Figure 7-4. Cortical Activity Prior to Voluntary Movement
There are several points worthy of note about the preceding
quotation. First, Ghez says "the instruction itself elicited
different changes in activity in the neuron according to the
direction of movement called for". This can be viewed as the
neurological aspect of the understanding by the monkey of what he is
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to do. Secondly, the burst of neural activity termed the intended
discharge is the neurological aspect of the intention to pull the
handle. Third, according to Ghez, learning "determines which muscle
groups should contract and how much contraction should occur
relative to the locus and intensity of stimulation. Once learned,
the instruction signal puts the nervous system into the appropriate
set". Ghez also cites the studies of Kornhuber et al., which show
that changes in the potential recorded from the human scalp begin
about 800 msec before a voluntary finger movement". This activity
may be regarded as the neurological aspect of the initial
contemplation or consideration of the action (thinking about it).
The preceding study shows that thinking about something,
forming the intention (deciding) to do it, and proceeding to do it
is not an instantaneous action but is rather a complex neurological
and intentional process which occurs over a period of time.
Furthermore, it also shows that accomplishing such a task involves
relying on neurological coding which takes place during earlier
learning. By viewing these neurological aspects as aspects of a
complex process containing neurological, intentional, phenomenal,
and subjective aspects we can explain how thoughts and decisions can
interact with neurological processes. If we instead view thoughts
and decisions as completely distinct entities from neurological
processes in the manner of dualism, we cannot explain interaction.
Complex patterns of neural states have phenomenal aspects and a
person learns by experience what neural patterns produce what mental
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phenomena and learns by experience how to produce these neural
states. Speech and thought seems automatic until we try to speak
another language or watch a child learning his first words. The
commands which must be issued by the cerebral cortex to the mouth
muscles are very complex and must be learned through trial and error
and through imitation. There are "command" neurons in the cerebral
cortex whose function is to issue motor commands and commands of
other types to other elements of the nervous system. The signals to
these "command" neurons originate in other areas of the cerebral
cortex. A person can issue these signals by exerting a kind of
internal effort, but we must learn what effort will produce what
results. Learning to use our brains, like any other conscious
activity, takes attention and experience.
It might be that the states and N
2
in the diagram in
Figure 7-2 can be functionally defined. For example, might be
"the complex pattern of neurons which has as its phenomenal aspect
the sound of the word 'Fire'". The brain then calls a routine
producing which could be "the complex pattern of neurons which
has as its phenomenal aspect the sound of the word 'Run'". One
could define other neural states according to their mental function,
including neural states which issue certain specific signals to the
"command" neurons in the cerebral cortex such as "Raise the right
arm". In this way, one could give a functional analysis of the
brain
,
not of the mind
,
and define these functional neural states by
reference to mental phenomena. Such a view is not a reintroduction
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of parallelism, but an account of mind-body interaction that uses
functional techniques of analysis to show that mind and brain do not
form a dichotomy but rather are aspects of one another.
The account of interaction I have given applies only to mental
phenomena with (p)physical aspects. If there is a mental phenomenon
with no associated (p)physical aspects, my account does not explain
how such a phenomenon can interact with (p)physical entities.
Because such a mental phenomenon would be one with no neural or
(p)physical basis, it is doubtful whether there are any such mental
phenomena. If one construes the phrase 'mental phenomenon' broadly
so as to include phenomena such as sentence meanings (intensions) or
particular features of mental experience such as the intensity of
anger or fear, these intensions or mental features may not have a
particular (p)physical entity or property associated with them.
However, it is not clear that an intension can interact with a
neural event, and in the case of the intensity of fear or anger the
interaction is between the fear or anger itself and the neural event
or entity; we do not have to say that every feature of the fear or
anger also interacts with a neural event or entity.
The view I advocate is not a form of parallelism. According to
a parallelist view, mental states and brain states are distinct and
they occur parallel to each other. According to the view I
advocate, neural and other (p)physical entities are properties or
aspects of mental states and hence it is correct to attribute a
causal role to the mental phenomenon in virtue of the causal action
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of Its neural aspect. We often attribute a property to a whole
based on the action of one of its aspects. For example, we might
say
-The water in Reading makes me thirsty- when it is the sodium in
the water that causes the thirst. Or, we might say
-That car is
making a lot of noise- when it is the car's exhaust system that is
making the noise. In both of these examples we attribute a causal
role to an entity in virtue of the action of one of its aspects.
Likewise, the neural aspect of a mental phenomenon acts causally on
the brain and we can attribute a causal role to the mental
phenomenon in virtue of the action of this neural aspect. This view
is not parallelism because a parallelist would deny that mental
phenomena have (p)physical aspects and that (p)physical phenomena
have mental aspects.
7.4 Similar Accounts
The account of interaction I have just presented and the
multi-aspect view it depends on is not entirely novel. Jack
Ornstein develops a multi-aspect view of mind in his book The Mind
and the Brain: A Multi-Aspect View . According to Ornstein, an
adequate analysis of a subject's being in pain must take five
16
aspects into account:
An adequate analysis of the subject's being in pain
,
however, would have to take into account the following
aspects or features: experiential, neural, bodily,
behavioral and verbal.
Ornstein then describes each of these aspects:^^
The experiential aspect: This is the felt quality orthe sensation of pain—the "raw feel" as it has sometimesbeen called. It is what one experiences or feels when one
IS in pain. This is the feature of pain which leads us to
call pain a 'mental' process, it is because this feeling
or sensation could not exist unfelt or unsensed that we
call it 'mental'. That is, it could not be truly said to
— unless it were sensed; "I am in pain but I am not
aware of the pain" is self-contradictory. It could not
exist unless it existed as an aspect of consciousness.
The neural aspect: These are the brain processes which
we have granted to be invariably correlated and
concomitantly variable with specific experiences. As
neurophysiologists will readily admit, extremely little is
known about how the brain operates and very little
investigation has been conducted into the phenomenon of
pain. However, it was thought that criticisms of, and an
alternative to, the Identity Theory, would be more readily
accepted if as much as possible were granted to it.
The firing of the neurons in question, then, has been
conceded to be necessary and sufficient for the occurrence
of the experience. If the appropriate neurons were not
firing in X's brain, and the rest of his body, then he
would not be having this experience.
Bodily aspects of pain: An example of this aspect would
be X's decayed tooth. Of course a decayed tooth is not,
properly speaking, an aspect of mind . It is, however,
very often a feature of toothaches—states which are
characteristically mental in the senses outlined above.
Thus the bodily aspects of being in pain are part of our
concept of pain. When someone is in pain we naturally
assume that there is something wrong—some physiological
irregularity due to damage or disease which is the source
of the pain. We naturally assume it because there
characteristically is something amiss physiologically when
one is in pain.
The behavioral aspects: This is an aspect of mind.
That is, we often do refer primarily to someone's behavior
when we speak of his mind, e.g. "He has a good mind".
However, .. .consciousness is a sufficient condition for the
presence of a mind. If a person were conscious but unable
to behave at all due to complete paralysis, we would still
say that he had a mind. In fact, even if we allowed that
a computer or a robot "behaved" in many ways as a man, we
would not say that it had a mind if we know that it was
not capable of being conscious.
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Behavior, then, is often what we are referring to when
we speak of someone's mind. But we usually are referring
in such cases not merely to what the person did or is
doing but also to what he is capable of doing.
The verbal aspect; This is not what X feels, not what
is occurring in his brain, not what happens to him and not
what he does--it is what he says. It may be objected that
verbal behavior is just a species of behavior and,
therefore, that it should not be classified separately.
I think, however, that the verbal aspect of pain merits
separate classification. It is the one aspect of pain
which is uniquely human. The other animals share with man
all the other features of pain. Only man verbalizes his
pain.
These, then, are the five aspects or features of being
in pain—experiential, neural, bodily, behavioral and
verbal. The first two aspects are the sine qua non of
pain but some or all of the last three are
characteristically present. Pain involves neither solely
neural processes nor solely an experience. It is
conceivable that someone could possess the latter of these
features without the other but so far as we can tell this
could never occur. Neither, of course, is pain solely
behavior. Once it is learned that pain always has a
neural component, any theory which identifies pain with
actual and potential behavior is rendered untenable.
To say that one or the other of these five aspects is
what pain (or the mind) really is, is to ignore the other
four aspects. Identity theorists ignore all but the
neural aspect. Cartesian Dualists deny all but the
experiential aspect and Behaviorists deny all but the
behavioral aspect.
Ornstein does not to my knowledge address the problem of
mind-body interaction. However, his view that a mental phenomenon
such as pain has a neural aspect is consistent with the view I
present above. He also believes that mental phenomena have a
bodily, a behavioral, and a verbal aspect. While I have not made
this claim, and will not defend it here, such a claim is clearly in
the spirit of the account I have given of mind-body interaction.
Ornstein's view is similar to the view I present in that he rejects
the claim that the mind-body distinction is a dichotomy and
recognizes that mental phenomena have (p)physical (neural and
bodily) aspects.
G.d. Wassermann presents an account of mind-body interaction
that resembles the one I give. Interestingly, Wassermann takes
himself to be defending a view he calls materialistic dualism.
Wassermann states this view as follows:^^
^^terialistic dualism is a metaphysical doctrine, which
hypothesizes that in addition to physical properties some
or conceivably all components of matter are endowed with
mental properties, and that the conceptual modes of
symbolizing physical properties of matter could never
suffice for symbolizing its mental properties.
Wassermann states his view of interaction as follows:^^
An antimaterialist cynic might ask how anyone could
theorize about brain representations of, say, visual
images, without having consciously experienced such an
image, so that his conscious experience of images has a
bearing on his theorizing. To this one can simply reply
that it is our physical brain representations of
theories--and not our conscious experiences of visual
images--that lead us to theorize about brain
representations. Let us also return to the apparent
dilemma, mentioned earlier in this section. It concerned
the problem of how people could claim to be consciously
aware of something without their conscious awareness
"causing" the claim to be made. This, however, poses no
problem for the materialist when it is recognized that the
conscious awareness of anything could be associated with a
specific physical state of a particular brain
structure. .. .This awareness-related brain state could then
become associated with appropriate brain representations
that encode verbal claims, leading thereby to a verbal
claim of a conscious awareness. In this case, however, it
is not the awareness that "causes" the activation of the
brain representation of the claim of that awareness.
Instead it is the brain representation that is associated
with the conscious awareness that causes the brain
representation of the claim of that awareness to be
activated.
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Here Wassermann states a view very similar to the one I advance
above. Instead of supposing that conscious awareness considered as a
purely mental phenomenon with no physical aspects causes someone to
make a verbal claim, he supposes that the awareness-related brain
state becomes associated with brain representations that encode
verbal claims, leading to a verbal claim of conscious awareness.
Wassermann does not make the further claim that the brain state is
an aspect of conscious awareness as I do, but still his account is
quite similar to the one I present.
2 0In his recent book, Intentionality
, John Searle presents an
account of interaction that resembles the one I have given. Searle
makes use of the notion of "levels of description" in stating his
21
view:
But this model of "caused by" and "realized in" only
raises the next question, how can Intentionality function
causally? Granted that Intentional states can themselves
be caused by and realized in the structure of the brain,
how can Intentionality itself have any causal efficacy?
When I raise my arm my intention in action causes my arm
to go up. This is a case of a mental event causing a
physical event. But, one might ask, how could such a
thing occur? My arm going up is caused entirely by a
series of neuron firings. We do not know where in the
brain these firings originate, but they go at some point
through the motor cortex and control a series of arm
muscles which contract when the appropriate neurons fire.
Now what has any mental event got to do with all of this?
As with our previous questions, I want to answer this one
by appealing to different levels of description of a
substance, where the phenomena at each of the different
levels function causally; and as with our previous
question I want to make clear the relations involved by
considering completely banal and unproblematic examples.
Consider the explosion in the cylinder of a four-cycle
internal combustion engine. The explosion is caused by
the firing of the spark plug even though both the firing
and the explosion are caused by and realized in phenomena
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at a microlevel, at which level of description terms like
firing and "explosion" are entirely inappropriate.
Analogously I want to say that the intention in action
causes the bodily movement even though both the intention
in action and the bodily movement are caused by and
realized in a microstructure at which level terms like
intention in action" and "bodily movement" are
inappropriate. Let us try to describe the case a little
more carefully and again it is not the particular case or
its details that matter but the type of relations that are
exemplified. The aspect of the spark plug firing which is
causally relevant is the rise in temperature in the
cylinder between the electrodes to the kindling point of
the air fuel mixture. It is this rise in temperature
which causes the explosion. But the rise in temperature
is itself caused by and realized in the movement of
individual particles between the electrodes of the spark
plug. Furthermore the explosion is caused by and realized
in the oxidization of individual hydrocarbon molecules.
Diagrammatically it looks like this:
ll
rise in temperature
causes and realizes
causes
l2
explosion in
cylinder
causes and realizes
movement of individual causes . oxidization of individual
electrons between hydrocarbon molecules
electrodes
The phenomena at and respectively are the same
phenomena described at different levels of description.
For that reason we could also draw diagonal arrows showing
that the movement of the electrons causes the explosion
and the rise in the temperature causes the oxidization of
hydrocarbon molecules.
Though we know very little about how intentional action
originates in the brain we do know that neural mechanisms
stimulate muscle movements. Specifically they stimulate
calcium ions to enter into the cytoplasm of a muscle
fiber, and this triggers a series of events that result in
the movement of the myosin cross bridges. These cross
bridges connect myosin filaments to actin filaments. They
alternately attach to actin strands, exert pressure,
detach, bend back, reattach and exert more pressure. This
contracts the muscle. At the microlevel then we have a
sequence of neuron firings which causes a series of
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physiological changes,
action is caused by and
and the bodily movement
resultant physiological
formally similar to the
engine
:
At the microlevel the intention in
realized in the neural processes,
is caused by and realized in the
processes. Diagrammatically it is
diagram of an internal combustion
ll
intention
cause and
individual
firings
in action
realize
neuron
causes
l2
^
bodily movement
cause and realize
physiological changes
Notice that on this model, as with our earlier model, we
could also draw diagonal arrows which in this case would
show that the intention in action causes physiological
changes and that the neuron firings cause bodily
movements. Notice also that on such a model the mental
phenomena are no more epiphenomenal than the rise in
temperature of the firing of a spark plug.
Let us now return to our 'dilemma*. The first horn
claims that if we think of the relation between the mental
and the physical as causal we are left with a mysterious
notion of causation. I have argued that this is not so.
It only seems so if we think of mental and physical as
naming two ontological categories, two mutually exclusive
classes of things, mental things and physical things, as
if we lived in two worlds, a mental world and a physical
world. But if we think of ourselves as living in one
world which contains mental things in the sense in which
it contains liquid things and solid things, then there
are no metaphysical obstacles to a causal account of such
things. My beliefs and desires, my thirsts and visual
experiences, are real causal features of my brain, as much
as the solidity of the table I work at and the liquidity
of the water I drink are causal feature of tables and
water.
Searle's account appeals to the notion of "different levels of
description of a substance". On his view, a description of the
neural state associated with an intention occurs at a different
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l6Vel of description than a description of the intention. I
discussed the notion of a level of description in Chapter 4 in the
context of a discussion of Dennett. There I was not able to
provide a very complete account of this notion. However, Searle's
use of this phrase seems very similar to my use of the phrase
conceptual domain', which derives from Davidson. I see no reason
why Searle's claim could not be formulated as a claim about
different conceptual domains, with a unique level of description
being roughly equivalent to a unique conceptual domain. If this is
so, his account of interaction is very similar to the one I have
presented with the (p)physical (neural) aspect of a mental
phenomenon causing other (p)physical (neurological) changes.
Searle's view of the relation between a neural state and an
intention is that individual neural firings cause and realize the
intention. While I have not discussed this relation in detail,
Searle's view is a promising way to analyze this relation.
Searle also criticizes the view that 'mental' and 'physical'
name two ontological categories that are mutually exclusive. He
appears to endorse the view that a mental phenomenon together with
its neural aspect form a single substance. On this view, the neural
aspect of an intention is as much a part or element of an intention
as its phenomenal aspect. It is the neural aspect of the intention
that acts causally on the brain. By rejecting the conception that
the mental-physical distinction forms a mentally exclusive
dichotomy, such a view can account for mind-body interaction.
294
7.5 Viewpoint Pluralism
The account of mental and physical phenomena and of mind-body
interaction I present preserves the insights of dualism,
materialism, and functionalism while rejecting features of those
theories which make them untenable in their current form. The view
I present preserves the insight of dualism that there is a
mental-physical distinction, though this distinction is not a
dichotomy and is a distinction of aspects and conceptual domains.
It preserves the insight of materialism that neural activity plays a
causal role in mental phenomena. It preserves the insight of
functionalism that it is useful to take a functional view of the
brain. According to the view I advocate, brain states are defined
by their mental function. Because the key feature of this view is
its plural aspect analysis of mental and physical phenomena, it is a
plural aspect view.
I have not disussed pluralism of entities or aspects in this or
in preceding chapters in any detail. However, in Chapter 1 I took
note of Spinoza's plural attribute view and Leibniz's pluralism of
viewpoints. Spinoza's use of the term 'attribute' was similar to
our contemporary use of the term 'property'. I have spoken of
pluralism of aspects, which seems to introduce still another term to
describe the same phenomenon. However, the term aspect does have a
unique meaning apart from 'attribute' and 'property'. The term
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'aspect', unlike either 'attribute' or 'property', contains a
reference to the idea that something is perceived from a particular
view. An aspect of x can be defined as a property of x as perceived
from a point of view:
V. A is an aspect of x just in case A is a property of x
as perceived from a particular point of view.
This definition of 'aspect' provides a link between Spinoza's
plural attribute (property) view and Leibniz's pluralism of
viewpoints. If an aspect of x is a property of x as seen from a
particular point of view, then it should be possible to perceive
different aspects of an entity by changing points of view of the
entity. For example, changing one's point of view of a house allows
one to perceive its different sides, its different colors, and both
its outside and inside. Conversely, an entity that has many aspects
is one that can be perceived from many points of view. Principle V
thus allows us to provide a link between a plural aspect view and
pluralism in points of view.
I cannot fully explicate the link between aspects and points of
view here. However, there is another connection between the notion
of viewpoint and the concept of a conceptual domain as Davidson
introduces it and as I have used it in preceding chapters. I stated
that the (s)physical domain includes at least the following elements:
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1. Logical terms ('and', 'or', 'if, etc.)
2. Mathematical terms ('number', 'line', 'point', etc.).
The mathematics chosen can be governed by pragmatic
considerations.
3. Syntactic rules.
4. (s)physical terms which are descriptive. These can be
nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs.
I gave similar definitions of the (p)physical and (o)physical
conceptual domains. I argued that these constitute three distinct
conceptual domains.
My definition of the (s) physical domain may appear to be
incomplete in that it does not contain a specification of the
meaning of the term '( s) physical' . In Chapter 6 I defined the
notion of an (s)physical term as follows:
T(s)
.
't' is an (s)physical term just in case 't' refers
to some (s) physical property or (s) physical entity.
I defined the notions of " (s) physical property" and "(s)physical
entity" as follows:
P(s). is a purely (s)physical property = df. is a
property and 2L is uniquely specifiable in terms
from only the languages of physics and chemistry.
P(s)'. is a uniquely (s)physical property = df. is a
property and ^ is partially but not completely
specifiable in terms from only the languages of
physics and chemistry.
E(s). 2^ is a purely (s)physical entity = df. is an
entity and all of ^'s essential properties are
purely (s)physical properties.
E(s) '. 2^ is an impurely (s)physical entity = df. JL ^n
entity and at least one but not all of j^'s
essential properties are (s)physical properties.
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The above five definitions are implicit in the specification of
the conceptual domain I gave above (conditions 1-4) in that these
conditions implicitly rely on a conception of what an '( s) physical
'
term is even though this conception is not explicitly stated. If we
conjoin conditions 1-4 with the above five definitions we have a
more complete specification of the (s)physical conceptual domain.
This specification explicitly states what an (s)physical term is.
One way to describe this is by saying that it formulates a
membership condition for the class of (s)physical terms.
It should be possible to state such a membership condition for
every conceptual domain that can be specified in a way that
parallels my specification of the (s)physical domain. My
specification of this domain relies on the notion of (s)physical
terms. It should be possible for any parallel specification of a
conceptual domain to provide definitions that state the meaning of a
term which is relied on in this way. Thus, I also give definitions
of ' ( p ) physica 1 ' and '( o) physical' . In light of the preceding
paragraph, we can say that it should be possible to specify a
membership condition for any conceptual domain that can be specified
in a way that is parallel to my specification of the (s)physical
domain.
When a conceptual domain includes a specification of a
membership condition as specified in the preceding paragraph, I will
say that this conceptual domain expresses a point of view. The
point of view of the (s)physical domain is that some entities have
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properties that can be uniquely specified in terms from only the
languages of chemistry and physics. While I cannot fully defend or
explicate this notion of a point of view and its relation to
conceptual domains in this chapter, I believe I have said enough to
give a sketch of a position.
If my argument that there are at least three distinct
conceptual domains is correct, and I am correct in saying that each
of these conceptual domains can be specified in such a way as to
formulate a unique point of view, it follows that there are at least
three distinct physical points of view in terms of which the world
can be viewed. These, together with the mental conceptual domain
(point of view)
,
constitute four points of view of the world. While
I believe this argument can be generalized to generate a bolder,
more full-blooded ontological and conceptual pluralism, I content
myself here with the conclusion that from these four points of view
one can perceive at least four irreducibly distinct aspects of the
world. I call this view Viewpoint Pluralism .
7. 6 Summary
I began this chapter by considering an argument by Michael
Levin advanced in Chapter 6 against the possibility of mind-body
interaction. Using concepts developed in the second half of Chapter
6, I conceded that Levin's argument may provide an argument against
the possibility of interaction between mental phenomena and
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(s) physical entities and between mental phenomena and (o)physical
entities. However, I argued that Levin's argument does not show the
impossibility of interaction between mental phenomena and
(p)physical entities. The basis for this claim is in part that some
mental phenomena have (p)physical properties or aspects and that
some (p)physical entities have mental properties or aspects. I then
gave an account of mind-body interaction according to which the
neural aspect of a mental phenomenon interacts causally with the
distinct neural aspect of a distinct mental phenomenon. I then
cited three writers who have presented views similar to the one I
advocate: Jack Ornstein, G.D. Wassermann, and John Searle. I
concluded by citing the relation between the view I advocate and
dualism, materialism, and functionalism. I then briefly stated a
more general theory that links a plural aspect view with Leibniz's
pluralism of viewpoints. I call this theory Viewpoint Pluralism.
7.7 Conclusion
In Chapter 1 I presented a historical survey of the mind-body
problem. In Chapter 2 I defended Saul Kripke's dualistic views
against criticisms by Fred Feldman. In Chapter 3 I discussed Donald
Davidson's anomalous monism. While I later utilize some notions
Davidson develops such as that of a conceptual domain, I argued that
Davidson has not established anomalous monism and that there are
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good reasons to doubt that it is true. In Chapter 4, I criticized
Daniel Dennett's defense of functionalism.
In Chapter 5 I discussed two criteria for identifying mental
phenomena. The first, incorrigibility, is advocated by Richard
Rorty. The second, intentionality
,
is advocated by Roderick
Chisholm. In the first half of Chapter 6 I discussed the problem of
mind-body interaction and concluded that a conceptual revision in
the notions of "mental" and "physical" is necessary before an
account of interaction can be given. In the second half of Chapter
6, I attempted such a revision by distinguishing three conceptions
of the physical. I called these conceptions the scientific
( (s) physical) conception, the objective ( (o) physical) conception,
and the personal ( (p) physical) conception. In Chapter 7 I returned
to an argument against the possibility of mind-body interaction I
discussed in Chapter 6 and showed how distinguishing the three
conceptions of the physical helps given an account of interaction.
According to this account, the neural aspect of a mental entity acts
causally on the distinct neural aspect of a distinct mental entity.
I concluded with a brief statement of Viewpoint Pluralism.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Michael E. Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 84-6.
2. Refer to the quotation from Noback and Demarest in Chapter 6,
Section 6.2. '
3. Refer to Chapter 6, Section 6.2.
4. Levin, Ibid., p. 84.
5. By Yuri Gellner and others. I have not discussed alleged cases
of mind moving matter, extra sensory perception, or other forms
of psychic phenomena anywhere in these chapters not because I
think that nothing can be learned from them but because those
who are predisposed not to accept their validity are usually
not convinced by these phenomena. On the other hand, many of
those who are predisposed to accept the validity of psychic
phenomena accept their validity uncritically.
6. Refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.2.
7. Eric R. Kandel, "Visual System III: Physiology of the Central
Visual Pathways", in Principles of Neural Science
,
ed. Eric R.
Kandel and James H. Schwartz (New York: Elsevier/North Holland,
1981), p. 237.
8. Ibid., p. 240, pp. 243-5, and pp. 245-7.
9. Peter Gouras, "Visual System IV: Color Vision", in Kandel and
Schwartz, op. cit., p. 253.
10. Ibid.
11. Refer to Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1.
12. Kandel, op. cit. p. 247.
13. Gouras, Ibid.
14. Refer to Chapter 3, Section 3.4.
15. Claude Ghez, "Cortical Control of Voluntary Movement", in
Kandel and Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 331-3.
Jack Ornstein, The Mind and the Brain A Multi-Aspect
Interpretation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 122.
16 .
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17. Ibid., pp. 122, 130, 132, 134, 138, 141.
18. G. D. Wassermann, "Materialism and Mentality", Review of
Metaphysics 35 (June, 1982), p. 716.
19. Ibid., pp. 721-22.
20. John Searle, Intentionality (New York; Cambridge University
Press, 1983)
.
21. Ibid., pp. 268-71.
22. Refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.
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